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Following several decades of suppression under authoritarian military rule, Myanmar’s 
civil society has played an important role in shaping the process and the impact of recent 
political reforms. Constitutional and legislative change favourable for civil society has 
been accompanied by an expansion of initiatives by international development agencies 
to build the capabilities of civic actors and to strengthen their influence in governance and 
policy making. Together, these are claimed to have enhanced the freedom, security and 
opportunity, or the space, for civil society to build from its rich history of social and 
political action and better mobilise for future protection and fulfilment of political and 
human rights objectives. 
This thesis argues that normative change in civil society can only be fully assessed, 
explained and understood through analysis which critiques rather than repeats 
conceptualisations of civil society as an autonomous zone of freedom, and the state as an 
apparatus of coercion. Notions of an ‘expanding space’ or an ‘improved enabling 
environment’ conceal structural and cultural forces which affect the collective agency and 
normative orientation of civic actors by shaping the political terrain on which they act, 
enabling and constraining actors’ form and political objectives. 
I analyse these changes in Myanmar using critical realism and the thought of Antonio 
Gramsci, and show how the reorganisation of state power and contractual, legal and 
ethical relations between state and civil society have led to the emergence of an 
institution of organisation. Tendencies towards professionalisation, formalisation and 
depoliticisation arise as legitimate activity comes to centre around the hegemonic form of 
the non-governmental organisation (NGO), with significant implications for the radical 
transformative potential of both civil society and human rights. Case studies reveal how 
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the impact of these institutional forces varies according to contingencies in circumstance, 
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Chapter 1: Civil society - a brief history 
of a confused concept 
Introduction 
Conceptual resurrection is not uncommon in the social and political sciences, but the 
double migration of civil society from the intellectual morgue to the ivory tower, and then 
to policymakers and development practitioners is impressive. Commonplace in political 
philosophy for centuries before falling out of use in the nineteenth century1, it is today 
frequently deployed across the political spectrum, across global geographies and in a 
multiplicity of institutional settings. Forming much of the intellectual core of democratic 
movements in 1980s Eastern Europe and Latin America (Escobar 1992; Baker 2002), it is 
also a defining element in the toolkit of solutions for state and multilateral development 
agencies, expected to bear dividends in democratic performance, economic growth, inter-
communal harmony, gender equality, good governance and many other elements 
believed to be core components of modern, well-functioning states. If it is not the 
panacea for all conceivable social ills then it at least appears to be part of, or partner in, 
their remedies (Rosenblum and Post 2002: 23). As Biku Parekh writes, “there is today an 
almost universal consensus that civil society is a vital component of a good society, and 
that the stronger and more developed it is, the better governed and more stable the 
wider political community is likely to be” (2004: 14).  
 
1 Gramsci’s exhumation and adept use of the term in the early twentieth century is, of course, an important 
exception, and is discussed later in this chapter and drawn upon frequently in this thesis. 
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Yet in recent years this confidence has tended to be replaced by caution, even criticism. 
The “plethora of confused meanings and conflicting usages” (Keane 1988: 14) attached to 
civil society makes for an unhelpful umbrella concept, while untamed optimism mystifies 
agency and inhibits sober ethical assessment. This chapter seeks both to avoid and 
examine these problems by placing the conceptual development of civil society in its 
historical context and to examine the contested thought and political coordinates within 
which intellectual and material labour have shaped the concept. A necessarily condensed 
historical overview through antiquity, the Enlightenment and the modern day shows a 
dialectical development with concepts of the state, democracy and the market which 
continue today, especially in social movements and international development. Finally, I 
show how conceptions of civil society are a vector for power and competing visions of the 
state. This has important consequences for legitimacy in the carriers or agents of 
transformative potential, and of the realisation or preclusion of that potential. I position 
the non-governmental organisation (NGO) as a key object of contention in an apparent 
division between orthodox, development-oriented civil society and a counter-hegemonic 
version taken up by politically-oriented social agency. 
 
Genealogies of civil society thought 
 
Rather than seeing actually existing civil society work today as the translation into practice 
of a set of universal principles, contemporary applications are more clearly illuminated by 
examining the origins and influence of beliefs, theories, norms and values that have, at 
one time or another, shaped its conceptual evolution. The varied lineages which have 
developed to inform and lend political hues to civil society today can be understood as 
tradition(s) of attempts to use the concept in response to the core problematic of 
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modernity: namely, how human beings should live in common following the throwing off 
of the yoke of traditional rule. Civil society is therefore deployed as a “specific, historically 
varying way of addressing the requirements of the viability of modern polities” (Terrier 
and Wagner 2006: 9). The material, political and intellectual conditions in which answers 
have been sought illuminates the social history of civil society theory, as well as the 
nature of the succession between generations of thought – there is no master type of civil 
society, nor are its concrete manifestations its tokens. As Geuss remarks, “politics is in the 
first instance about action and the contexts of action, not about mere beliefs or 
propositions” (2008: 12). 
 
Different authors have employed various typologies and approaches to organise this rich 
seam of intellectual history. John Keane (1988) applies modes of thought – analytic, 
normative and practical – critical; Jensen (2006) takes a similar approach. More common 
are chronological approaches, and here I follow Jeffrey Alexander (1998) by situating 
thinkers within periods of thought and broader contexts of action. Primarily, these 
concern conceptual and political economic relationships with developing cognates, 
especially state and market, signalling difficulties with any straightforward assumption of 
the autonomy of civil society. In addition, the norms and values which civil society 
contains or inculcates, either emergent from or superimposed on the concept’s analytical 
and practical use, are vital to understanding how a particular variant of civil society is 
taken up or rejected by theorists or practitioners. 
Civil and civilised society: from antiquity to Enlightenment 
Despite having described above how the term civil society came into common usage in 
modernity in Enlightenment thought, it is not uncommon for commentators to remark 
that civil society has a history stretching back to the ancients. This is quite true, yet does 
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not warrant the conclusion that the civil society we talk about today would be one which 
the ancients would recognise. Failure to appreciate conceptual complexity can lead to 
bold claims when writing histories of civil society e.g. “Whilst not arguing that the UK has 
a longer history of civil society than other countries, it is clear is that its evolution has 
been recorded as such for at least 1,000 years” (Savage and Pratt 2013: 2). In Chapter 3, a 
variant of this argument is presented from Myanmar; this chapter should serve to 
problematise these kinds of assertions more generally.  
 
Certainly, conceptual antecedents are said to stretch back to Greek and Roman city states. 
Through Cicero and Roman law and into Christendom, civil society as societas civilitus 
retains its identity with the state, conceived as a political community of members bound 
by the regulation provided by their own laws (and free by virtue of them) - “the state 
(civitas) as a partnership in law (societas) with equality of legal status” (Black 2001: 33). 
Liberties cultivated virtues of grace and civility befitting the highest form of community: 
Aristotle’s zoon politikon could realise his teleological virtue only in a political community 
(koinōnia politike) in which man moved above and out of the natural society of animals. 
Look beyond the state and you find the barbarity and tyranny of unchecked power and 
nature; you do not, by definition, find alternative institutions. 
 
Civil society as interchangeable with political society, offering a “historical remedy for the 
inconveniences of the state of nature” (Dunn 2001: 51), continues through Aquinas to the 
early modern state theory of Hobbes and Locke. This is not to say that the nature of this 
interchangeableness remains the same: Plato’s “oppressive” ideal of justice obliterated 
subjectivity, whilst for Locke civil society was equated with a state so sufficiently “benign” 
that it would function effectively through relations of trust between itself and its 
individual citizens (Khilnani 2001). Such civility, dependent moreover on individual 
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discipline and polite resolution rather than realisation of universal justice, plays little role 
in accounts of the classical polis. Yet in common is the elevation of man above the state of 
nature through his place and participation in creating and sustaining the body politic. 
 
Departures from the civil society / nature antithesis in the eighteenth century heralded 
the dawn of the contemporary usage of civil society, and indeed of modernity itself, as the 
concept was deployed to make analytic and normative understanding of modes and 
forces of economic and political organisation operating following the break with feudal 
societies dominated by traditional rule and obligation. The breakdown of the old order on 
the one hand and the rise of a commercial class and property exchange activities 
independent from monarchical authority on the other, catalysed by enormous progress in 
the sciences, presaged “the society of the ‘Enlightenment’, constituting a new form of 
public life… [that] was the prototype of the early modern concept of civil society” (Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 87). Scarcely any notable figure across the Enlightenment period fails to 
address and to develop the concept of civil society, with Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, 
David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel making the most significant contributions.  
  
The geographical and temporal extent of the Enlightenment, the variety of perspectives 
on the impact of the political and economic processes it partly constituted (although the 
class status of most prominent thinkers of this time made for a degree of commonality 
here) and the traditions of thought drawn upon, meant that there was no overwhelming 
consensus between thinkers. Basic political concepts of modernity were still under 
development: characterisations like Alexander’s, that “civil society [between 1750-1850] 
was an inclusive umbrella-like concept referring to a plethora of institutions outside the 
state” (1998: 3) are premature – the natural law tradition continued to influence early 
thinkers, making it difficult to identify a state with an inside and an outside. 
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Understanding the nature and implications of the rise of the burgherliche Gesellschaft was 
therefore accomplished initially with conceptual resources of the societas civilis. 
 
Scottish theorists of commercial society followed Locke in moving on from the antimony 
of civil society and nature2 while remaining within the overall natural law tradition; the 
continuities and contradictions between Roman jurisprudence and early capitalism would 
propel civil society thought forward. For Adam Ferguson (1996 [1767]) the liberty of the 
moderns was founded both on constitutional protection from arbitrary interference – 
citizens of a free state under the protection of the rule of law – and the contemporary 
contestation between individuals fostered by industry. Civil society therefore involved 
legal and political frameworks and socioeconomic relations, both rational, instrumental 
artifices that enabled human needs to be met. Yet this far from exhausted civil society: 
what Scottish Enlightenment theorists stressed were the emergent humanising 
tendencies (balanced by degrading potential) of commercial, urbanised society.  
 
Like Smith, Hume and William Robertson, Ferguson celebrated the material and cultural 
progress of the time, the polished, benevolent civilised manners and habits inculcated, 
and was exercised in laying bare the mechanisms by which civilisation emerged as a 
humanising, historical force. Yet the advancements associated with commercial 
interaction were far from automatically virtuous. “Commercial humanism” was in tension 
with “civic humanism” (Pocock 1975), and new foundations would therefore have to be 
sought on which to secure political community lest the cohesion of society be torn apart 
through the primacy of industrial over civic relations, wrecking the tradition of civil society 
from which it sprung. Ferguson lamented this fall: “To the Ancient Greek or Roman, the 
2 For Locke, the state of nature was a waystation to civil society, characterized by its inconveniences for more 
developed society, rather than outright Hobbesian barbaric individualism. 
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individual was nothing, and the public every thing. To the modern, in too many nations of 
Europe, the individual is every thing, and the public nothing” (Ferguson 1996 [1767]: 57). 
  
This tension between private interests and the common good is the source of a functional 
gap from which a conception of civil society develops that lays emphasis on civility and 
the civic (Jensen 2006). Although social relations in this early capitalism were driven by 
need and private interest, the resulting “range of political institutions and social 
transactions” found in society are “held together by the non-legal substance he called 
‘bonds’ or ‘bands’” (Oz-Salzberger 2001: 73); the social stuff constituting these bands is 
moral sentiment or natural sympathy, a kind of benevolence flourishing in the social 
intercourse of commercial society. It is the moral dimension of this society. These would 
underpin Ferguson’s republicanism as realised in the collective institutions articulating a 
popular will, a “national spirit” to discuss, take part in making just decisions and to see 
they were obeyed (Ferguson 1996 [1767]).  
 
Adam Smith similarly emphasises the civility of civil society, arguing that just as economic 
order emerges from the self-interested acts of every man, an “end which was no part of 
his intention” (Smith 1979 [1776]: 456), so the same invisible hand guides the 
development of an unintended moral order arising from the polite acts and moral 
affections between civilised men. A laissez-faire economic system “enables one to make 
contracts with all” (Khilnani 2001: 21), rather than with only those permitted by tradition 
and privilege, overcoming particularity and exclusiveness. Furthermore, with earthly 
needs taken care of through market transactions, the instrumental would not pollute the 
moral affections which flourished in civil society, raising the tide in both the moral and 




Both thinkers took a dialectical approach to civil society that identified constituent social 
forces and their tendencies to produce particular social outcomes. As Ferguson’s 
sentiment quoted earlier indicates, a real anxiety regarding the dehumanising potential of 
early capitalism pervaded their writings; spontaneous order was always threatened by 
antagonism, disorder and despotic responses by government. Purported links between a 
healthy civil society and social stability would be drawn on and developed as a ‘watchdog’ 
by later thinkers and practitioners, although as Keane (1988) remarks, it is unclear how 
civil society would be able to rescue itself from the negative dialectics of political 
economy once government assumed the role of guarantor of order in the body politic. 
Furthermore, still wedded to traditional natural law, the psychic relations scaffolding civil 
society – from Locke’s trust to Smith and Ferguson’s moral sentiments – constituted a 
particular variant of polis, there was little direct application in Scottish Enlightenment 
writing to address the concerns of future civil society adherents, identified against the 
modern, abstract state. Yet Enlightenment thought issues a contemporary cautionary 
note regarding the unchecked potential of the impact on morality unleashed by 
commercial relations. Proximity and interaction with fellow citizens is vital for other-
oriented moral behaviour; even in the 18th century, with intensified competition between 
capitals over greater distance, so “increasing emphasis [was given] to more abstract, 
reason-based notions of justice rather than moral sentiments, and in the case of Smith, to 
self interest as a regulator of economic activity” (Sayer 2000b: 86). 
 
Making the break: the contested rise of the state-civil society 
dichotomy 
Intellectual labour was further catalysed by the Age of Revolution, the emergence of the 
modern European constitutional state and egalitarian invocations of popular sovereignty 
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and equal rights. Questions arose that Scottish thought, reliant on “the force of moral 
sentiments and natural affections” to overcome the dichotomy between the private and 
the public could, not readily answer (Seligman 1992: 33).  How, for instance, could the 
sovereignty of the individual – at the core of human rights thought today – be reconciled 
with the sovereignty of the constitutional state?  
 
Most famously, it was Immanuel Kant who sought to rise above earthly political economy 
with a transcendental conception of justice that involved a revised conception of civil 
society (1993 [1781]). Kant crowned reason rather than natural moral capacities as the 
wellspring of social and political institutions, and a public-juridical realm where reasoning 
– including, importantly, that of the state and the ends it sought to impose – could be 
scrutinised. He rejected the insecure resolution of the contradictions of civil society 
through moral affections in favour of a political community based on man’s capacity for 
reason (1969 [1784]). In such a civil society, the categorical imperative would raise 
rational man above the perils and pulls of the particular. The French Revolution was an 
example of universal justice as the wellspring of political history3; in rational man’s ability 
to reflect on and undertake justifiable public actions in response to the moral quality of 
political arrangements, so the integrity of political and ethical community is less organic, 
more a product of reasoned deliberation. Yet as the ethics of civil society remain the 
transcendental engine of politics, with the state the emergent product of ethical actions, 
their identity remains ultimately intact, if more metaphysically complex. 
 
Only with Hegel, who had absorbed Ferguson’s and Smith’s writings while democratic 
revolutions were raging, does the contemporary state-civil society dichotomy begin to 
appear clearly. Like the Scottish thinkers, Hegel had an acute awareness of the double-
3 Kant famously withdrew support when The Terror became common knowledge. 
9 
 
                                                            
sidedness of the burgerliche Gesselschaft, enamoured of its autonomous subjects, the 
satisfaction of their private wants and the production of luxury but equally the “distress 
and depravity” and resultant “cynicism” toward society (Hegel 2004 [1820], in Avineri 
1972: 153). Not that the egoism of civil society did not represent a dialectical advance 
over the kind of freedom described in earlier communities, particularly that depicted by 
Rousseau. In Hegel’s civil society, the satisfaction of selfish interests depends on 
reciprocal actions of production and exchange by others; on a division of labour and an 
assembling in corporations with those who share one’s proclivities; and a judicial 
framework to ensure the protection and regulation of civil society and its products. Such a 
system of interdependence was a “universal egoism” (ibid.: 134) in which individuals 
would be conscious of their selves and recognise others – civil society is the universal 
framework of reciprocity which enables individuals, their property and the possibility of 
exchange.  
 
Superficially resembling the political community of earlier thinkers, of overwhelming 
importance to Hegel was the mediating role such a civil society played in the achievement 
of freedom, and the universalising of subjective particularity as the whole of society was 
not the terminus but, in its mere convenience for self-interest, only a moment en route to 
freedom. The state entangled in civil society “may be prima facie regarded as the external 
state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it” (Hegel 2004 
[1820], in Avineri 1972: 142). A truly universal state does not depend on but transcends 
the expediencies of the particular. The contradictions of civil society, born out of the 
particularity of exchange and the corporations involved, are overcome not through the 
checks and balances offered by critical, independent entities but through their sublation 
in the State and movement into a realm of normative order, the realisation of absolute 
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Spirit, rising above and completing civil society as the metaphysical guarantor of order, 
community and rationality (Femia 2009: 132-135).  
 
Hegel thus solidifies the familiar triplicate of family, civil society and the state as the 
complete, modern ethical and political totality, emerging dialectically. In Hegel, the 
profundity of the ethical shortcomings of civil society are fully recognised and overcome 
with political, not civil, institutions that can act in defence of the common good, defined 
nevertheless externally from civil society. Political liberty is not civil liberty. Practically, 
Hegel’s contribution therefore holds out the threat of despotism: with the hierarchy and 
rationality of the state established through an idealist logic, civil society becomes the 
object of the state and subject to its legitimate dominance and control. Hegel did not set 
out to justify authoritarian rule but romantically froze in thought an institutional integrity 
of yesteryear, not grasping “that the ideal, integrated unity of the Middle Ages had 
disappeared in modern times” (Avineri 1968: 21). This mistake guided him like a will-o’-
the-wisp to a deeper metaphysical error, presenting the separation - or alienation – of the 
state from civil society as its very essence.  Precisely what had disappeared, the forces 
that had generated the disentangling of that integrity, and its social and political 
consequences, formed the core of Marx’s devastating critique of Hegel (Marx 1970 
[1843]), whose supposed overcoming of the contradictions in civil society remained 
trapped within existing political economy. 
 
Indications that Hegel had rationalised historically and geographically singular 
circumstances (essentially justifying the existing Prussian state) into a necessity came 
from across the Atlantic, where different contexts and experiences drove thought towards 
a normative reversal of the relationship between people and government. If Hegel 
inadvertently demonstrates the dangers of the state alone articulating societal interests 
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and the ease by which reasoning can become self-serving, crippling civil society for its 
own good, Thomas Paine’s legacy is the assertion of the moral priority of civil society and 
its place as a site of (almost) self-sufficient good. Paine’s Rights of Man (1999 [1791]) can 
be read as a rejection of the rational articulations of the alien, intrusive state he left 
behind. In the face of colonial rule, Paine’s Rights of Man propounded the sovereignty of 
the individual and a set of God-given civil rights that pre-dated any government. Paine 
returned nature to a prominent but unique role: it was not set against civil society but 
was civil society, part of the natural order and threatened by – not completed by – 
government, which had strictly limited functions.  
 
Emerging contradictions 
It is this idea of an ineradicable tension between state and civil society, rather than 
Hegel’s notion of an ethical whole, which has normatively framed liberal understandings 
of civil society struggles in recent decades, with Keane (1988: 17) locating in Paine a 
tradition legitimately “contemptuous” of the status quo. Self-interest plus a capacity for 
mutual aid enabled civil society to cultivate an operational autonomy from government, 
and Paine’s radicalisation of the doctrine of individual sovereignty permitted only the 
most limited of states – this had to be explicitly consented to by the people, rather than 
tacitly through a Lockean social contract, demanding (and in its restricted condition, 
enabling) a close watch to be kept on it by a civil society in constant communication 
between its constitutive associations. Vested in these are civil society’s mutuality and its 
especial value for democracy. For Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, these associations – serving their members’ interests, and in so doing 
that of the broader public – were vital if the contradictions of social equality and freedom 
were not to result in a suffocating government and correspondingly passive individuals, 
interfering in the most minor details of life (a contention that remains vibrant and 
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seductive in US politics today.) He was clear that the “equality of conditions” he found in 
America were in no small part down to its rich associational life, but the tendencies 
equality initiated placed society perennially under threat from government. Associations 
alone ensured the promise of democracy was fulfilled:  “In democratic countries the 
science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon 
the progress it has made” (Tocqueville 1945 [1840]: 118).   
 
Although Tocqueville’s associational approach remains an important strand of civil society 
thought today, this contrasts markedly with its influence at its time of writing. If, as I will 
argue, the form of the resurrection of civil society in recent decades has been driven by 
the political economy of the state-building process, then so too was its downfall and 
consequent disappearance from political thought during much of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Marxist thought threw cold water on the progressive ambitions 
of civil society. Marx observed the rancour, inequalities and discord that commerce 
fostered and, as mentioned above, railed at Hegel’s state and the way idealist logic made 
civil society the object of the state rather than the subject of man’s material history. Yet 
any affinity with liberal thought was only superficial: it was the sublation in the state of 
the alienating quality of civil society that Marx found objectionable. Man’s essence was 
material, meaning that idealist philosophy can only rationalise away the aggression, 
isolation and atomisation that characterises civil society, never grasp and overcome it. 
Transcendence within existing political economy necessarily conserved, even concretised, 
this alienation: “[p]resent civil society is the accomplished principle of individualism; the 
individual existence is the final end” (Marx 1970 [1843]: 87). 
 
For Marx, civil society thought and the type of politics erected upon its foundations 
depended on a distinctly bourgeois angle of vision. The emergence of a historically 
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unique, autonomous region of liberty and rights masked and mystified the dramatic 
changes in social and political relations which underpinned the unfettering of productive 
forces bringing civil society into existence and which made for its unequal enjoyment and 
precarious future. Bourgeois emancipation from feudal order was the liberation of the 
economic from the political, privatising power into individual units and divesting it of its 
public responsibilities. “The political spirit… was now gathered up… freed from its 
entanglement with civil life, and turned into an ideal communal sphere”, the state, in 
which all men were equal as citizens (Femia 2001: 135). Yet this “consummation of the 
idealism of the state was at the same time the consummation of the materialism of civil 
society” (Marx 1978 [1844]: 45) as the rights of man in his egoistic condition of 
competition in civil society were those protected in his political guise as citizen, his most 
authentic and “basic element”. Turning Hegel on his head, materialist critique shows how 
in actuality it is therefore the state which rests on civil society. Looking to the future, this 
fundamentally changes the objective of emancipation, which now depends not on lifting 
politics from civil society but on the return of politics to civil society and the overcoming 
of alienating market forces by its complete democratisation: 
 
Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed 
into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his 
work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and when he has recognized 
and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer 
separates this social power from himself as political power (Marx 1978 [1843]: 46). 
 
Marx’s materialist analysis of civil society, its identification with capitalist economic 
relations, according to Alexander, makes it a mere “epiphenomenon of capitalism” and 
thus “no longer necessary, either intellectually or socially” (1998: 5). Many Marxists since 
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have indeed been inclined to relegate to a superstructure the legal frameworks, political 
arrangements and cultural products of human existence, a reductivism arguably 
encouraged by Marx in what can only be a partial history of the separation of society and 
state. With the guarantor of freedom lying not in Tocqueville’s “independent eye” of free 
associations but in economics and collective proletarian movements seeking to answer 
the social question, we can understand Alexander’s charge (1998) that Marx’s 
identification of the market with civil society led directly to the latter’s demise. Certainly, 
the tradition of civil society discourse discussed above withered after Marx, but it is 
hyperbolic to hold him responsible for this decay. All classical theorists of civil society 
recognised the salience of the force of capital in shaping civil society even if they drew 
different normative conclusions. To argue against such an identification is to implicitly 
propose the addition of the economy as a further analytic element to the state / civil 
society dichotomy, which Alexander does, but this only becomes more reasonable 
following the massive expansion and systematistion of accumulation according to market 
imperatives in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. This saw the development of 
the science of economics and the extrication of the economy from its broader social and 
political context and its development as a distinct object of analysis in its own right, tacitly 
underwriting Polanyi’s observation (1944) that modern society was embedded in the 
economy, rather than the reverse. Despite the seductiveness of modern epistemologies, 
there is always a complex interplay between these supposed ‘zones’, one which casts 
doubt on their separateness and autonomy. I return to this later in the chapter. 
The modern, liberal orthodoxy of civil society 
 
The thought of each of these thinkers, and their respective traditions, is obviously much 
richer than can be described here, yet this brief historical summary should provide the 
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necessary background to understand and to act as counterpoint to the deployment of civil 
society discourse as part of analytical frameworks and normative aspirations today; 
strands are woven from the corpus detailed above into a new guide rope inevitably 
leading towards a “vision [that] is an unmistakably liberal one” (Mercer 2002: 7). The key 
themes discussed above orient discussion, if not agreement, in today’s dominant liberal 
conceptualisation of civil society across three dimensions.  
 
Analytically, as above, early civil society thought illuminated complex interrelationships 
between the social, ethical, economic and political4. Enlightenment thinkers writing in a 
natural law tradition were occupied with the civility of modern society, the decorum 
encouraged by commerce and the gradual emergence of formal institutions of 
government. Whilst dispensing with civility, neither Hegel’s idealism nor Marx’s 
materialism analytically sealed off state and society, with economic relationships greasing 
their dialectical interplay. In the New World, however, fresh beginnings and a greater 
distrust of government saw far more emphasis laid on extra-governmental relations and 
entities, laying the foundation for later inclusive definitions of civil society such as 
“businesses, schools, clubs, unions, media, churches, charities, libraries and any other 
non-governmental forms of organization through which a community’s members relate to 
each other” (Scalet and Schmidtz 2002: 27). Civil society, in its quintessential modern 
liberal form, becomes involved in contestation with the state over the degree of 
separateness of its own private, civil relations from those of government, underpinning 
leanings toward binary ‘realms’ or ‘spheres’. 
 
4 Of course, as civil society came to be analysed separately from the state so the state came to be an object of 
analysis in its own right. This is obviously an enormous topic, central to Western political thought and must 
remain peripheral to a study which works from the standpoint of civil society. 
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Normatively, civil society is identified as a kind of society that fosters particular sets of 
values. Enlightenment thought yielded respect for individual sovereignty, equality and 
tolerance; the rise of commercial society shattered the Christian moral community and 
replaced values of deference and tradition in favour of self-reliance and acquisition, but 
also “natural sympathies” – trust, co-operation, friendship and mutual dependence. This 
evaluative dialectic reappears in later claims that civil society promotes democratic 
virtues. Nevertheless, Marx was not the only thinker to point out that outcomes are not 
necessarily always benign: selfishness, inequality and atomisation can issue from 
commerce, while the promotion of sectional interests threatens the cohesiveness of the 
social whole. This leads to a second normative aspect, as despite the above complexities, 
evaluative reasoning tends to mix with the analytic to furnish each sphere with distinct 
ethical identities. In particular, civil society becomes understood as a realm of freedom 
while the state is principally coercive. Establishing this is at root a metaphysical rather 
than empirical matter – on the one hand are the interactions and institutions of 
sovereign, self-determining individuals, pursuing freely-chosen ends through associations 
of their own choice; on the other is the state, operating on and compelling society, with 
its own  tendency and rationality of expansion, domination and conquest. This has crucial 
implications for the role of civil society in democracy: property-centred understandings of 
civil society may be in tension with democracy-centred interpretations, clearly visible in 
the American tradition but also in Locke, which position civil society as a bulwark against 
despotism. 
 
Finally, these developments created practical recipes for action – the democratisation of 
the public sphere, participation in associations and their defence against the state and 
encouragement of community cohesion through “new forms of solidarity and moral 
norms… [that] enable modern societies to synthesize individuation and integration” 
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(Howell and Pearce 2002: 31). Given the normative reflections above, action to 
strengthen and protect civil society would seem to be warranted, while analytical work 
illuminates locations where attention should be aimed. These are the points of 
intervention of today’s international development actors and policymakers, the 
professional network largely responsible for returning civil society to common parlance 
worldwide. 
Civil society, democracy and the state 
Liberalism as a political credo is a moving target, forever adapting political thought and 
the politics of state by refashioning constitutive elements in order to better manage its 
own internal contradictions and cope with external crises. In the consensus that has 
undergirded the working ideology of liberal democracy deployed in the restructuring of 
government and governance worldwide in recent decades, a ‘vibrant’ civil society is 
understood as a key part of its realisation as an interrelated set of processual and 
institutional components and norms (Williams and Young 1994; Ayers 2008). Civil society 
finds an apparently natural fit as one of the pillars of the liberal state, along with 
constitutionalism, rule of law and human rights, good governance, and elections and their 
supporting formal political processes.  
 
These components not only constitute the framework for a modern liberal state, but the 
conditions for democratic rule through its institutions of government. With liberalism “its 
absolute premise and foundation” (Parekh 1992: 161), public powers are separated from 
civil society and the exercise of liberties protected under a regime of rights. The state’s 
organic links to community severed, expressions of the popular will guide the use of state 
power through the regular election of representatives, by which the authority of rulers to 
govern the ruled “makes sense” and renders it fit to wear the badge of democratic 
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legitimacy (Williams 2005: 10). Parliaments far from exhaust democracy, and their 
potential for manipulation by elites, possibly using state apparatus, only underscored the 
importance of the further diffusion of counterbalancing social power among the countless 
interest groups that populate nations, variously seeking protection from the predations of 
the modern, powerful, centralised state, the articulation of needs and demands, and 
more simply the conditions and opportunities required to enjoy their rights. 
 
It is this organisational or associative ‘realm’ and, further, the pursuit of interests for the 
public good or for their own private publics5 by their civilised occupants, which has come 
to define civil society in liberal democracy. Examples in this dominant line of thought in 
which civil society and state constitute autonomous zones, “each… defined in opposition 
to the other” (Rosenblum and Post 2002: 11), are legion: Larry Diamond argues that civil 
society is “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) 
self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules” (1994: 5). Michael Walzer draws definitional boundaries while also depicting the 
particular forms of sociality we could expect to find within this territory: “the words “civil 
society” name the sphere of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational 
networks formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology that fill this space” 
(1992: 107). In contrast to the Enlightenment collapse with bourgeois society, it is 
common (but disputed) to exclude economic relations by focusing on the uniqueness of 
the identitarian or public rule-making objectives of associations that are genuinely of civil 
society. Scholte, for instance, sees civil society as “a political space where voluntary 
associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern one or other aspect of social 
life… [including] formal directives… informal constructs (such as gender roles) and / or the 
social order as a whole” (2002: 283). 
5 Managing these diverse demands is the focus of Habermas’ communicative theory, through which he 
understands civil society as the public sphere. 
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This “space” is the repository of diverse normative functions. Whilst government is public, 
overarching and inclusive, “characterized by overarching public norms made and enforced 
by official institutions”, civil society is plural and particularist, consisting of “partial 
publics” wedded by mutual recognition (Rosenblum and Post 2002: 3). Pluralisation of the 
public sphere strengthens it, as the expansion of participatory opportunities leads to a 
manifold of interest groups with a stake in shaping state and society, showcasing how 
“associations act as transmission belts between the individual and the state” (Mohan 
2002: 3). Opportunities extend to the marginalised, whose voice is amplified. 
Tocquevillian and Painean notions of liberty and equality, mutual aid and self-interest, 
and (privatised) public engagement loom large here, yet associations do not only ‘look 
after their own’. Civil society can also be considered as the active protector of the 
environment in which it exercises autonomy, mediating “a distinctive set of institutions 
which safeguard the separation of state and civil society” (Shils 1991: 4. Emphasis mine.) 
and which rest, fundamentally, on human rights and a judicial system to guarantee their 
effectiveness (Peruzzotti 2004). In terms of a functioning polity and state-building 
processes, specialist bodies scrutinise public data to hold government to account and act 
as a bulwark against despotism (Kudlenko 2016; Ishkanian 2007; Behr and Siitonen 2013). 
Civil society is thus said to play a central role in democratic consolidation, as Tocquevillian 
associational tradition and a Lockean concern for checking despotism combine: 
“independent associations provide the channels or mediating structures through which 
political participation is mobilized and states are held accountable by their citizens” 
(Edwards 2004: 74). 
 
From a human rights perspective, the associational realm provides a context conducive to 
normative pluralism that enables “citizens’ diverse and cooperative pursuit of their 
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comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious views”, “a vital instrument for 
containing the power of democratic governments, checking their potential abuses” and, 
often underemphasised, offers a citizenship education opportunity to maintain the health 
of civil society itself (Jensen 2006: 44). For Habermas (1989), its defensive role is not 
restricted to the predations of the state: the lifeworld is under constant threat of 
distortion, disruption and colonisation by both the state and economic systems. On this 
basis, Cohen and Arato distinguish the logics of power animating political parties and 
economic actors from the collective action for shared ends motivating civil society (1992). 
Post-Marxist thinkers meanwhile have dispensed with the notion of mere democratic 
consolidation, turning defence into offence and liberation by civil society actors on a 
global scale, as seen in Hardt and Negri: civil society is an active force, a multitude, 
standing against oppressions both of government and of economic actors (2000; 2004). 
 
Capturing agency: the NGO as primus inter pares 
In addition to a not inconsiderable amount of wishful thinking, not least evident by the 
tarring of less acceptable private actors with the predicate ‘uncivil’, realising its various 
functions clearly demands a great deal from civil society, demanding that we move from 
the somewhat vague and indeterminate sphere conceptualisation to concrete labour, 
from liberal theory to political agency. Despite the everyman connotations of ‘the 
association’, Tocqueville’s spirit today materialises as one unique form of associational 
actor capable of fulfilling theoretically given demands – the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO). Against the centuries-old tradition of civil society, the NGO is 
quintessentially modern, the term making its first official appearance in the UN Charter, 
which states that “[t]he Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters 
21 
 
within its competence” (United Nations 1945: Article 71). Since the 1970s, the massive 
expansion of this organisational form at a variety of levels has seen writers attempt to 
understand it through a variety of classifications, including scale (e.g. international, 
national, regional, community), their ownership (membership or non-membership based), 
orientation (service delivery or empowerment), approach (top-down or participatory) and 
operational dimensions (research, advocacy and campaigning, implementation). 
 
These organisations are sometimes said to constitute a Third Sector or non-profit sector, a 
lexical shift from ‘realm’ that hints at the return of the economy to civil society. According 
to Etzioni, the sector results from the merging of capitalism and socialism in modern 
economies, and its constiuent organisations “combine “the best of both worlds” – 
efficiency and expertise from the business world with public interest, accountability, and 
broader planning from government” (1973: 315). This contains an enormous diversity of 
organisational types and objectives – “a strange juxtaposition of very large charities… 
happy to take over provision of formerly public services, alongside small and radical 
cooperatives, and also NGOs quietly performing everyday disaster relief” (Hull et al. 2011: 
xvii).  
Thus, like civil society itself, defining an NGO can be problematic. Mercer seeks to capture 
the common visible markers and traits, holding that the term 
refers to those organizations that are officially established, run by employed staff (often 
urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more often the 
case, international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced. NGOs 
may therefore be international organizations or they may be national or regional NGOs 
(2002: 6).  
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NGOs are deemed to be the repository of the skills, knowledge and agency required to 
perform the actual activities to fulfil the functions of civil society detailed above. They give 
a voice to the plurality of public in civil society and articulate grievances on behalf of 
interests they are set up to represent. They are the "'missing middle' between citizens and 
the state" (World Bank 1997: 114), of vital importance at the local level in democratising 
states and in the international sphere where they play a critical role “in the emergence, 
formulation, and monitoring of international norms” (Törnquist-Chesnier 2004: 253) – 
land mines, climate change, global poverty, as well as country-specific concerns such as 
human rights in Myanmar,  to name but a fraction of the areas of focus. Such work is both 
regular and ongoing, and also enacted in highly specific, time-bound chunks of activity as 
projects. They are de Tocqueville’s “independent eyes”, “expanding citizen participation, 
providing civic education, engaging in advocacy and lobbying for public goods, serving as 
watchdogs against government abuses, and empowering marginalized and disadvantaged 
societal groups” (Antlo 2010: 419). 
 
Given the apparent importance of democracy for development, the significance of NGOs 
in development follows almost syllogistically if one considers them to be somehow primus 
inter pares among actors in civil society. NGOs therefore come to bear the load of both 
democracy and development: whilst civil society is the “chicken soup of the social 
sciences” (Rosenblum and Post 2002: 23), when it comes to international development 
NGOs are a “magic bullet” which, fired off in any direction, can eliminate a whole range of 
problems and issues that beset states and populations (Edwards and Hulme 1996b). The 
existence of an NGO sector can be thought to constitute an indicator of the good 
governance and political stability required for the universal goods of democracy, human 
rights and economic growth. Should NGOs be absent, or if actors or institutions of civil 
society appear oriented towards other ends (so-called ‘uncivil society’), then civil society 
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is deemed weak and will have to be built. “Fund NGOs, and you are building civil society” 
claims Clare Mercer of the “donorthink” that has captured civil society support (2002: 10). 
Recent decades have seen, therefore, a conflation of civil society with NGOs; and this 
development can only be fully understood through analysis which critiques rather than 
repeats the epistemic assumptions that have undergirded the conceptualisation of civil 
society as an autonomous zone. 
 
Epistemological limitations, ideological inclinations and the 
Gramscian alternative 
The above conflation might not be overly concerning if the actual impact of NGOs had not 
been challenged, at both the international and local levels. While the NGO’s functioning 
as a vector of orthodoxy within civil society is the main focus of this research, others have 
taken issue with its capacity to accomplish core normative tasks. Apparent success in 
policy or legislative change pays little heed to the complex causalities involved in social 
change, and arguably has more to do with inter-state political economies than ethical 
concerns (Fernando 2011: 19-21). In addition to alleged hubris, the outright failures of 
NGOs in achieving both project-specific objectives and broader aims tend to be ignored or 
drowned out by a chorus of approval for the morality of the work in general. The 
suspicion that NGO claims run ahead of genuine influence, even in the most favorable 
environments, serves to complicate the idea of a set of normative functions bundled into 
civil society. Such doubt is met with a stock response that the liberal model shows only 
ideal types: whether the separate logics of state, civil society and economy function as 
expected and the spheres fulfil their given normative functions, whilst their autonomous 
operation is an empirical matter. Indeed, Alexander admits to a “shock of encountering 




Yet the liberal understanding of civil society is also chastened by many more troubling 
contradictions. Formal equality of access can contrast with dramatic inequalities in actual 
voice and influence between different groups, ‘uncivil society’ undermines conditions for 
democracy and human rights, while corrosion of lifeworld by the system appears 
ineluctable, challenging the attribution of power to civil society (Habermas 1989). 
Resolving the tension between theoretical claims of an autonomous civil society 
possessing unique properties of solidarity and freedom against a reality of conflict and 
dislocation by appeal to empirical drift places modern liberal civil society theory 
dangerously close to insulating itself from criticism; it is certainly unmoored from reality, 
presenting significant analytical limitations. As Chandhoke enquires, even if we can make 
analytical sense of the concept of civil society, “can we think of any sphere of human 
activity as either autonomous or as marked by a different logic?” (2001: 6). To believe 
society can be dissected into discrete parts, each with their own characteristic qualities 
and functional attributes which, taken together as a whole make up social life, is an 
additive social science which ignores substantive relations. Whilst they may constitute 
useful heuristics, what “should be resisted is the implication that these sectors of human 
activity do not constitute each other, or that they are marked by an exclusive and discrete 
logic that differs from site to site of such interaction” (ibid.: 8). It overlooks, in particular, 
the complexities of mutual dependence between state and civil society: even the most 
cursory observation reveals how the latter depends on the former for legal protection and 
fulfilment of rights demands, whilst the state depends on civil society for fulfilment of its 
functions. 
 
This much is often conceded by liberal theorists, but only insofar that such 
interdependencies are deemed necessary for the functioning of each category or the 
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maintenance of their boundaries. Yet even this is a highly problematic assumption 
dependent on neo-Kantian elevation of concept above existence. Liberal civil society 
theory constructs its ideal type by collapsing difference between a manifold of entities – 
NGOs sit alongside cooperatives, table tennis clubs, trades unions, Girl Guides, protest 
groups and so on – on the basis of a number of shared features – primarily the purported 
autonomy from the state and non-profit status, but also freedom of entry and exit, 
interest representation and so on. Entities are arbitrarily granted systemic equality on the 
basis of theory alone. Flattening differences between associations, loading normative 
work onto civil society qua sphere masks difference and power, and mystifies actual 
causal processes. Presented with what Marx called a “chaotic conception”, with disparate 
objects grouped together regardless of structure or relationships, attributions of agency 
become immensely problematic “as soon as anyone attributes unitary causal powers or 
liabilities to the objects falling in that class” (Sayer 1992: 139). With regard to this 
research, what is most troubling is the difficulty of analysing the disparity of influence of 
the NGO. 
 
Even worse, by restricting theory to a domain of highly abstract social and ethical 
constructions, liberal civil society theory not only lacks analytical rigour and explanatory 
value, its dichotomies resting on highly unstable epistemological foundations, but also 
conceals its ideological content. It does this by obscuring the relation between social and 
political conditions and the discovery and advocacy of purportedly universal properties of 
society, making necessary truths from a selective version of extant circumstances 
(“boundary ideas”, in Gramsci’s terminology (in Buttigieg 1995: 11)) rather than 
problematising them. The relationship between theory and reality then easily becomes 
wishful thinking, constructed around what we want civil society to be like rather than how 
we find it (Geuss 2008). This motivates Fraser’s rejection of the analytical value of 
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Habermas’ ideal typical public sphere “when these discursive arenas are situated in a 
larger societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of dominance and 
subordination” (Fraser 1990: 65). These form no part of Habermas’ public sphere; indeed, 
given his approach to abstraction, they cannot6. 
 
Instead of treating theoretical work as something pursued in ahistorical quarantine, it 
should be acknowledged that concepts assume substantive form only in particular 
historical contexts (Sayer 1987). As with any work of political theorists, on the streets or in 
the universities, bodies of thought are cultural emergents that, in order to be fully 
understood, must be seen as products of their time. Their appearance, appeal and 
operation can only be fully understood in light of social and material conditions. Moving 
away from the heuristics of realms, spheres and boundaries towards an acceptance of 
ideas as inextricably bound up with changes in material conditions, the conceptualisation 
and actualisation of a particular variant of civil society in the 1980s and 1990s indicates a 
political project rather than a teleological unfolding of the universal. Unfortunately, 
orthodox Marxist or, more specifically, historical materialist approaches to civil society 
have tended to relegate the work of social actors to the superstructure and to downplay 
the impact of their work as voluntarism, insignificant or irrelevant in the face of the 
unfolding logic of capital. This, too, is highly problematic. Moreover, it is not enough to 
simply explain away civil society: the deficiencies of liberal theory do not preclude asking 
important questions regarding relevant social phenomena.  
 
Antonio Gramsci’s thought runs against the reductivist grain of orthodox Marxism. Whilst 
situated within the broader Marxist tradition (c.f. Finocchiaro 2009, in Wainwright 2010), 
Gramsci’s articulation of civil society is part of a rich, variegated understanding of society 
6 Although see Habermas’ further reflections in Habermas (1992). 
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and politics in general that is acutely sensitive to contingent distributions and expressions 
of state and social power (Gramsci 1971). Opposing economism of all political hues, 
Gramsci’s work in the early twentieth century did not so much reverse Marx’s base-
superstructure logic (Bobbio 1979) as operate with a completely different conception of 
the state, its coercive apparatus and the nature of consent. Gramsci realised both the 
depth of consent to capitalist dominance in “advanced” societies and the precarious 
foundations of Bolshevism in Russia; in order to make sense of this he found analytical 
and practical use for civil society in its own right. The hegemony of prevailing social forces, 
constituting a historical bloc, was secured by political society not only through the 
coercive machinery of the state but also through the circuits of power within civil society. 
Through the rich and varied work of the church, the school and other institutions the 
speculative project of political society would be ideologically diffused. Dominated classes 
would come to acquiesce in their subordination: civil society acts as its grounding, its 
trenches and fortifications forming a dialectical unity with political society in the “integral 
state”, as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent 
of those over whom it rules” (1971: 244). 
 
For Gramsci, civil society was an analytical term, and the aspect of the social it articulated 
was always in a fluid dialectic with political society as the state (hence his well-known 
formula, state = political society + civil society). Civil society has a certain degree of 
autonomy, which can be understood as institutionalised power and agency, varying 
between institutions, and affects political society through ideas, practices, struggles and 
conflicts while being affected by the coercive instruments, laws and public policy that 
constitute and enact the speculative projects of political society. It follows that just as civil 
society can be enfolded into the “historical congruence between material forces, 
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institutions and ideologies” (Gill 2002: 58), “disseminating an ideological common sense” 
(Katz 2009: 409) or forma mentis to better ensure consent for domination, so it is also a 
terrain on which these institutions, the fortifications of the state, can be challenged. 
Revolutionary strategy which sought simply to capture the state was hopeless. Instead, a 
“war of position” would be fought precisely within civil society, with the intention of 
mobilising forces in a disruption of the network of mediations that constitute the broader 
apparatus of the state and hold together the historic bloc. Cultural work that instils an 
alternative forma mentis among the subaltern is necessary preparation for any “war of 
movement” that would bring lasting change (Gramsci 1971: 229-235). 
 
The position of civil society, for Gramsci, vis-à-vis the state cannot therefore be given by 
definition or formula but is rather an expression of the configuration of forces in politics 
and society. If consent is maintained by domination alone then there is no ethical 
component to the state and civil society appears external. It follows that any 
thoroughgoing reformation of state and society, whether emancipatory for the subaltern 
or not, will seek to rearticulate the organic links between political society and civil society. 
I will return to this point when discussing Myanmar’s authoritarian regime, yet for now 
the possibility of differently contoured terrains helps to better understand the purported 
ambivalence or vagueness of civil society as a term in political and social science – “[a]ny 
fixed definition of the content of the concept 'civil society' would just freeze a particular 
moment in history and privilege the relations of social forces then prevailing” (Cox 1999: 
5). This complicates any simplistic binaries that identify the state with coercion and civil 
society as freedom, problematises the notion of civil society as external to the state (and, 
indeed, the rejection of the notion of the state as a synonym for government), exposes 
the associational idea of civil society led by the NGO as a profoundly Eurocentric or 
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Western conceptualisation, and, in rejecting autonomous spheres, moves analysis along 
more realist lines. 
From sphere to reality 
I will expand on the Gramscian notion of the state, civil society and other relevant 
concepts in later chapters. For now, we can appreciate how the interaction of social, 
political and economic forces enables recognition of the complex constitution of various 
social objects previously sequestered in autonomous realms. Notably, the associational 
approach to civil society around the world is realised through an international 
development industry – “the community of scholars, consultants, activists and policy 
analysts that influences policy making in national governments, international agencies, 
and non-governmental organizations” (Jenkins 2009: 250) – that is not only deeply 
penetrated by national and inter-governmental state development agencies, but also by 
markets and economic priorities. Civil society strengthening became a core part of 
development thinking and practice in the 1980s, an integral part of ‘development 
solutions’ offered to newly democratising nations or those qualifying for international 
assistance. Given its apparent centrality in consolidating democracy, generating economic 
growth and facilitating accountable government, the unalloyed good of a strong civil 
society came to be a perpetual present in major Western aid programmes (Ishkanian 
2007).  
 
This financial and technical largesse has overwhelmingly been directed to NGOs, with 
Fowler (1991) reporting a five-fold rate of increase in their funding against official 
development funding in general through the 1980s. The timing of the mass rediscovery of 
civil society in the form of the NGO is contemporaneous with expansion of neoliberal 
capitalism (Rieff 1999), and the inception of development of new global governance 
30 
 
architecture to manage the new market-based global order. This is a well-told story. 
Following the failure of Keynesianism to provide the necessary fix for capitalism’s 
contradictions, a market expansionist consensus combined readily with liberal 
pronouncements on freedom and democracy to reorder state priorities and economic 
infrastructure along lines captured in what came to be called the New Policy Agenda 
(NPA). Multi-party democracy, rule of law, expansion of open markets and limitations on 
their regulation, good governance and, of course, an adequate civil society, together 
reorganised social and economic power in society by recombining national and 
international actors in a new historic bloc. State-led development solutions were eclipsed 
by approaches that harnessed efficiencies and ingenuities that supposedly resided in the 
private sector, and the resizing and reshaping of the state saw ‘big government’ shift to 
‘flexible governance’, from the state as a unitary centre of power to a range of 
apparatuses “engendering a polycentric organization of interacting governing bodies” 
(Räthzel et al. 2015: 157) 
 
This required the cooperation of an associational civil society, based on the NGO, put to a 
variety of uses as required within the new development consensus. Like neoliberalism 
more broadly, approval of civil society involvement did not appear to be confined to party 
ideological positions, mainly thanks to the multiplicity of ends which organisations pursue. 
Liberals could celebrate the work of NGOs promoting democracy by observing elections 
and providing voter education, or promoting human rights – especially civil and political 
rights – groups. Conservatives could champion their role in fighting corruption and rent-
seeking, enabling sound public financial management and, more controversially, to act as 
an alternative service provider for those facilities formerly supplied through the state. 
Different donor development ambitions and agendas might select certain NGO functions 
as attractive, but in general their importance as a solution for international development 
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is consistently recognised. High-level thinking on the value of civil society for development 
was therefore remarkably consistent among major Western governments: for the UK, “a 
vibrant civil society can be a multiplier for all human rights, driving sustainable economic 
development and reinforcing good governance” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
2014), while the European Commission proclaims that an 
 
empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is an asset in 
itself. It represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, 
equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth (2012).  
 
Underlying this consistency from a Gramscian perspective is civil society’s role in 
cementing the hegemony of the reformed historical bloc, fostering coherence in political 
and economic ambitions by facilitating consent for particular approaches to state building, 
economic growth and democracy that would otherwise threaten destabilisation. The 
urgent need to secure support through civil society in order to better achieve consent for 
a newly articulated hegemonic bloc demonstrates its centrality and identity as a 
“combination of forces upon which the support for a new state and a new order can be 
built” (Cox 1999: 5). Official aid narratives give the impression that such support is readily 
forthcoming, that social and political agency has been more or less compliant in enabling 
liberal hegemonic objectives. Yet Gramsci’s freeing of civil society from its liberal yoke 
makes this a contingent matter, and indeed in many times and places civil society has 
assumed a counter-hegemonic role, associated with subaltern efforts. In contrast to the 
“mainstream” approach described above, Howell and Pearce call this the “alternative 
tradition” of civil society which, although “largely untheorized and mostly implicit… [and] 
composed in practice of a multiplicity of visions”, articulates collective social responses in 
opposition to exploitation, repression and deleterious forms and consequences of 
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development (2002: 31). Centres of power apparently beyond the easy reach of political 
elites or marketisation highlight challenges faced by the subaltern, if not capacity for their 
resolution. This work often coalesces in social movements, and while liberal norms such 
as human rights, equality, democracy and the value of civility and associational bonds are 
far from rejected7, recognition of the antagonisms and struggle of daily life means that 
issues of power and conflict, contestation and inequality are not bracketed but are seen 
as central to social forces shaping civil society and its activity. Marx’s original critique thus 
retains significance not in a cynical rejection of the institutions of civil society as mere 
epiphenomena of a bourgeois society, but in recognition of their dual character – 
potentially offering acquiescence to, or agency to overcome, inequalities in social and 
economic power. 
 
Liberal thought does not, therefore, have a monopoly on civil society, as examples across 
space and time demonstrate. Leftist movements influenced by Gramscian theory8 in 
1970s and 1980s Latin America worked through coalitions involving the church and 
voluntary organisations, as well as armed revolutionary groups, seeking social and 
economic equality rather than democracy and rule of law. In Eastern European, Czech 
dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s possessed, like Paine, a confidence in society’s potential 
for self-government, their weariness of central planning articulated (mainly as sentiment 
rather than a strategic goal) in the Chartists’9 ‘society first’ approach that would enable a 
bottom-up, self-management political project (Baker 2002: 33-50). Elsewhere, in Asia, at 
the Forum for Philippine Alternatives in 1993, civil society was provocatively described as 
“an arena of social and political life autonomous from state domination where progressive 
7 However, in challenging all various aspects that constitute liberal thought – free markets, democracy, human 
rights and so on – it can also be seen to incorporate ‘uncivil society’. 
8 This followed the Spanish translation, publication and widespread dissemination of Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks among Latin American intellectuals and revolutionaries in the 1960s and 1970s (see Allen and 
Ouviña 2017).  
9 The moniker comes from the Charter 77 group to which they were attached. 
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values and political practices can be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be 
created” (Greshman and Bello 1993, in Biggs and Neame 1996: 35). Given the expansion 
of capitalist relations of production in recent decades, it is not only the coercive apparatus 
of the state that is challenged, and as a multi-scalar process, capitalism draws civil society 
actors into action at diverse levels. Manifestations of what was once negatively termed an 
anti-globalisation movement can be seen at local sites of impact as well as in global 
networks of “activists across borders” (Keck and Sikkink 1998), implicating different sets 
and types of actors, resources, social agency and social structures (Graeber 2002). Civil 
society analysis therefore blurs here with studies of contentious politics and social 
movements, and often involves competing human rights claims. 
 
Challenging NGO agency 
Despite, or because of, the lack of success of alternative manifestations, civil society can 
be seen as contested terrain. As a mediator of hegemony or counter-hegemony it yields 
the potential, on the one hand, for its power and agency to be harnessed in pursuit of 
building consensus for elite or neo-imperialist domination, and on the other hand to be 
harnessed by progressive political leaderships for alternative, emancipatory or 
redistributive objectives. The phenomenon colloquially called ‘rolling back the state’ 
widened the gap between political authority and the practical life of people, closing off 
democratic control and apparently offering greater terrain to both orthodox and 
alternative forces, making the form and orientation of political agency crucial for 
achieving desired outcomes. The above discussion returns us, therefore, to contestation 
over the politics of the most visible modality of activity in the modern, associational 
understanding of civil society; namely, the NGO. Its position within circuits of power in 
developing countries, its ascendancy contemporaneous with the rise of neoliberalism and 
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the growth of civil society as a development instrument, has made it a significant actor of 
contention for theorists and practitioners critical of the liberal consensus in civil society 
and the NGO’s need for, rather than resistance to, supporters of global market expansion. 
 
Technical considerations of NGO impact and management practices of the so-called third 
sector, of the kind discussed earlier in this chapter, have tended to dominate discussion of 
civil society in the social sciences. The growth in NGO numbers, increase in financial 
turnover, their presence in debates and policy making and their expansion into new issue 
areas have generally gone uncontested as key indicators of a growing strength of civil 
society, a transformation moving in sync with the installation of other pillars of modern 
liberal democratic development. The contrasting position outlined above casts this simple 
identification into doubt and therefore directs attention to consideration of the legitimacy 
of NGO power. Yet this also has tended to be interpreted in technical fashion, an issue of 
accountability, representativeness and performance (Lister 2003). Weberian conceptions 
of legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 3-41) sideline normative or historical discussion regarding 
how the NGO and its powers came to dominate the civil society landscape in the first 
place. Exploring legitimacy in this sense examines the development of beliefs and the 
construction of consent, how “the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions”, and the changes in social and political contexts that have seen enabled or 
retarded these (Suchman 1995:  574). 
 
This is important, as radical authors have challenged the ascendency of the NGO on 
grounds of social and political values against other non-NGO civil society actors. They 
draw a “sharp distinction between NGOs and ‘the movement’” (Alvarez 1999: 185). The 
latter is comprised of self-organised groups committed to achieving collective goals across 
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a wide thematic spectrum – “women’s movements… ecology movements… peasant 
groups… civic movements… youth movements… squatter movements” (Escobar 1992: 
421). Their “largely volunteer, often sporadic, participants (rather than paid staff), non-
formal organizational structures, significantly smaller operating budgets, and whose 
actions (rather than projects) are guided by more loosely defined, conjunctural goals or 
objectives” (Alvarez 1999: 186) contrasts with the NGO: staffed by professionals, receiving 
funding from national or international public and private sources, with clearly defined 
project goals and organisational structures. The latter are an undesirable “alternative to 
the social movements and their radical antisystemic politics” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005: 
9). 
Yet this immediately leads to an important problem: if the NGO is a problematic form for 
the emancipatory ambitions of civil society, and if Gramsci restores a degree of relative 
autonomy for the civil society actor, why do actors continue to adopt the NGO form? As 
this conversion seems to be most noticeable under liberal regimes, overt coercion can be 
ruled out. The tendency of the NGO not only to dominate civil society but to become the 
appropriate vehicle for civil society, to displace or crowd out alternative traditions 
therefore merits close attention. This process has been termed NGOisation (INCITE! 2007; 
Choudry 2010; Choudry and Shragge 2011; Choudry and Kapoor 2013a). More than the 
simple increase in numbers of NGOs, it is the overwhelmingly negative implications of 
NGOised agency that is at issue, the pollution of civil society’s enabling environment with 
“hierarchies of power and knowledge” that “reproduce rather than challenge dominant 
practices and power relations” (Choudry 2010: 17-18). Making causal sense of this process 





This chapter has summarised the origins and long, rich history of the analytic, normative 
and pragmatic aspects that have constituted conceptualisations of civil society. Although 
tracing its origins in antiquity, it is primarily a concept associated with modernity, having 
gained meaning and significance from its relation to related objects of Enlightenment 
thought, such as individual sovereignty, equality and human rights and democratic 
constitutional government. Developing from interrelations of associational and 
commercial activity and with contrasting normative connotations, it was also seen as an 
essential bulwark against despotism. Its modern usage in the liberal democratic consensus 
has primarily been as a realm of associations which, vis-à-vis the state and the economy, 
fulfil a variety of wholly positive functions – uncivil society notwithstanding10 – which 
enable the better operation of the institutions and processes of modern liberal 
democratic polities. 
 
This conception of civil society as an autonomous realm or sphere, widely promoted by 
liberal thinkers and global institutions, is based on an abstraction that neglects the 
complexity of social relations. These cross over the ideal typical boundaries between 
state, economy and civil society imposed by liberal theorists, undermining expectations of 
autonomy integral to liberal theory. Bracketing social structure and power renders liberal 
theory useless in analysing actually existing civil society. Abandoning the notion of 
autonomous spheres for a return to the political economic approach favoured by Gramsci, 
Marx and earlier Enlightenment scholars, the dialectic between – rather than the 
separation of – economic, political and social forces enables us to analyse, critique and 
better understand today’s neo-Tocquevellian associational understanding of civil society.  
10 The straightforward creation of a normative category for the unwholesome and troublesome is again 
testament to the flattened landscape that the liberal faces – it doesn’t matter why or from where these 
elements have arisen, but simply that they are unwelcome in the liberal order. 
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The uncovering of substantial interrelationships between formerly sequestered spheres 
demonstrates the politicisation of civil society – or, indeed, its depoliticisation – and is 
essential for understanding the ascendancy of the NGO as one part of a broader political 
project. The norms and assumptions of the mainstream liberal approach continue to 
inform the recipes for practical action of a manifold of international development actors. 
Although the conflation of civil society with NGOs is an epistemic event, the social 
construction of civil society qua NGO has a significant material dimension and effects, for 
example, through flows of finance to local NGOs rather than trades unions, and capacity 
building programmes in project cycle management rather than praxis for structural 
transformation. Yet it is reductive and blinkered to park responsibility wholly with donors: 
these shifts in knowledge are deeply entwined with shifts in broader political economy, 
and they collide with alternative conceptions and approaches to civil society and citizen 
organising, making the NGO a strategic site in the struggle between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic forces. 
 
This struggle consists both in the intolerance towards other modes of organising, which 
must give way for the NGO, and in the distorted actualisation of liberal ambitions due to 
its own contradictions and the material and normative historical legacy. The slate is never 
wiped completely clean, and rather than homogenising space through liberal 
superimposition the impact and legitimacy of NGOs depends greatly on local contexts and 
history. The failures of sphere theory highlight how understanding of these contexts and 
their abstraction and theorising needs to be guided by the actual structures and powers 
which constitute social reality. The forces that have enabled a particular, orthodox 
organisation of agency to become historically dominant in civil society must, to expand, 
be successfully introduced into existing social and political orders. Chapter 2 will develop 
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the critical realist architecture that will scaffold the core of this research, a critical study of 




















Chapter 2. Institutions, social change 
and NGOisation: a theoretical 
framework 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the contours of the dilemma for those seeking to retain a radical, 
emancipatory edge for civil society under the broader social, political and economic 
influence of liberal principles and objectives. For those analysing political change, 
democratisation and social movements, civil society can connote a zone of freedom that 
is thought to challenge and push back against state coercion. Yet this underestimates and 
misconceives state power and the forces involved in its exercise, and the way this affects 
the form and orientation of social agency collected under the broad civic associational 
umbrella. Since the 1970s, shifts in these phenomena have undergirded the rise of the 
NGO (Lewis 1998). The prominence of the NGO today typifies civil society in all its various 
works: in its service delivery, governance, democratisation and human rights activity; in all 
the vehicles through which this work is done – forums, campaigns, government and 
private sector partnerships and the ubiquitous ‘project’; and in the mobilisation of expert 
local and international knowledge, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs in developing 
countries (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; Fisher 1997; Mercer 2002). 
The New Policy Agenda (NPA) – consisting of the familiar menu of privatisation, fiscal 
austerity and market expansion and deregulation – not only created a demand for the 
(believed inherent) efficiency of civil society in service provision but shifted expectations 
regarding democratic governance, creating the ‘enabling environment’ for civil society 
actors to play an increasingly central role in social and political development (Silliman 
1999). This so-called ‘space for civil society’ will play an important role in the argument in 
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later chapters. Since the arrival of the NGO, critical literature has questioned their 
performance and suitability yet explanatory critiques of their materialisation itself - as 
distinct from broader civil society, social movements or activism - is more recent. 
NGOisation brings together scholars, practitioners and activists writing on this topic as a 
branch of social movement studies. As the suffix suggests, this concept seeks to critique 
the ascendency of the NGO as a process of change like any other comparable 
phenomenon – globalisation, democratisation, financialisation, liberalisation and so on – 
and understand the forces, processes or determinants which have led to the emergence 
and dominance of this form of organisation. 
 
In Chapter 2, I outline the theoretical framework by which I seek to contribute to this 
phenomenon, zooming out to argue that NGOisation must be understood as an example 
of a more general process and result – that of institutionalisation. Institutional theory is a 
broad church in the explanation of social change; setting NGOisation in this tradition 
makes available a range of conceptual apparatuses largely – and, unfortunately – ignored 
by radical theorists and practitioners concerned with the implications of the rise of the 
NGO. Yet as Chapter 1 situated civil society within shifting configurations of social forces, 
positing determinations of civil society institutionally demands a similar abstraction with 
the latter. Indeed, it is vitally important to be precise about key concepts such as power 
and force, as well as to clearly articulate and interrogate assumptions regarding 
fundamental processes and elements involved in social change, such as causality, agency 
and properties. Therefore, after introducing the institution, I then argue that the concept 
– and, a fortiori, the institutional understanding of the NGO and NGOisation – can be most 
productive in social explanation when articulated within the epistemological and 
methodological setting of critical realism. This meta-theoretical framework will be used in 
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subsequent chapters to explain and deepen understanding of the phenomenon of 
NGOisation in Myanmar’s civil society. 
Institutions in the social sciences 
 
What is notable with regard to the growth of NGOs in many developing countries such as 
Myanmar is not so much the ubiquity of NGOs but the unquestioned obviousness of 
organising and doing social, political or economic development within its quite singular 
parameters. As a colleague remarked, somewhat incredulously, on first hearing the term 
NGOisation in 2013, “But what else would [political activists] do now but start an NGO?” 
The NGO appears as a form of agency which is “desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 
1995: 574).  But how, amidst the immense variety of social issues which civil society is 
supposedly directed towards and the forms that it could conceivably take, has the NGO 
achieved this status? We witness here the emergence of a social institution; 
problematising the NGO’s ascendancy in this way opens up the use of a particularly 
fecund branch of social science, yet one replete with possibly as many variations and as 
much vagueness as civil society. 
 
Definitions reflect theoretical predilections of the writer and the questions they are 
interested in tackling, and institutions are no exception. For Scott, institutions are 
“composed of normative, regulative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott 
2008: 48). The institution illuminates the taken-for-granted aspects of social life, the ‘rules 
of the game’ that provide “stability and meaning to social life” as norms, conventions and 
standards (ibid.). These have a paradoxical quality in that although, felt inwardly as 
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compulsions, they are perceived as objective entities. Whilst formal laws and 
constitutions are made by official acts of government and become effective through 
threat of formal sanctions, the compelling qualities of social institutions appear to 
originate and be maintained by the collective actions of individuals, which, “Durkheim 
writes, are a product of joint activity and association” (Alexander 2014: 259).  
 
Many questions pursued by the social sciences have been given an institutional 
treatment, ranging from the basic building blocks of modern society, such as the modern 
state, markets and democracy, to more intimately focused studies on social phenomena 
such as the financial audit (Power 1996) and French cuisine (Rao et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, the institution might be understood in different ways. For example, the 
institution of democracy might be described: 
  
• in regulative terms, as the procedural rules of elections and parliaments,  
• normatively, as per the belief that democratic organising is a marker of the 
legitimacy of formal power (majority voting pervades a wide variety of social 
settings in the West),  
• or as cognitive-cultural frames, through which we make sense of or assess other 
nations or groups (as in measures of democracy). 
 
Scott’s definition above represents an attempt to capture and consolidate the various 
ways in which the power of the institution has been depicted, deployed and explained. 
However, such catch-all definitions underplay the distinctive schools which have formed 
around the institution11. Hall and Taylor’s typology (1996) of institutional schools of 
11 This ‘return’ followed the rejection of functionalism and behaviorism across much of the social sciences. 
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thought describes rational choice, historical and sociological variants; these broad 
traditions have become associated with particular areas of study. Institutional economists 
have complemented their once-standard utility maximisation reasoning with the concept 
of bounded rationality (Simon 1982). Historians of political development, particularly of 
the state, are more inclined to use institutional thought as part of a broader political 
economic approach to examining how formal political or organisational systems are 
dialectically related to – and, partly, expressions of – social action and the reproduction of 
power asymmetries and social conflict. This approach, associated with the work of Moore 
(1966), Charles Tilly (1978) and Theda Skocpol (1979), tends to work on wider historical 
and geographical scales, often highlighting path-shaping or path-dependent tendencies, 
such as the way in which the appearance of the state directly or indirectly affects the 
shape of certain social activity, such as democratic constitutionalism on collective 
bargaining traditions. Meanwhile, neoinstitutional sociologists have updated Durkheimian 
analysis with a richer, more complex understanding of the normative – “routines, 
procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organisational forms, and technologies… 
beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge” (March and Olsen 1989: 22) – often 
embedded in more culturally-inclined science that seeks to lay bare the “symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding 
human action” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). 
 
When explicating institutions, for all the complex theory-building and competing 
perspectives in institutional thought undertaken by scholars, their work centres in the 
main on two key aspects: firstly, the institution or institutionalisation is used to refer to a 
process, usually occurring within an industry, sector or a less defined ‘region’ of social life 
such as civil society. This aspect constitutes institutional change – involving institutional 
reproduction or breakdown (deinstitutionalisation) – and involves institutional 
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dissemination and institutional carriers as part of explanation. This has recently been 
coined as “institutional work”, “the knowledgeable, creative and practical work of… 
maintaining and transforming institutions” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 219). Secondly, 
and interwoven with process, the institution itself is a particular outcome or result of this 
process, displaying particular properties e.g. the dominance of a particular organisational 
form in civil society. 
 
In explicating the process and outcomes of social change then, although 
neoinstitutionalists may have developed their own distinctive theoretical vocabulary, “the 
questions which they address are the common currency of many of the social sciences” 
(Morgan 2014: 936). To add a further ontological point (anticipating later realist 
arguments), the social reality that they attempt to grasp is objectively the same as that 
addressed by non-institutional social science. Here, there is as little unification among 
institutionalists from different schools as among writers in other parts of the social 
sciences. A shared embrace of the institution cloaks important differences in how the 
institution should be deemed causally significant. As Scott argues, different institutional 
“perspectives embrace not simply different conceptions of the elements or ingredients 
involved, but of the processes underlying their construction, maintenance and change” 
(2008: 121).  
 
Institutional thought and investigation certainly brings to the fore issues that should be 
central for any kind of social research – the relationship between the social environment 
and agents, the reproduction or modification of that environment, the reproduction or 
modification of the agent, the nature of the causal processes involved in this maintenance 
or alteration, and so on. At the same time, “the concept of institution continues to elude 
clear and full specification” (Mohr and Friedland 2008: 421), and as with all its examples, 
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“[w]hat punch the concept in fact has will be revealed when we use it in practice to 
analyse reality” – it is here where the concept demonstrates its ability to provide “deeper 
insight” or greater “explanatory power” than its rivals (Danermark et al. 1997: 122). It 
therefore pays to move towards a sounder understanding of the institution by 
temporarily leaving its confines for the wider social world, and setting our conceptual 
requirements within a broader theoretical approach to understanding the appearance 
and nature of social reality. 
Social theory, explanation and critical realism 
 
Two traditions have been thought to dominate investigation of the social. For naturalists, 
there was no fundamental difference between the objects of social and natural sciences. 
Explanation simply involves asking questions about how and why things are the way they 
are, a pursuit which demands observation and descriptions of facts on the basis of which 
we gain knowledge of the (social) world by identifying regularities or patterns – 
“deductive subsumption under universal laws” (Bhaskar 1998: xi). Against Durkheim, Mill 
and the empiricism and positivism of behaviourists and functionalists responding to the 
Vienna Circle, an anti-naturalism came to follow from the consideration that the objects 
of the social world are intrinsically meaningful to the actors involved. This necessitated 
interpretative understanding on the part of the researcher, what Weber called verstehen, 
required to grasp the meaning-making activities by which people create and make sense 
of each other and their world (1978 [1922]). The two approaches are seen as in 
opposition, a schism which has only grown as empiricist and positivist traditions have 
spawned sophisticated variants aided by developments in fact-gathering technologies of 
data collection underpinned by advances in rationalist philosophies of science, while anti-
naturalism has been energised by a post-Wittgensteinian linguistic turn and social 
constructivism. At its most extreme, railing against a logocentric scientism, 
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postmodernism rejects the idea of an objectively knowable world entirely – the discursive 
construction of the world shatters reality into multiple, incommensurable worlds12 (Lopez 
and Potter 2001; Sayer 2000a). 
Despite the polarisation entrenched by this dichotomy, their rivalry is, on the one hand, 
constructed on a fundamental philosophical error and, on the other, offers a false choice 
by ignoring the breadth of social scientific investigation. Incorrect, firstly, is the positivist 
portrayal of natural science: that science proceeds by the empirical realist search for and 
discovery of Humean regularities constituting scientific laws. Against this, proceeding by 
inverting Kant (asking “What must the world be like in order that scientific practice be 
successful?” rather than “What a priori scientific categories are required to render sense 
experience coherent?” (Harvey 2002)), Bhaskar (1975; 1979) has argued that the 
transcendental condition for science is rendered philosophically incoherent by positivism: 
it cannot accommodate the quintessentially scientific endeavour of searching for 
unobserved causes of observed (empirical) phenomena, nor can it sustain the 
transcendental reality of these causes when empirical indicators of their existence might 
be absent. The objects of science lay beyond sense data: they are “structures, powers, 
mechanisms and tendencies… aspects of reality that underpin, generate or facilitate the 
actual phenomena that we may (or may not) experience, but are typically out of phase 
with them” (Bhaskar and Lawson 1998: 5). This depth realism is ill-conceived by 
naturalists and anti-naturalists alike, and by positivists and anti-positivists. Secondly, 
placing these transcendental realist considerations alongside studies of society, the roots 
of such an approach to social science are visible in a great deal of work since the dawn of 
the social sciences – in Marx, of course, but also in Polanyi, Durkheim, Weber and in 
today’s so-called post-positivism and, indeed, neoinstitutionalism. The challenge is to 
12 Weber did not reject the scientific ambitions of sociology nor generalisation, which is often counterposed to 
the relativism implied or embraced by some discourse theorists. 
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draw from and develop upon this work a consistent, naturalist epistemology, which 
Bhaskar and others have accomplished in critical realism. 
 
Realism is a much-used (or overused) term across philosophy and the social sciences. In 
this context, it simply asserts a fundamental precept of science: that there is a real world 
independent of the researcher. The concepts and theories developed by the latter, which 
form the resources and media of science, are transitive, while the objects they claim to 
refer to intransitive. Reducing questions of being to questions of knowledge, experience, 
perspective or discourse collapses ontology into epistemology and “results in the 
systematic dissolution of the idea of a world… independent of but investigated by 
science” (Bhaskar 1975: 36–37). The temptation toward epistemic fallacy, to analyse 
questions or statements about as questions or statements about knowledge, is far greater 
with the social world as it is dependent on human beings and their interactions to 
constitute, reproduce and transform it. Yet whilst differing in such agent dependency 
from the natural world, this does not change the fact that the world created through our 
everyday interactions brings into being real objects independent of the knowledge and 
concepts used to grasp and understand them by the social researcher, and, for that 
matter, by the lay individual. The social world, whilst dependent on our continued 
physical and mental activities, pre-dates and confronts both the researcher and social 
agent as the medium and outcome of social activity. 
 
Motivating the rejection of philosophies based on an epistemic fallacy was the inability of 
empirical realism to provide an explanatory science, “as if the world just happened to 
correspond to the range of our senses and to be identical to what we experience” (Sayer 
2000a: 11). A similar dissolution of intransitivity occurs in those varieties of hermeneutics 
which understand the world as wholly constituted by textual creation and interpretation. 
48 
 
Both operate on the basis of a “logic of immediacy” through which experience or 
discourse exhaust the world (Cruickshank 2003). Against this flattened ontology, realism 
holds that in order to explain social phenomena like events and trends, or beliefs, 
dilemmas and values, the world must be understood as having ontological depth. Reality 
is understood as layered, consisting of a stratum of actual events, a more restricted 
empirical domain constituted by our experiences of those events, and a real domain of 
social structures and mechanisms (Bhaskar 1975). 
 
Given the nature of the real it follows that the task of natural and social science is not the 
listing of atomistic occurrences but investigation and explanation of the generative power 
of causal mechanisms. “Causal explanation”, therefore, “is not about recording the 
deterministic or stochastic association of patterns of events, but the ascription of causal 
powers to objects” (Tsoukas 2000: 29). Empiricism and constructivism evade questions of 
causality and necessity, and hence fail to explain how different the objects and forces of 
social reality interact. An important epistemological and methodological consequence of 
recognising ontological stratification is a more sophisticated conception of these objects 
of science and of the underlying base of their capacities. Specifically, features or aspects 
of the world can combine to make “properties or powers of a whole that are not 
possessed by its parts” (Elder-Vass 2010: 16). Rather than a reductive explanation, critical 
realism – unburdened by empiricism – looks to explicate the parts and the (most likely 
unobservable) necessary relations that constitute social objects and resulting emergent 
powers. For example, the ability of an NGO worker to disburse grants depends on role 
capacities within the organisation, the organisation’s relationship with a donor, donor 
agency’s relationship with taxpayers at home, with the host state and so on.  
For the researcher, this highlights the importance of abstraction, which “attempts to 
grasp… precisely the generative mechanisms and causal structures which account in all 
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their complex and multiple determinations for… concrete phenomena” (Bhaskar 1998: 
xvi). Rather than empirical generalisations or application of neo-Kantian idealist models, 
analysis is directed toward the structures considered involved in the phenomenon under 
investigation, rather than experience or idealist reconstructions of it e.g. the autonomous 
spheres of civil society discussed in Chapter 1. Practitioners and researchers rarely subject 
the mental activity of selection of such objects, the movement from the “real concrete” to 
the “thought concrete”, to critical scrutiny (Ollman 2003: 60); but as Sayer notes, “neither 
objects nor their relations are given to us transparently; their identification is an 
achievement and must be worked for” (1992: 88). At the end of this Chapter, I outline my 
method for realising this ambition in empirical research on NGOisation. 
Below I apply these observations and injunctions to institutional thought and the causal 
processes of institutional change in the context of NGOisation. I begin by placing 
NGOisation in a broader research tradition of rationalisation and formalisation in 
organisations; careful analysis of influential work in this area demonstrates how critical 
realism is required to add vital clarity and support required by causal explanation. 
Institutions and the rise of the formal organisation 
 
The institutional outcome I primarily focus on within this research is the dominance of the 
NGO and its effects on the politics of radical, emancipatory collective action. An offshoot 
of social movement studies, the term ‘NGOisation’ has been increasingly applied in recent 
years by a small number of writers investigating the rise of the NGO, in a variety of 
contexts. The term covers variably critical perspectives on recent change in the nature of 
civil society organisation and activity, characterised by various manifest pathologies 
including bureaucratisation, “professionalization, depoliticization and demobilization” 
(Choudry and Kapoor 2013b: 1); in this way, NGOisation challenges, retards or even 
defiles radical values and objectives of ‘authentic’ social movements. This situates 
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NGOisation within a broader phenomenon: the ascendency of formal or rational 
organisation. Such a dependent variable has been the focus of a great deal of work 
throughout the twentieth century and in recent decades has seen organisational theory 
twin with neoinstitutionalism and, consequently, be articulated across the latter’s many 
variants. 
 
Sociologically-inclined institutionalism, in rejecting the pre-constituted rational agent as a 
basis for the dispersal, reproduction or undermining of institutions (and thus reductively 
explaining away the institution), instead sees institutions as embedded in the broader 
socio-cultural environment, the “collective normative order” (Zucker 1987: 444). The task 
of the social researcher, on this account, is to explain how a rationalised zeitgeist comes 
to be crystallised in organisations. Meyer and Rowan famously made the case for the 
decoupling of efficiency and instrumentality from the decision to adopt formal 
organisational rules and structures, and instead present a cultural argument that “the 
formal structures of many organizations in postindustrial society… dramatically reflect the 
myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities” 
(1977: 341). This has accelerated tremendously in recent years as the rationalisation of 
activity and formal organisation has spread across practically all domains of life, 
demonstrating “widespread cultural rationalization, characterized by scientism, human 
rights and empowerment discourses, and the expansion of higher education”(Meyer and 
Bromley 2013: 369). Whereas the early work held that “ceremonial rules are transmitted 
by myths” with actors “ceremonially conforming” to institutionalised environments (1977: 
355), later work described the dissemination of these cultural principles from 




Meyer and Rowan’s work prompted more detailed investigation into the interconnections 
between the organisation and environment-as-institution by Powell and DiMaggio. Their 
much-cited (1983) paper argues, contra Weber, that in late modernity entities display a 
surprising isomorphism in their structure not by virtue of their enclosure within an “iron 
cage” of bureaucratic rationality as demanded by capitalist market economy, but through 
their being structured in an organisational field – in “a recognised area of institutional life” 
characterised by connectedness and structural equivalence (ibid.: 148). Within the field, 
analytically distinct coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic processes operate to see 
similar forms and approaches respectively forced upon, copied or professionally 
encouraged, often – echoing Meyer and Rowan – taken up without an iota of evidence 
that the qualities and properties being replicated are in any way instrumentally effective. 
“To the extent that organizational effectiveness is enhanced, the reason will often be that 
organizations are rewarded for being similar to other organizations in their field” (ibid.: 
153), even though adopted norms are often even decoupled from actual behaviour. 
 
Most applications of Powell and DiMaggio’s work have centred on commercial 
organisations, but understanding the ‘environment as institutional force’ clearly merits 
broader application, including civil society. Barnett understands humanitarianism as an 
institutional field within which “organizations, desirous of symbolic and material 
resources and exposed to the same environment, will tend to adopt the same 
organizational forms” (Barnett 2005: 729). The depiction of the aid industry as a non-
profit industrial complex opens the way for introducing this observation into aid and 
development more broadly, and understand the dominance of the formal organisation in 
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civil society activity and its effects on social movements – NGOisation – as a particular 
token of institutionalisation13.  
 
Sociological institutionalism successfully prevented theoretical colonisation of 
institutional approaches to organisation by the neo-utilitarian theory of the firm, enabling 
culture to displace calculus. However, what is deeply problematic in the above 
sociological accounts of institutions and organisation is that the purported relationship 
between the institutionalised agent and their institutionalised environment collapses into 
a unity. The isomorphism between the organisation and its environment – principally 
constituted by other organisations – erases the agency of the organisation. Despite this 
identity apparently processed by reflection, all the heavy lifting is accomplished by 
“institutionalized environments” into which “organizations tend to disappear as distinct 
and bounded units” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 346).  
 
The transformation of agents into institutional dupes is due in no small part to the 
inability of empiricist methodological inability to theorise beyond collected sense data. 
Although Powell and DiMaggio claim to identify real causal processes behind 
isomorphism, they are wedded to an understanding of institutional isomorphism which is 
exhausted by generalisations of the behaviour of actors. This is a common but egregious 
error, well described by Fleetwood: 
 
One of the most common mistakes in social science is to confuse the temporal sequence 
involving agents, the socio-economic phenomena they draw upon, and the resulting 
action/outcome. It is, for example, extremely common to find institutions conceived of 
13 I understand NGOisation as an institutionalisation process. As I show later through the example of Myanmar, 
different socio-historical circumstances mean the institution is realised in quite different ways. 
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simultaneously as phenomena that causally influence agents’ actions, and as patterns of 
agents’ actions, typically in the form of regularities (Fleetwood 2014: 246). 
 
The result is a confusing conflation of the institution, agential routines and structure, a 
conflation that both stands in for and in the way of a causal description of relationship 
between what are distinct, real social elements. By virtue of this error, DiMaggio and 
Powell’s purported “mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs” 
are merely a description of the phenomena to be explained (1983: 150). What was 
originally the explanandum now appears as the explanans. 
 
Both these iconic papers draw attention more widely to the undoubted importance of 
cultural and political change in the dominance of formal organisation across society. 
Below, I argue that a critical realist understanding of structures, agency and the institution 
can better grasp the ontology of social change at the meso level and allows it to be more 
readily connected to dynamics at other levels of abstraction. Allied with insights from 
historical institutionalism and political economy, a critical realist understanding of a 
stratified reality makes it well-placed to understand – without conflation – the different 
layers of structural, agential and institutional dynamics involved in a process of social 
change like NGOisation. Below I examine recent critical realist attempts to understand 
institutions and institutionalisation, identifying their insights and their lacunae, before 






Critical realist approaches to institutions and institutionalisation 
processes 
 
Given its restriction to ‘underlabouring’14, there is no special critical realist version of 
institutions. Critical realists approach a purported institution as any other entity – with a 
concern for constitution, emergent properties and causal mechanisms through which they 
affect the world and a recognition that their sui generis powers operate amongst other 
social mechanisms in open systems. Towards the end of this chapter, I detail the method 
by which an institution can be identified, explained and its causal powers assessed in 
practice, using specific critical realist modes of inference to “[describe and conceptualise] 
properties and causal mechanisms generating and enabling events, making things 
happen…, and then describing how different mechanisms manifest themselves under 
specific conditions” (Danermark et al. 1997: 74). Given that realist method and 
epistemology is driven by ontology, we must embed the kind of causal account required 
by critical realism within institutional theory – and, having offered further evidence for an 
institutional character in the tendency towards NGO formation, to NGOisation – whilst 
avoiding the difficulties seen above.  
Our initial sociological understanding of institutions directed attention to “that [which] 
introduce[s] a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott 
2008: 54)15. Classical, Durkheimian sociology saw the causal power of norms inhere in 
society and culture itself. On the other hand, the felt compulsion that characterises norms 
is, by definition, subjective. Thus Elder-Vass asks “what form can culture take that is 
external to individuals and also able to influence their beliefs?” (Archer and Elder-Vass 
14 The notion of underlabouring in this context centres on the status of critical realism as “a metatheory or 
'philosophical ontology', rather than a 'scientific ontology' which tells us what structures, entities and 
mechanisms make up the [social] world” (Archer 1998: 197). 
15 Scott’s definition begins with “rules”, which is perhaps unnecessarily restrictive given the range of forms that 
normative prescriptions can take. 
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2012: 99). What are “the precise social entities responsible for the causal influence of 
normative institutions and the mechanisms by which they acquire these powers” (2010: 
116)?  
Similarly, Fleetwood sees agents “acting within a social environment consisting of 
[external] rules… that influence our intentions and actions” (Fleetwood 2008: 253). For 
Fleetwood the normative system is fundamentally different from social structures as the 
latter do not ‘touch’ us, whereas institutions seem to do precisely that. They can do this 
because, whilst structures remain ontologically separate from the agent, “an institution is 
a system of established rules, conventions, norms, values and customs that become 
embodied or internalised within agents as habits or habitus, via a process of habituation 
rooted in the nervous system” (ibid.: 254). For Elder-Vass, institutions have a similar 
impact but work through a different process. He sees them as the emergent power of a 
group or community - a “norm circle”. Parts (individuals) join together and combine to 
structure an entity, relating through commitment to the norm; the institution qua 
emergent power is the collective intention to support the norm. 
 
They may support the norm by advocating the practice, by praising or rewarding those 
who enact it, by criticising or punishing those who fail to enact it, or even just by 
ostentatiously enacting it themselves. The consequence of such endorsement and 
enforcement is that the members of the circle know they face a systematic incentive to 
enact the practice (Elder-Vass 2010: 124). 
 
This is not a mere pressure to behave that would most likely disappear when circle 
members’ backs were turned but a reconstitution of agential dispositions. The institution 
emergent from agential interaction returns downwards to causally affect that agency. This 
approach is an improvement on Fleetwood’s conception which, despite seeing institutions 
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constituted in a “system” (often a byword for a complexity of structures), retains the 
notion of powers inhering in rather than emergent from this entity – a restrictive 
retroduction. 
 
Despite their differences, both Elder-Vass and Fleetwood develop Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus to make sense of the internalisation of institutions (Bourdieu 1990). 
Straightforward, linear institution-to-behaviour hydraulics through habitus can easily 
resemble what Archer (2015: 125) calls a “blotting paper” approach to socialisation. A 
ritual reference to open systems (more open in Elder-Vass due to persons affected by 
wider sets of norms) and tendencies rather than regularities alone is insufficient here. For 
Fleetwood, this is particularly problematic as the institution qua norm appears to work 
directly on agency; in a return to an oversocialised concept of man it also becomes hard 
to understand how institutions can wither and fade, or be resisted (Wrong 1968). For 
Elder-Vass the relationship is indirect, allowing space for the institution to develop socially 
and be subject to the vicissitudes of agency, and indeed for agential reflection on the 
institution. Dying norms may bring about few or no previously expected sanctions, while 
underneath this is the structural dissolution of the norm circle as commitments wane. 
 
Yet norm circles do not help us understand change. For Elder-Vass, repeated exposure to 
norms changes neuropsychological circuitry that results in both subjective endorsing and 
enforcing behaviour; this is based on emergent products of past experience. It is difficult 
to make ontological room both for institutional emergence and for the subjective 
apprehension of norms in these circumstances. This suits norm circles to synchronic 
analysis under conditions of structural stability rather than diachronic analysis during 
structural elaboration (what Archer (1995) calls “morphogenesis”). Used in the latter it 
does not merely abstract from other determinants but overwhelms them. Although norm 
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circles offer an answer the question of how institutions work, it is not immediately 
obvious how it can help with other core questions sociological institutionalism commonly 
looks to answer. Why, for instance, does a particular institution emerge in the first place? 
Why, at that particular place and time, did the institution appear to break down, to 
‘deinstitutionalise’?  The effect is that “social structures abstracted lack historical 
ontological depth” (Roberts 2014: 12). 
 
Once we have admitted a more complex institutional environment, it is only by a 
particular methodological fiat – the bracketing of structure and agency – that the 
downwards causality of institutions holds and characterises institutions a priori. It is this 
which gives the norm circle an unwarranted telos for stability or even permanency, 
ignoring the powers of agency or other entities, even after the possibility of institutional 
abandonment has already been admitted. As Carrigan (2014) notes, 
 
There is a gap between what we endorse, encompassing both the reflective and the 
habitual, and what we enforce, shaped by the particular relational configurations within 
which different practitioners of reflexivity find themselves entwined and their ensuing 
orientations. 
 
An acceptable account of institutions should be sufficiently adaptable to elucidate key 
aspects of institutional phenomena: this certainly includes the power of normative 
institutionalisation, but also the emergence of institutions, their deinstitutionalisation, 
variation in the degree of institutionalisation, resistance to institutionalisation and so on. 
Whilst the idea of norm circles can be drawn upon to explain institutional power at 
certain points in the institutionalisation process, it is only through examining the 
diachronic interplay between structures, institutions, agency and reflexivity that a deeper 
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account of institutional variation, selection and retention can be given. In other words, 
institutions need to be put in their ontological place rather than assuming they are the 
fundamental architecture of social reality (Jessop 2001a; Sum and Jessop 2013: 33-71). 
An alternative: a strategic-relational approach to institutions and 
institutionalisation 
 
A more reasonable account of institutional power, satisfactory for the critical realist from 
ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives, comes from locating it “in 
wider sets of semiotic and structural relations and their articulation” (Sum and Jessop 
2013: 26). I use Bob Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (SRA) as an overarching 
epistemology of social change, and with insights from Andrew Sayer, Margaret Archer, 
Dave Elder-Vass and critical realism more broadly to build a commensurable 
understanding of two concepts from neoinstitutionalism – ‘logics of appropriateness’ and 
the ‘institutional field’. Taken together this represents an advance on the approaches 
discussed above through the production of a conceptual framework with sufficient 
conceptual potential to explore both the structural and agential components of the 
institution. Furthermore, it locates this study within a post-disciplinary framework 
promoted by critical realism. 
 
Jessop offers no special ontology for the institution, instead using the SRA to illuminate 
institutional processes of social development.16 Like other realist models of social action 
(Bhaskar 1979; Archer 1995), agents are assumed to interact with and so reproduce or 
transform pre-existing social structures, which constrain or enable social action. More 
16 This was originally designed to shed light on capital or class-centred accounts of the state. This can be seen 
as a variation on structure-agency dualism, and although, as Fleetwood and Elder-Vass point out, these terms 
are far from interchangeable, institution-agency can initially be understood as a further variant of their 
dialectic and the SRA, therefore, offers a suitable epistemology to examine it. 
59 
 
                                                            
uniquely, the SRA understands structure and agency relationally; their relationship 
hinging around structural privileging of certain actors and ways of acting, and agential 
understanding and response to such structural bias. Thus, fundamentally, “social structure 
can be studied… as involving structurally inscribed strategic selectivity; and action can 
likewise be analyzed in terms of its performance by agents with strategically calculating 
structural orientation” (Jessop 1996: 124). Beginning from this premise – and although the 
SRA’s rejection of an isolationist ontology of institutional elements makes dissection 
somewhat difficult – I work from structure to agency and culture in order to develop each 
side and strata of the relationship, elucidating the co-constitution of the institution, its 
transformation over time and the all-important socialisation or conditioning of the 
subject. 
Structure in the strategic-relational approach 
Structures are here understood as relatively enduring relations between social positions. 
They can exist on a micro scale, such as the relations between professional roles which 
constitute a firm, or on a macro scale, such as the relations of production that constitute a 
form of economic organising, such as capitalism. Entities like NGOs appear deceptively 
simple: however, we have already seen they subsist only within complex relations with 
the state, and further analysis can show their relations with public law, their beneficiaries, 
donors and so on. Neoinstitutionalists have termed these systems of relations 
institutional fields, a concept variously described in recent decades of sociology and 
institutional writing, most notably by Bourdieu and his usage that brings together 
totalities of actors and their “objectively defined relations” across culture and society 
(Wacquant 1989: 39). Similarly, Meyer’s action context, meanwhile, “identifies the 
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specific social actors who, enabled and constrained by a set of macro-, situated, and field-
level identities, are connected by relations of interdependency”17 (Delmestri 2009: 132).  
The social structure itself can be understood as an outcome of relations between social 
positions, internally constitutive of identities “in that what the object is is dependent on 
its relation to the other” (Sayer 1992: 89). For example, the landlord-tenant structure 
defines the social identities and composite qualities – notably, its powers and its vested 
interests – of social positions within property rental systems. Moreover, “different (and 
antagonistic) interests… conflicts within society, and hence… interest-motivated 
transformations” are relational, located in social structure (Bhaskar 1979: 52-53). This 
approach to understanding a subject therefore sees it, and its various properties, 
constituted in a web of social relations. It is in this tradition that I continue to use the term 
‘field’, using it to refer to a latticework of relations constituting a structure with emergent 
selective powers rewarding certain strategic approaches (and thus employing it 
specifically in an institutional sense). 
This latticework is an outcome of earlier social actions, pre-dating and confronting the 
actor as objective18 reality. Confrontation here is employed metaphorically, as what is 
most likely to be ‘felt’ by actors are certain effects of structural selectivity, the privileging 
of “some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, 
some actions over others” (Jessop 2001a: 1223), as agents attempt to realise projects 
motivated by structurally-fostered interests19. It is by virtue of the impact of these 
structural mechanisms that the institution appears in a particular area of social life as a 
17 Highlighting structural identities and interdependency here is helpful, so long as we understand that 
interdependency does not entail symmetries of power. 
18 Throughout this work, I take objective to mean “‘pertaining to objects’, as distinct from subjects and refers 
to the nature of things regardless of what we or others may think about them” (Sayer 2000a: 58). 
19 The NGO, for instance, located in a latticework that includes structural relations with donors and 
government, will look to raise money from and keep good relations with the former, and perhaps criticizing 





                                                            
strategic context or terrain, forming (in part) by virtue of the strategic selectivity of 
structures and the particular agential strategies better suited to prevailing institutional 
circumstances than others (structurally-oriented agency). Figure 1 shows how these are in 
dynamic, dialectical relation with one another, evolving (and, also, unravelling in 
deinstitutionalisation), creating an institutional history, “path-dependent, emergent 
phenomena, recursively reproduced through specific forms of action” (Jessop 2001a: 
1230). As strategic actions compatible with structural prejudices tend to be rewarded, a 
reinforcing circularity reproduces the institutional field. 
Strategic selectivity and structural orientation can therefore be understood as 
mechanisms in the critical realist sense: causal powers or capacities emergent from 
particular organisations of parts. However, the agential capacity to gain a ‘feel for the 
institutional game’, modifying and adapting strategy to in-built contours of the system, is 
tactically challenging, as legacies from the outcomes of earlier institutional interactions 
limit agential ability to recalibrate itself (or to challenge structures and work for their 




Figure 1: Bob Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to the structure-agency dialectic 
(Jessop 2001a: 1224). 
Norms and logics of appropriateness 
I will work within this Jessopian institutional frame as the dialectic of structurally inscribed 
strategic selectivities and structurally oriented strategic calculation is a powerful, useful 
epistemology to grasp the ontology of stability and change in civil society actors. But as 
Sum and Jessop note, institutionalisation “involves not only the conduct of agents and 
their conditions of action, but also the very constitution of agents, identities, interests and 
strategies” (2013: 65). Precisely how agential constitution or institutional conditioning 
proceeds is therefore of central importance; whilst the SRA unpacks the forces involved, 
we need to investigate the socialisation process itself in closer detail. Taking the 
normative content of institutions seriously means finding a place for some of the core 
material of neoinstitutionalism, including conventions, values, beliefs, modes of 
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calculation – in short, for the socialisation which results from the collective sense-making 
involved in getting to know and work with particular structural selectivities. Having 
focused on structure, I now restore balance to the institutional framework developed thus 
far by seeing the concept of a logic of appropriateness through the lens of Margaret 
Archer’s approach to cultural conditioning. This helps elaborate Jessop’s notion of 
structural selectivities to yield a culturally mediated structural orientation. 
The logic of appropriateness 
 
The notion of a logic of appropriateness (LoA) captures well the normative topography I 
wish to emphasise in the institutional dialectic. A LoA says that to 
act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalised practices of a collectivity 
and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. Actors 
seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a 
membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be 
adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity (March 2008: 193). 
This widespread approach to the LoA draws from hermeneutics and Winch-inspired, 
Wittgensteinian social theory (Sending 2002). However, as appropriate behavior follows 
institutionalised practices, the concept appears circular, and once again threatens to turn 
agents into institutional dupes, “trapped in the narratives that one has learned… to create 
and live by” (Harre 2001: 26). At the same time, the LoA appears to capture something 
fundamental and important about the ‘givenness’ of much routine social life, such as how 
procedural norms associated with project cycle management are now an integral part of 
what it means to undertake development and human rights work.  
An approach to the LoA more commensurable with realism would see it as an abstraction 
of knowledge from outcomes of earlier SRA dialectical processes i.e. from the sets of 
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intelligibilia associated with past structure-agency outcomes. These might include ideas, 
beliefs, routines, problem-solving logics, technologies, solutions, formations and so on. In 
Archer’s words these are part of “the environment of contemporary action”, mediating 
agency as an “objective influence which conditions action patterns and supplies agents 
with strategic directional guidance” (Archer 1995: 196). Whilst the idea of actors 
reflecting on structural selectivities carries an air of scholastic fallacy (Bourdieu 2000), 
making more familiar things objects of reflection is more realistic especially in times of 
morphogensis, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) showed with the prevalence of mimesis 
and isomorphism in circumstances of uncertainty. 
These logics are encountered in the institutional context in which agents act. Bourdieu 
(1977), for example, maps out contexts as networks of relevant relationships, while 
Stones takes seriously the hermeneutics of an agent’s “practical action horizon” within 
networks of position-practices (2005: 87-94). Such networks have also been understood 
as “communities of practice” (Wenger 1998); they offer learning and reflective 
opportunities by virtue of being a setting for the daily interactions and routines of similar 
or related entities – in other words, they are institutional carriers. To take an example 
from this research, the project and its associated routines such as report writing and 
financial management are necessary – and to some extent, primary – in the modern 
labour of democracy promotion and human rights protection. By insertion into this 
institutional milieu, it is not just these practices that are acquired; at a normative and 
ideational level, human rights and democracy promotion come to favour a particular 
agential form and norms. 
The practical requirements of ‘getting on’ in a community of practice are contingent 
socio-cultural prompts to access an institutionally-relevant subset of items in the “corpus 
of ideas” that composes the cultural system (Archer 1995). These cultural emergent 
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properties (CEPs) “are objective and are the product of previous generations of thinkers 
and the causal relations pertaining to those thinkers” (Thursfield and Hamblett 2004: 
114). When this corpus of knowledge qua LoA is accessed, it is a generative mechanism 
with the causal power to enable or constrain action. It offers qualitative guidance for 
structurally-oriented action, an invitation to orientation through extant practical solutions 
that can, nevertheless, be refused, challenged, transformed, ignored or misunderstood, 
depending on agential projects20. For NGOs, these cultural products might include 
“methodologies for calculating results, abstract rules to guide standardized responses, 
and procedures to improve efficiency and identify the best means to achieve specified 
ends” (Barnett 2005: 729), and also, less tangibly, underlying assumptions e.g. that these 
approaches rather than direct action against government are the way to perform human 
rights and development work.  
Importantly, the conditioning of the actor is achieved not by enforced action, or 
absorption (both suggesting determinism), but by supplied reasons for action; it is the 
agent-in-focus that turns outcomes of everyday encounters into a learning object and his 
/ her interaction that activates their causal powers, not the object itself, meaning that a 
problematic reification is avoided21. I am not therefore suggesting that a logic with causal 
powers somehow materialises and obligates certain actions. This operationalises Jessop’s 
observation that 
the recursive selection of strategies and tactics depends on individual, collective, or 
organisational learning capacities and on the ‘experiences’ resulting from the pursuit of 
different strategies and tactics in different conjunctures (Jessop 2000: 49). 
20 I use this word in the Archerian sense, broadly meaning ‘planned actions’. In later chapters it will also refer 
to the technical intentions of development actors. 
21 “As [actors] weigh them in the balance, [objective] costs and penalties tip the scales in one direction, 
meaning that countervailing concerns would have to be strong enough to outweigh them” (Archer 1995: 209). 
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Situations and agential capacity vary widely in the concrete. In remarking on the “relative 
variations in the ontic manifestations of general ontological concepts”, Rob Stones invites 
us to appreciate how qualities of agency such as knowledgeability, reflexivity and strategic 
thinking are matters of degree, and that this variation between actors can make a 
difference to outcomes (Stones 2005: 78). From another angle, if actors can only access a 
limited set of cultural points in which the LoA inheres, if they do not move within 
particular social circles, they will have little understanding or awareness of developments 
in logics of appropriateness. This variability of capacity in the face of institutions will be 
important when exploring the different outcomes of NGOisation. Different groups of 
human rights defenders seeking resources for varied activities may encounter the same 
‘solution’ in the form of a donor-grantee fiduciary structure, but may differ in ability – or 
inclination – to respond. This is a more reflexive way of understanding similar points made 
by Fleetwood (2009) and Elder-Vass (2010) regarding the importance of proximity for 
habitus. Actors with different capacities, histories and interests are differentially affected 
by (and are differentially effective upon) selectivities, and the LoA ‘answer’ is always 
contested and contingent, shutting the door on institutional dupes. 
Culturally-mediated interaction with structural selectivities 
Although structural selectivities are most readily, though fallibly, grasped by actors 
through norms visible and understood once interacting in the system, contra Giddens 
(1979) such rules of thumb are not structure. Like the institution of the norm circle, the 
LoA is an emergent entity - a compendium of received wisdom of structurally-oriented 
calculations with its own powers to affect agency via reflexivity. Structures, on the other 
hand, are here understood as enduring relations between social positions. Although 
presented here as somewhat fixed for didactic purposes, structures change, norms 
change, thanks primarily to agential action. It is important to understand clearly the 
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relationship between the two institutional levels described, viz. the enduring social 
relationships constituting the institutional field, and the norms, conventions and values of 
the LoA, and its dialectical relationship in the creation of the institution.  
Given the identity “built into a social position by the relationship of that position to other 
positions in the system” (Archer 1995: 204) its occupants have particular vested interests 
and pursue culturally mediated courses of action to meet them. For example, someone is 
structurally a tenant by virtue of his occupation of a property relation; they will maintain 
their tenancy by acceding to certain associated norms such as paying the rent on time, 
keeping the place clean and so on. Moreover, unless one is the kind of person who can 
accede to these norms e.g. has a steady job and a bank account, then one is unlikely to 
become a tenant at all. This is the mechanism of selectivity, an emergent property of the 
structure, operating differently on differently endowed subjects. 
In this sense, the LoA can be seen not only as disseminating information on simple norms 
like the correct way to shake hands, but reinforcing fundamental identity-constitutive 
relations encoded in structural selectivities. At this level my focus is therefore on the 
institutionalisation of the subject, occurring by virtue of selectivities for the kind of entity 
that can subsist in a given (pre-existing) field position and the agent’s varied awareness 
and response to those selective mechanisms. It is the institutional work which takes place 
on the entity that shapes the adequacy of the entity for that role, not the existence of the 
role itself as per crude functionalism or role theory. 
Reality is, of course, complex, and institutional life is not simply made up of interactions 
internal to one institution but also of causal interactions between them. As heuristically 
useful as it is to proceed on the basis of a simple one-to-one dialectic, whether the real 
mechanisms of “a potentially unstructured complexity” are unified in a “structured 
coherence” is not only down to reflexive reorganisation of strategic selectivities – a 
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dialectical unity of structure-agency – as Jessop highlights (2001a: 1225), and the ontic 
variation of agential capacity to accomplish this, but is also a function of the 
complementarities or contradictions between elements of institutions themselves. 
“Practical exigencies” (Archer 1995: 215) created by “second order emergent properties 
of compatibility or incompatibility” (ibid.: 201) in institutional ensembles which will 
“hinder [or help] the achievement or satisfaction of [agents’] vested institutional 
interests” (ibid.: 215). Compatibilities or contradictions arise between institutionally 
adjacent norms, beliefs and ideas, while structural synergies appearing or being disrupted 
between different areas of social interaction.  
In these situational logics, tension or congruence between cultural logics and material 
structures can become apparent. To return to the landlord-tenant relation above, proof of 
UK residency is now required for tenancy agreements. Such a change in structural 
selectivity will be refracted in the cultural system e.g. predatory landlord practices arising 
to service undocumented migrants. The intrusion of utilitarian calculations onto moral 
economies can result in incongruencies and ethical dilemmas. For example, when the 
structures and norms around childcare and modern employment institutions graze one 
another, it is not only systemic incompatibilities which are revealed (for Archer, a function 
of material relations) but also “the extent to which needs and virtues get compromised in 
the process”(Sayer 2000b: 93). This highlights the importance of values. 
The place of values and ideas 
 
Whilst the social theory above might provide an epistemological frame to grasp aspects of 
social reality, it says nothing about why the goings-on in this world should motivate or 
matter to people, nothing about what we value and how we come to value it. For a thesis 
in which the main protagonists were imprisoned for decades for standing up for human 
rights, this would be an unacceptable omission; however, the subjective quality of values 
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appears out of step with the realist view presented so far. Yet far from being irreducibly 
subjective, Andrew Sayer (2011) has shown how values have an irredeemably objective 
element to them. Sayer understands values as relational phenomena, as “sedimented 
valuations” (2011: 25) emergent from the history of evaluative stances taken by people 
towards the world. Our relations of care and concern towards the world generate 
attitudes and dispositions, becoming part of our selves. Values, therefore, “while in one 
sense… subjective and personal… are fallibly related to objective circumstances and 
events” (ibid.: 28). Our interaction with the everyday world, on this account, is a relation 
with a world of concern. Hence, the suffering that the civil society activist desires to 
ameliorate or the authoritarian government she seeks to depose for freedom or equality 
involve “’action-guiding’ or ‘world-guiding’” causal qualities that motivate behaviour for 
change (Jessop 2000: 44). 
Another reason values are not exhausted by their subjective component is because our 
experience of the world is mediated by prevailing social and cultural attitudes. Institutions 
therefore provide a social context for the acquisition and contestation of values. This does 
not mean they are “merely ventriloquized by social discourses” of the institution (Sayer 
2011: 27), but insofar as institutionalised actors share communities of practice and 
normative orientations then similar values can arise by virtue of a similar relation of 
concern and commitment to the world, something especially visible in political action. Yet 
this can be a dangerous assumption to make, especially between actors occupying 
different structural positions, and the wider we draw the boundaries of a community of 
practice the more likely it is that an apparently shared world of concern will actually 
fragment. For example, a grant for a civil society project superficially indicates a common 
outlook between donor and organisation, but different structurally-defined interests 
make this a hasty assumption. 
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Broadening this point, a logic of appropriateness and institutional norms are only fallibly 
related to agents’ values, and can themselves become objects of evaluative assessment 
and prompts for collective action in defence of what matters. This is because institutions 
can have certain undesirable or unexpected outcomes that conflict with values. Such 
contradictions and the never-fully-closed circuit of institutionalisation highlights the 
crucial point that actors “can reflexively reconstitute institutions and their resulting 
matrix” (Jessop 2001a: 1226). On the other hand, social, cultural, political and even 
physical or environmental change may fundamentally alter the objective reality against 
which values were developed in the first place – for example, commitment to violent 
action may seem outmoded following state concessions. Again, whether common ground 
can be found and an acceptable institutional ensemble maintained, or whether values 
themselves are reappraised (all more likely to be a matter of discussion in human rights 
and democracy work than in other social activities) is a contingent, socio-cultural matter. 
As values are closely related to beliefs, theory and reflection can play an important 
enabling role in the direction socio-cultural change takes. As the globalisation debate of 
the 1990s and 2000s showed, major societal change is commonly accompanied by 
developments in theory and explanation. It is therefore an uphill struggle to not merely 
explain material or ideational development but also to critique it. As Elder-Vass reminds 
us, the relations that sustain societies are, fundamentally, “intentional relations: They 
depend on the beliefs and dispositions that individuals hold, and in particular on the 
commitments to each other that these entail” (2012: 20), even if emergent structural 
powers are encoded materially. Unlike the relationship between our beliefs and the 
physical world, where the mental is radically separate from the physical, beliefs are a 
critical component in the reproduction of social stuff as they stand in close relation to, 
and partly constitute, their object (see Collier 2003: 131-157). Taken-for-granted beliefs 
that make up the logic of appropriateness and the structures and systems formed by 
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social relations are shot through with ideas about, and implications for, society. If 
explanation in social science is not be ideologically complicit by suspending judgment and 
presenting uncomprehending descriptions of structures and actions then it must extract 
these ideas and subject them, and the standpoints from where judgments are made, to 
critical scrutiny. 
Gramsci conceived such interrelations in his analysis of the formation and use of state 
power and, following from Chapter 1, I will use his conceptual apparatus through the 
following chapters as they powerfully extend the ontological and epistemological frame 
set out above. In his analysis of the persistence of elite rule under politically emancipated 
conditions, Gramsci saw this accomplished with the active consent of dominated – or 
subaltern22 – groups by way of hegemonic leadership throughout the social realm, which 
could be secured through the diffusion of certain attitudes, beliefs and moralities 
(Gramsci 1971: 244). These can be seen to subsist in common apparatuses and practices 
of society, which yield a “consensual diffusion of a particular cultural and moral view 
throughout society and its interconnection with coercive functions of power” (Morton 
2007: 95). Attempts to cultivate hegemony are promulgated by intellectuals who organise 
and diffuse ideas in order to cement a reciprocal relationship between the ethico-political 
and economic structures – constructing complementarities between economic, political 
and social life into a historic bloc. It is by these means that state power is secured and, a 
fortiori, a class leads and dominates. 
Translating Gramsci into the institutional and critical realist parlance employed above, we 
can see how logics of appropriateness are secreted through everyday practice, and 
22 Whilst ‘the subaltern’, like many of Gramsci’s concepts, took on different meanings according to the 
different problems to which he directed it to illuminate, in this thesis I use it according to what Liguori has 
called Gramsci’s first sense - “disaggregated sections of the population, politically (and therefore culturally) 
marginalized, whom he judged to be ‘at the margins of history’” (Liguori 2015: 129). Prior to political reform in 
2011, this includes the bulk of Myanmar’s population; opposition leaders can therefore be understood in this 
sense as subaltern leaders, although sometimes allied with bourgeois class interests. 
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discerned and acquired by agents as they go about their work in their communities of 
practice. Such cultural mediation serves to ensure that work is more or less adequate or 
effective with relation to the wider social formation, responsive to its structural 
selectivities and tending to reproduce them rather than overcome them. Yet any cosy 
cohesion between beliefs and structures cannot be taken for granted; as Gramsci noted 
and neo-Gramscians like Jessop insist, the relative autonomy of the superstructure from 
the economic base, of beliefs from structure, of consciousness from social being, opens 
the way for an alternative discursive mediation of the interactions between these two 
strata (Jessop 1982; 1990). Subaltern intellectuals engaging in counter-hegemonic 
struggle, in a war of position on the plane of politics and political values, means that any 
culturally-mediated structured coherence is only a tendency. Counter-hegemonic projects 
can involve logics inappropriate for the dominant structural field on which logics of 
appropriateness are based; in other words, political agency may play a key role in the 
construction of generative mechanisms to transform the established power of institutions 
(Joseph 2002: 125-145). 
With this in mind, below I consider NGOisation through the lens of the institutional 
account given above, prior to further developing this approach through empirical 
investigation and explanation in subsequent chapters. 
Application of institutional thought to studies of NGOisation 
 
Despite only occasionally making explicit reference to institutional thought itself, recent 
historical-political studies of NGOisation (which, relative to the scale of the phenomena, 
are scant) explore the kind of social phenomena well-suited for this line of enquiry: the 
causes, experiences and consequences of the expansion of a certain kind of behaviour, 
strategising and organising. Whilst studies from a variety of theoretical perspectives have 
provided rich accounts of NGOised civil society and civil society agency’s location in 
73 
 
particular circuits of political power 23, for a variety of reasons – particularly the 
underdevelopment of a clear ontology of social causality – theories of and approaches to 
NGOisation have tended to be one-sided with regard to the institutional dialectic. 
 
For example, social constructivist and discursive accounts have tended to foreground 
agency over social structure. This is evident in Shrestha and Adhikari’s argument that 
NGOisation is a product of a certain performance of politicality (2011), and in Ebrahim’s 
Foucauldian account, which overwhelmingly sees “the actions of NGOs as being 
structured by development discourse” with actors using their “perceptual frames” to 
“filter [discursive] information and stimuli from their environments and organize it into 
worldviews” (Ebrahim 2003: 112). Such approaches can be causally confusing – either the 
agent is all-powerful in that NGOised institutions are their creations, or the creations and 
discourses are all-powerful so that agents are its creations, with politics ‘getting inside’ an 
entity.  
 
Pulling in the opposite direction are structural accounts drawing from political process 
theory, which ties the emergence of openings for NGOised agential action to state change 
at the national and international level. Reimann, for example, highlights “top-down” 
factors which have led to “the creation of new international institutions” and their 
provision of “new political opportunities and incentives to organize” (2006: 48). Whilst 
Reimann goes on to cite the dissemination of a “pro-NGO norm” (ibid.: 58), with little 
room for agency the normative stuff of institutions can only belong to structure, which 
does all the causal heavy lifting. 
 
23 I emphasise this point as actors and their projects are always located in a circuit of power. Institutions are 
everywhere, but NGOisation is a politically distinct institutionalisation project.  
74 
 
                                                            
The NGO boom of the 1990s and 2000s led practitioner-academics observing change from 
the standpoint of grassroots social movements, especially in Latin America and South 
Asia, to foreground the political economy of neoliberal development in accounts of 
NGOisation. Resulting sociological and anthropological accounts of NGOisation drew 
attention to the professionalisation and depoliticisation of once radical actors and its 
connections with accompanying profound economic change. Alvarez (1999; 2009) 
examines the advent of NGOisation and its fracturing of a once vibrant feminist 
movement in Latin America. It stems from “global neo-liberalism’s active promotion and 
official sanctioning of particular organisational forms and practices among feminist 
organizations and other sectors of civil society”, leading to “[s]tate, IGO and IFI promotion 
of more rhetorically restrained, politically collaborative and technically proficient feminist 
practices” (Alvarez 2009: 176). Murdock (2008) highlights similar factors. These accounts 
tend to be deterministic, as the irresistible but disconcertingly nebulous force of 
neoliberalism negates the agency they are seeking to defend and renders analysis 
practically unnecessary (Townsend et al. 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005). Later work in 
this vein recognises such difficulties and returns both the power of agency (Alvarez 2009) 
and recognition of the contingencies involved in local struggles. This is evident in Choudry 
and Kapoor’s publication of collected investigations of NGOisation worldwide (2013a), 
which attends “to the variety in NGO and other organizational/movement types and 
formations in varied contexts of resistance and mobilization” (2013b: 2).  
However, resisting the temptation to posit a “21st century Iron Law of NGOization” 
(Alvarez 2009: 182) need not be at the cost of imprecision about social change: 
appreciating “that the term NGOization, and the urgency of particular concerns about this 
phenomenon, may indeed differ across contexts” (Choudry and Kapoor 2013b: 12) does 
not preclude investigating causal relationships nor entail that no general understanding of 
NGOisation as a causal process can come from situated investigations. Causal accounts do 
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not demand positivist, Popper-Hempel covering law generalisations which obliterate 
contingency, values and identity. Elucidation comes from identifying the structures, 
mechanisms and emergent properties that generate causal relationships but which are 
activated (or not) and shaped in concrete circumstances. In an attempt to open the way 
for grounded accounts of NGOisation to be more richly theorised, I have outlined a 
dialectical ontology of the institution based on a strategic-relational approach to structure 
and agency. On this critical realist account, professed ‘characteristics’ of NGOisation such 
as professionalisation and bureaucratisation are empirical phenomena which – if present 
– require causal explanation. Yet their absence does not mean that the causal 
mechanisms associated with NGOisation are not present, but rather that these powers 
are not activated or are counteracted by other powers, affected by ontic variations found 
in the history of organisations and the state, or negated by value-laden reasoning and 
actions. 
The critical realist approach to this research therefore contends that institutional causal 
dynamics involve a duality of structure and agency which ontologically converge but can, 
and must, be analytically separated and examined for causal explanation. Objects of 
earlier outcomes in the form of culture and values  constitute a medium,  which, through 
agential interaction, the move from an idea – a project –  to promote and protect 
democracy and human rights to an actual concrete formation and ways of acting is made 
and reproduced. The process of realising projects on the institutionalised terrain of civil 
society involves causal factors that reward a particular form of agency and the strategies 
it is capable of. With regards to NGOisation, we are investigating the institutional 
privileging of the NGO.  
The theory presented above describes the ontological and epistemological commitments 
and key analytical concerns of a critical realist-inflected institutional analysis of 
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NGOisation; it does not, however, offer much in the way of guidance for empirical 
investigation. Below I translate the theoretical framework into a methodology for 
investigating concrete institutional phenomena, in the particular form of NGOisation. 
Operationalising theory: Critical realist research design and the 
case study 
 
In the strategic-relational approach (SRA), structures are understood to have particular 
strategic selectivities. Emergent mechanisms or powers favour particular configurations, 
behaviours, practices and projects developed by agents. Examining and explaining 
NGOisation will therefore demand the depiction of the structural field encountered by 
human rights and democracy-promoting entities and an exploration of the processes by 
which structures select for and reinforce institutionally-related interests, yielding 
NGOising tendencies that impact agential form, practices and values. 
Unlike conjunctions of observable events, however, structural relations are not so readily 
accessible, let alone measurable, putting critical realist explanation at risk of indulging in 
convenient just-so stories conjured from the fertile academic imagination. Yet whilst 
critical realism emphasises how “theorizing is an inherent and absolutely vital part of the 
research method itself” (Danermark et al. 1997: 3), this in no way entails downplaying 
empirical investigation; nor, however, does it lead to an obvious method and techniques 
for empirical investigation. Rather, critical realism is unequivocal in holding that 
ontological commitments must guide epistemology and methodology. 
Although deployed by social scientists of all methodological persuasions, case study – “an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
units” (Gerring 2004: 342) – has been called “the basic design for realist research” 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014: 23). Accented by critical realist metatheory, case study 
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contradicts the positivist notion that this research design gains scientific credibility 
through “choosing cases that are especially representative of the phenomenon under 
study” (Gerring 2004: 347) or when it results in data that can “expand and generalize 
theories”  (Yin 2003: 10). This is because, firstly, widely varying contingencies in open 
systems mean there is no representative case which stands for the phenomenon in 
general , and secondly because inductive logic cannot describe the explanatory impetus 
driving realist research. For the realist, the goal is to lay bare mechanisms of causal 
necessity rather than to develop universal covering law-type statements. Realist case 
study therefore leans more toward intensive rather than extensive research. It seeks to 
identify the “substantial relations of connection” entered into by social agents and the 
emergent properties of these relations, thereby illuminating interdependencies between 
social positions and causal mechanisms generating – and, hence, explaining – phenomena 
of interest (Sayer 1992: 88). Any actual mechanism, however, must somehow subsist 
within particularities of space and time, so exploring its development also means 
explicating the wider context. 
In this research, the phenomenon of NGOisation is explored through a case study 
centering on a particular nation state, Myanmar. Understanding the possible 
development and impact of NGOisation is undertaken by separating and examining 
constituent elements of the institutional dialectic as they develop and interact over time. 
The case study thus investigates the logics of appropriateness that have characterised civil 
society agency over the nation’s longer history, and identifies the latticework of relations 
constituting the structural field that have appeared and affected these agential logics and, 
I will argue, generated the phenomenon of NGOisation in more recent years. Comparative 
case studies then demonstrate how the impact of NGOisation on actual organisations is 
shaped by entity origins, values and other contingent factors.  
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These different elements investigated within the case and the different explanatory aims 
attached demand a research design with methodological approaches and analytical 
devices suitably attentive to the ontology of the forms, processes and relations involved. 
As Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014: 23) note, “research designs for [critical realist]-research 
projects have the abductive and retroductive logics of discovery… embedded in them”, 
and I deploy these modes of inference in field and organisational investigations. Their 
meaning and application, along with other methodological considerations, are described 
in detail below. 
The case study: Identifying structures 
 
As detailed above, social structures underpin the generative mechanisms of institutions. 
Accordingly, analysis of their development is a key part of this research: as Mutch notes, 
“attention will need to be paid, if we are to take conditioning seriously, to the formation 
of the structures within which social interaction takes place” (2014: 226). However, as 
relatively durable social relations, social structures change only gradually – or, only rarely 
rapidly – over time. Connecting these points, Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014: 32-34) refer to 
a “generative institutional investigation”, in which attention is directed to the 
development of emergent generative mechanisms and also to the conditions in which 
change emerges. Research is both analytical and historical as “[c]ausal connections are 
sought suggesting the typical way generative mechanisms and contexts have connected 
historically to produce unique outcomes” (2014: 33). Using this approach the researcher 
may home in on a particular single case such as a geographical place, as in a regular case 
study, but within this examine “change in specific combinations of generative mechanisms 
and their contexts” (ibid.), identifying structures and examining how they combine with 
historical outcomes to generate, alter or destroy institutions over time (diachronically, as 
opposed to synchronically). 
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Within the sweep of time constituting the broader historical context of the case lurk 
structural developments, whose emergent mechanisms we suspect to generate the 
institutional phenomena we are interested in. The challenge is to pick out mechanisms 
from the wider mélange of social, political and cultural change – from, for example, shifts 
in technology, changes in consumption patterns, in governing parties and so on. To a large 
degree, the process of abduction involved here is a matter of taking on a reliable 
theoretical guide in order to clarify, redescribe or recontextualise some aspect of 
phenomena that may already be partly known within a conceptual or theoretical frame 
that elucidates new aspects (Danermark et al. 1997: 88-95). Possessing “a scholarly 
knowledge of the object of study in question” is therefore vital (Sayer 2000a: 19).  
Chapters 1 and 2 have prepared theoretical ground by critiquing the notion of civil society 
as a realm of freedom and articulating it as a terrain constituted by particular structural 
relations that affect – and that are affected by – social agents. In recent history, as a result 
of structure-agency interactions, NGOs as formalised operations have risen to the fore, 
with accompanying shifts in actors’ understanding of their role and dominant logics of 
practice, possibly depoliticising and professionalising subjects. I have suggested this is the 
effect of certain emergent mechanisms, but have heeding Bhaskar’s advice to “avoid any 
commitment to the content of specific theories and recognize the conditional nature of all 
its results” (1979: 6): theory does not specify mechanisms but only provides “parameters 
of possibility” within which we discover, identify and understand the mechanisms in play, 
and to reciprocally adjust one’s theory to more accurately represent the dynamics at work 
(Fletcher 2017: 184). 
In taking the development of civil society in Myanmar as the case study, a broad period of 
historical time was examined – from pre-colonial times, through British conquest in the 
mid-nineteenth century and through to the present day – but, guided by the theoretical 
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considerations outlined earlier, data collection and analysis centred on gathering evidence 
of possible NGOisation and, once noted, the abduction of generative mechanisms. For the 
critical realist, this typically begins with the identification of empirical “demi-regularities” - 
events, patterns or tendencies in data which indicate the operation of structural 
mechanisms (Lawson 2006: 204). Various empirical indicators might suggest the onset of 
NGOisation: increasing numbers of NGOs, expansion of financial assistance and services 
for civil society, changes in attitudes towards antagonistic behaviour by civil society 
actors, and so on. Viewed through the lens of theory, such data may indicate a 
reorganisation of the structural terrain underlying civil society, and a change in the 
mechanisms affecting civil society actors. 
This does not, of course, provide any new knowledge about particular structures. For this, 
the variation of critical realist metatheory used in this research, the strategic relational 
approach, supplies principles to guide data collection and analysis to discover structures 
and emergent mechanisms. As structures are understood to dispose actors to certain 
orientations in form and practice, the appearance of certain forms of agency or shifts in 
dominant logics of appropriateness of agents can be used to infer structural change. 
Qualitative data on practices, on what social movement literature has called “repertoires” 
(particular sets of tools and techniques available for collective action in a particular space 
and time, or “culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics” 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 16)), on adaptations in actors formations, changes in the 
knowledge and discourse accessed, produced and disseminated by communities of 
practice, and the consolidation of these communities over time, is therefore particularly 
instructive not merely as reports or descriptions about agents and agency, but for what it 
reveals about the structures selecting for them.  
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The logic of discovery used here is retroductive, asking what the world must be like in 
order to explain a certain change between times T1 and T2. This can be furthered by 
posing counterfactual questions: for example, would the activities that civil society 
entities engage in be possible if they did not have certain capacities? If not, what 
constitutes these capacities? What do they depend on? Evidence of particular value can 
be found in the changing powers and qualities of the civil society actors under scrutiny 
and the shift in strategic approach these capacities make possible (or even demand) 
toward actors in other social positions, particularly donors and government. Because the 
powers, liabilities and interests of entities are inextricably connected to their involvement 
in material social relations, specific qualitative information about civil society actors can 
more clearly illuminate the identity of the structures they encounter in the social 
environment (Sayer 1992: 89). 
I deploy this method in a case study of the history of Myanmar civil society, in which I 
argue for the development of two distinct logics of appropriateness buttressing 
communities of practice within civil society (Chapter 3), which are later differentially 
affected by NGOisation. Structural analysis shows NGOising forces to be constituted by 
the convergence of a number of structural mechanisms (Chapter 4) which are elucidated 
using the above empirical methods. The process of research involved moving to and fro 
between these two interrelated areas of empirical data, reinforcing analysis: as evidence 
indicating changing logics and practice was gathered, so the development of structures 
that agential strategies relate and adjust to (or possibly resist) would be elucidated. 
Furthermore, in so doing, the theoretical understanding of NGOisation was further 
developed24. 
24 The interconnections between these different strands of social activity means that the presentation in 
subsequent chapters does not necessarily represent the chronological order of the research, nor should it 
suggest they were undertaken separately. 
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The case study: the differential impact of structural mechanisms 
 
Research at the field level seeks to discover shifts in the normative orientation of civil 
society and to consider the structures and forces constituting institutional change. Yet 
structures only have actual influence by virtue of the projects of actual actors – agential 
interaction with the former activates the emergent powers of the mechanism. In Vincent 
and Wapshott’s words, a key goal of research therefore is “to understand how micro-level 
normative practices condition the causal powers of institutional mechanisms which affect 
the possibilities for action and actor choices” (2014: 162).   
Whereas case study analysis of the structural field is restricted to an intensive study of a 
single unit over an extended period of time, analysing actual interaction at the micro level 
with mechanisms believed to NGOise focuses attention onto the differing qualities of 
actors encountering such mechanisms. To understand the impact that such variation 
makes on the institutionalisation process, in Chapter 5 I undertake comparative case 
study. Once again, standard method is reconceptualised to fit the metatheoretical 
premises of critical realist research. For example, Yin states that “evidence from multiple 
cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study… more robust” than 
single case studies (Yin 2003: 46). Whilst critical realists might readily agree, the power of 
multiple cases for Yin derives from Popperian empiricist methods according to which “we 
convince ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere isolated ‘coincidence’, but with 
events which, on account of their regularity and reproducibility, are in principle 
intersubjectively testable” (Popper 1972: 23). For the realist, on the other hand, the value 
of comparison comes from the greater knowledge we gain of the mechanisms under 
investigation; in particular, the degree to which agency and agential variation contributes 
to empirical outcomes reveals the power or weakness of structures (Kessler and Bach 
2014; Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014: 30-32). 
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Causal mechanisms will likely manifest impact in a variety of ways, generating a 
multiplicity of effects, but I restrict investigation to a certain class of research objects. 
Thus, with overall research focusing on the way the institution of organisation impacts the 
political orientation of CSOs, I initially select cases on the basis of their similarity, “lightly 
theorized as suggesting a convergence in process or outcome which derives from the 
influence of common case features” (Kessler and Bach, 2014: 174). Each case organisation 
is a politically-oriented (human rights-focused, anti-military, pro-reform) Myanmar civil 
society entity with its organisational history rooted in logics of appropriateness that, 
broadly speaking, sought to challenge the existing order. The institutionalisation occurring 
through the impact of emergent mechanisms should see each shift towards less 
confrontational, NGOised institutional logics. 
However, there are also important differences between the entities examined. Each will 
be shown to have emerged from different traditions of civil society activity examined in 
Chapter 3. These differences may be embodied in certain unique properties in 
organisations or organisational histories so as to affect the outcomes of causal mechanism 
operations identified in Chapter 4. It is unlikely, therefore, to see homogeneity resulting 
from the NGOisation process. Furthermore, as the strategic agency of individuals may 
‘override’ the effects of structural mechanisms, we might expect differences in values 
held by individuals in each group to have an effect. Yet these too are not isolated from 
changes in the objective environment. Selecting for difference here should show how the 
peculiarities of agency, history and political belief might resist systemic tendencies issuing 
from structural change. 
Comparative case studies here draw evidence from organisational learning experiences 
and adaptations of strategy, including organisational configurations and normative goals, 
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taken in response to particular events or (mis)recognition of changing circumstances. This 
highlights an important discursive aspect to explanation: as Jessop (2000: 44) notes, 
an adequate explanation of a specific historical, cultural or social phenomenon must be 
adequate both in terms of motivational intelligibility (that is its social meaning for the 
relevant actors) and its production by the contingent interaction of causal processes in 
specific conditions.  
In each case study, I explore a thematic area of normative contestation related to 
NGOisation. I explore the organisation of work into projects (‘projectisation’), attempts to 
embed internal democratic practice as part of a broader radical democratic project, and 
the fate of civil disobedience. In the course of this contestation, significant turning points 
appear, moments which may reveal how earlier logics and ideas are “in sync” or “out of 
phase” with new institutional arrangements (Archer 1995: 66, 71). In this way, I situate 
what might appear as discrete, individual, micro-events within broader structural change 
in the politics of Myanmar civil society. 
 
Sources of evidence and data collection techniques 
 
As is common in critical realist case study, research involved theory-driven collection and 
analysis of a variety of primary and secondary data, using of a range of research 
techniques that support intensive case study research. 
Interviews  
Over fifty one-to-one interviews – totaling around 55 hours – were conducted with 
practitioners including CSO workers in a variety of positions, donor representatives and 
consultants on donor-funded civil society development projects. Interviews fulfilled 
various functions for both field and organisational analysis. For the former, they were a 
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source of information on key relationships and influential processes, and hence aided the 
abduction of structures. Information on history and events uncovered the wider social 
and political context. In addition, interviews provided insight into actor values and 
perspectives, especially as they relate to the development of logics of appropriateness 
and communities of practice. 
For organisational analysis, interviews were primarily sources of information to retroduce 
the causal processes involved in key organisational events, helping to “[gain] access… to 
richly textured accounts of events, experiences and underlying conditions or processes, 
which represent different facets of a multi-layered social reality” (Smith and Elger 2014: 
119). In addition, interviews function also as opportunities for reports on the “inner 
conversation” accompanying organisational change (Archer 2010), illuminating in 
particular tensions or congruities between values and wider structures.  
Interviews were conducted in English, which, more often than not, was a second language 
for respondents , yet this presented few, if any, limitations for the research. Practitioners 
were sought for their involvement with the historical subject matter of the research, for 
their lengthy participation in civil society activity, and were thus generally, due to more 
opportunities, those with better English. The danger of this factor introducing a selection 
bias is offset by interviews being only one of a number of sources of data. 
Programmatic documentation  
Documents accessed and analysed were mainly produced by state donor agencies, INGOs 
and local NGOs active in Myanmar, especially during the 2000s and into Myanmar’s 
commonly named ‘reform era’ after 2011. Many documents relate to projects and 
programmes developed for the purpose of civil society strengthening in Myanmar. Papers 
such as donor programme descriptions are of particular value for field analysis, as these 
contain details of rationale and programmatic content for working with civil society 
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actors. Interpreted in a theoretically informed way, these can illuminate changing 
relationships between local civil society actors, INGOs, donors and the state. On the other 
side of the dialectic, organisational documentation such as project reports and project 
proposals, reveal strategic adaptations of organisations in response to structural change. 
Programme evaluations and even high-level country overviews sometimes give 
descriptions and assessments (from a variety of perspectives) of current capacities and 
practices of civil society actors, often in the form of problem statements that describe 
limitations in organisational abilities or problems in wider conditions that might be 
alleviated or eliminated through interventions. They therefore provide a further source of 
information strategies likely to be favourable and, guided by theory, structural change 
that can make them favourable. 
 
Legislation and government policy 
Many in the human rights community, from field-based practitioners to academics in 
universities, and even some activists, possess a faith in the creation and enactment of 
just, fair legislation and legal practice to realise human rights and deliver promised 
universal goods of justice and freedom. More narrowly, legislation is a key object of 
analysis for assessing what is often called the ‘enabling environment’ or the ‘space for civil 
society’. This legalistic approach, however, runs the risk of decoupling law from its 
placement in broader structures of power and hence overlooking factors which limit or 
distort its effects (Gordon et al. 2000). Legislation - mainly domestic Myanmar legislation 
– therefore constitutes a source of information in this research by virtue of the way it 
directly constitutes or indirectly impacts certain capacities of social actors and shapes the 
relations between them. Legal change is never simple and unidirectional, making the 
examination of unintended consequences and interaction with other structures 
important. An often politically driven interpretation and selective application of laws and 
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state security powers also offers information as to attitudes towards civil society actors 
(and vice versa); data such as political prisoner numbers 25  and registration of 
organisations are, therefore, instructive. Meanwhile, changes in relations may be visible 
or prefigured by policy announcements, which may affect the legitimacy, constitution and 
profile of civil society actors. 
Secondary data 
I draw on secondary data from a wide range of published analyses of the social and 
political situation in Myanmar, the development and political economy of the Myanmar 
state and its civil society, particularly after 1990 and into the reform era. This work not 
only provides additional factual information, but also helps refine NGOisation theory. 
Historical and cultural examinations of Myanmar, meanwhile, are particularly 
instrumental for the identification of repertoires in civil society and gaining a sense of 
their persistence and relevance over time, informing agential logics of appropriateness 
and reinforcing or challenging structures of power.  
The availability and quality of scholarly literature on Myanmar has expanded significantly 
since 2012 as political reforms have made the country more accessible to researchers. The 
underdevelopment of Myanmar’s higher education system, however, means that the bulk 
of this body of work is the product of non-Myanmar writers. However, I also draw from 
journalism on Myanmar, especially since 2007 when the combination of repression, 
political events and natural disasters placed the country on the radar of many 
international reporters, supplementing more longstanding efforts by Myanmar’s exile 
media. 
25 Prior to political reform, it was common for Myanmar officials to assert that there were no political prisoners 
in the country e.g. “There are no political prisoners in Myanmar [Burma], and no individual has been 
incarcerated simply for his or her political beliefs” (U Thant Kyaw, Myanmar Ambassador to the United 




                                                            
Direct participation in projects, processes and events with practitioners 
My research benefited significantly from involvement in civil society initiatives in 
Myanmar, both before and during the reform era. My occupation of a variety of 
professional and voluntary roles, involvement in meetings, discussions and programming 
processes with a wide range of donor and civil society actors offered a vantage point from 
which to perceive developments in knowledge, practice and attitudes over this time. 





Whilst Bhaskar’s naturalism centres on the “essential unity of method between the 
natural and the social sciences” (1979: 3), differences in their objects of investigation 
necessitate specific practical considerations. Investigating social reality inevitably requires 
interaction with agents and their constructions, their beliefs, values and lives. 
Disseminating findings also affects the social world. It becomes incumbent on researchers, 
then, to consider and manage the likely impact of their activity and to respect another 
feature unique to social science; namely, that its objects bear rights26. 
Whilst the search for causal mechanisms means the wider context may often be 
bracketed, its features provide the setting for research and therefore demand practical 
attention. Research in Myanmar provides a perfect example: for decades, Myanmar has 
gained notoriety for the brutality and intransigence of the military regime that took power 
in 1990. The violence of its interminable rule resulted in systematic human rights 
violations and thousands of imprisoned human rights and democracy activists. Because 
affected individuals, their organisations and stakeholders are at the heart of this work, 




                                                            
considering the practicalities and consequences of research in light of exacting political 
circumstances is crucial. When participation might lead to physical or psychological harm, 
ethical protocols on informed consent and protection of the anonymity and 
confidentiality of subjects take on significant additional weight (Glasius et al. 2018: 25-26; 
Sriram et al. 2009).  
However, even in Myanmar social and political conditions admit of historical and 
geographical variation. By the time of theoretical development and secondary literature 
consultation in 2013, there were already a plethora of CSOs working openly on political 
issues. Continued improvement in conditions for civil and political rights, certainly in 
Yangon, made for an environment more conducive for safer interviewing and data 
collection in 2016 and 2017: present and past activity of human rights organisations was 
by then quite public and often undertaken with the cognizance of government, even 
when articulating strong opposition. Yet participation in research had not suddenly 
become risk-free and consequentially insignificant; rather, the composition of risk had 
altered. Interaction with a wide range of actors revealed that, while political dangers 
would never vanish entirely, the primary concern for CSO workers were livelihoods, 
organisational sustainability, relations with donors, friendships and reputations. 
Research ethics were thus “situated” and enacted in these circumstances (Piper and 
Simons 2005: 56). Information sheets detailed institutional details and purpose of the 
research, enabling subjects to weigh up the pros and cons of participation before 
providing written consent to interview, or granting access to organisational 
documentation. The subject’s right to withdraw at any time, to not participate or answer 
a question was clearly articulated. To ensure confidentiality, data was securely retained 
on encrypted USB memory sticks and not shared. Later, steps were taken to protect 
privacy and confidentiality through anonymisation of published data, using pseudonyms 
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or generic descriptive titles (Wiles 2013: 25-54). Nevertheless, subjects were warned of 
the potential of identification by readers with suitably detailed knowledge of the 
organisations and individuals at work in Yangon over the period of research (see Johnson 
1982: 85-86). This inescapable possibility redoubled the importance of an “ethical 
proofreading” of data, a self-censorship emergent from a more fundamental ethic to 
avoid publishing “negative information that would devalue individuals and groups” (Laine 
2000: 178). 
Extensive travel in Myanmar and over a decade of participation or employment in its 
expanding world of civil society strengthening projects, meetings, events and so on 
provided copious contextual information, offered objects of reflection for theoretical 
development and helped to develop trusted relationships with a wide range of 
individuals, organisations and donors. This thesis therefore draws deeply from this 
lengthy field experience and opportunities to appreciate varied actors’ understanding of 
and interaction with their environment, often in circumstances when disclosure of 
research was unfeasible. “Basic practical reasons” for non-disclosure of research are 
manifold (Spicker 2011: 120). Most common in this research were the fleeting, 
anonymous nature of the occasions when information or observations were made – as 
Woods notes (1996: 64) “one encounters so many people during a typical study, often 
casually, that it is impossible to secure the consent of all” – often with ‘data’ not 
recognised as such until much later; and, furthermore, that “the research draws on 
information gained before the research project began” (Spicker 2011: 121). 
One final point concerns the aim of the thesis itself. Interviews, documentation analysis 
and so on were not primarily sought for direct information on injustice and human rights 
issues in Myanmar but for what this work would reveal about more mundane forces 
shaping the dynamics of activism through organisations. Increasing openness and 
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international connections means Myanmar activists have become used to discussing 
human rights issues and their approaches to combating them, and often I found that 
enthusiasm to participate in interviews was down to expectation of a shared direct human 
rights interest and moral outlook. As Sriram (2009: 58) contends, “politicians, human 
rights advocates, and civil society leaders… [often choose to participate in research 
interviews] precisely because they want to draw attention to a situation they perceive as 
unjust”. A passion for human rights was indeed shared but, given research interests, was 
often moot. It is a basic premise of this enquiry, however, that to forgo examination of 
wider structures and powers and their institutional influence on the so-called ‘space for 
civil society’ and agential practices would itself be ethically remiss. Whilst far from 
advocating that human rights workers immediately down NGOised tools, a more 
reflective, critical understanding and awareness of how actors are positioned within and 
affected by established power may encourage a step toward a more emancipatory human 
rights praxis among civil society actors.27 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and explored a number of key concepts such as the 
institution and social structures, and situated these within a metatheory – critical realism 
– to better aid identification and explanation of the real powers and processes in the 
social world. The need for these was outlined in Chapter 1, which argued that 
understanding and explaining phenomena in actually existing civil society demanded a 
‘reality first’ rather than ‘ethics first’ methodology that could grasp actually existing civil 
society. Once the alleged autonomous logics of civil society were problematised in this 
way, conceptual space is made to introduce a causal perspective on the processes that 
27 The theoretical premises of the thesis were often discussed with subjects after interviews had taken place. 




                                                            
establish the primacy of the NGO. Critical realism has enabled the peeling back of 
stratified layers of social reality to analyse the contribution to processes of institutional 
reproduction made by agential interaction with cultural and structural mechanisms.  
I have argued the institution must be understood as a process of dialectical social change, 
as an aspect of the process and results of structure-agency interaction (and interaction 
with those results). Emergent properties of structural selectivity and agential strategic 
calculation together create the institution. The emergent LoA is a product of the strategic 
selectivity of a structural field, and reflexive cogitation on a community of practice’s 
repertoires oriented to the selectivities of that field. This institutional terrain constrains 
and enables the implementation of agential projects in that it offers an environment 
appropriate for particular sets of behaviour and particular forms of agency capable of 
such behaviour. At the same time, institutions do not have ontological primacy: value-
driven, reflexive agency can undermine structures or overcome the generative power of 
LoAs, although values held by actors can be disrupted as the institutional dialectic changes 
the agent’s world of concern. 
In the following chapters, I use the methodology described above to investigate the 
historical structural development of Burma’s civil society, focusing mainly on 
developments in recent decades, especially after 2010. This is followed by case studies of 
human rights defence and political / democratic educational groups in which I examine 
shifts in configuration and strategy in the face of institutional change. These chapters 
highlight the actualisation of institutional factors that have seen the NGO become the 





Chapter 3. Myanmar’s Civil Societies 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 argued that in order to examine the form and social power of agency, it needs 
to be understood against structures. Agents encounter these structures as pre-existing 
objective entities. They are products of history, outcomes of earlier social interactions. 
Therefore, as Lawson notes, the “comprehension of any (set of) structure(s) will entail 
identifying the nature of its internal relatedness as well as its particular history” (2006: 
232.) This includes institutions, emergent entities through which projects and powers of 
social agents are mediated and variably attuned to the selectivities of pre-existing, 
durable social structures (institutional fields). History matters because institutions are not 
erected on terra nullis – realist retroduction “sends us back in time to look for 
antecedents” (Mutch 2013: 225) that facilitated their arrival on the scene. 
This chapter mainly looks downwards to agency, and to the distinct histories and 
traditions which have emerged in Myanmar’s civil society28. Prior to the quintessentially 
modern institutionalising process of NGOisation, addressed in Chapter 4, I argue that 
Myanmar’s modern history sees the development of two distinctive communities of 
practice within its civil society, distinguishable by virtue of strategy, tactics and – crucially 
– values vis-à-vis objective structural settings: a politically-oriented civil society that is 
antagonistic towards state-structural conditions – which, whilst being inevitably mediated 
by them, ultimately seeks to transform them – and a developmentally-oriented civil 
society that is accommodated to extant political structural conditions. These logics of 
28 The English name ‘Burma’ was officially changed to ‘Myanmar’ by the government in 1989, along with the 
names of many towns and geographical features. Throughout this thesis, I use the names in official use at the 




                                                            
collective agency are relational achievements, constructed against structural selectivities 
and discursively mediated objective settings. Whilst the outcomes of interactions see 
these components intertwine, careful epistemological work can – and, for explanation, 
must – separate them and examine their interplay (Archer 2010: 274). 
Where in the course of this chapter I draw on secondary sources, we can expect other 
authors to abstract civil society in a different way to the Gramscian approach taken here, 
usually employing a liberal regime defence or neo-Tocquevillian associational 
conceptualisation. Nevertheless, those accounts are often part of the cultural 
environment or intelligibilia which actors draw from and, furthermore, can be understood 
as contributions to the discursive reinforcement of what will become hegemonic 
understandings of civil society. For this reason, although the chapter primarily focuses on 
developments in civil society after 1990, as this raw material for future institutionalising 
forces was made over many earlier decades, I take a chronological approach, beginning in 
pre-colonial Burma. With the research focus on the rise, influence and impact of 
NGOisation, from the 2000s my focus is largely centred on Myanmar’s main commercial 
city and former capital, Yangon, where structural change saw this tendency emerge in 
starkest form29. 
Historical developments 
The problem of pre-colonial civil society 
History appears to hold little in the way of propitious circumstances for Burma’s civil 
society.  Much recent attention on Myanmar has been focused on the seemingly 
29 A comparison between Yangon and other parts of the country is beyond the scope of this thesis. A 
potentially fruitful line of enquiry for NGOisation would be a contrast between Yangon and the Bamar-
dominated heartlands of Myanmar and the country’s ethnic states. Here the ethno-political relations that 




                                                            
unbreakable reign of military (also known as the Tatmadaw) rule, an appalling human 
rights record and Tatmadaw intransigence in the face of international sanctions, UN 
Special Procedures and Security Council debates, multilateral and bilateral aid restrictions 
and other punitive measures. During decades of interminable authoritarian rule “the 
military [was] the only institution in town”, the government “through its extensive 
surveillance and intimidation networks” leaving “no space for political and civil society” 
(Alagappa 2001, in James 2005: 41). Colonial rule had preceded this, with the British 
directly ruling Burma as a Province of British India from 1862, having overthrown an 
absolute monarchy presiding over a traditional system based on fealty, and with only 14 
years of parliamentary government after Burma’s independence in 1948 disturbing the 
monotony of non-democracy, one could be forgiven for thinking that the concept of civil 
society would struggle to find an objective referent. 
On the other hand, some writers have stressed the opposite and claim to locate the 
origins of a distinctively Burmese civil society in the pre-colonial past, particularly in 
traditional community and religious activities. Merit-making activity is at the centre of 
Buddhist community life across much of Southeast Asia. It “links the cosmology of 
Theravada Buddhism in graphic and practical terms to the daily lives of the people” 
(Swearer 2010: 21). Rituals of alms-giving, the making and presentation of robes to 
monastic communities and the renovation of old pagodas remain vitally important still 
today, and the organisation of collective work this entails and the religious life it sustains 
not only provide a community’s social glue but also nurture institutions beyond 
government. Thus, having noted that “usage of the term civil society in the country really 
started with the entrance of international agencies and donors in Burma in the mid-
1990s”, Kramer quotes approvingly from “one study on civil society in Burma” to attest to 
its pre-modern lineages: 
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Most villages organised social events and initiatives around the Buddhist temple. Monks 
led these events and initiatives and a local organisation in most villages was formed to 
support the temple and related activities. The strong patronage system and hierarchy in 
society probably limited the number of type of organisations to very basic community-
based social and religious groups. Yet there are records of many social and religious 
organisations within communities that were outside of direct state control (Kramer 2011: 
6). 
Kyaw Yin Hlaing understands these as evidence of the kind of qualities that characterise 
something approaching Tocquevillian civil society, noting that “[a]lthough formal 
organizations emerged only during the colonial period, associational life was not alien to 
Myanmar society” (2007: 145). The dominance of religion in organising social life also held 
for non-Buddhist communities: Kramer claims that the first “non-governmental 
organisation” was the Burma Baptist Missionary Convention (Kramer 2011: 6), formed in 
1865.  
Yet a pre-modern state system makes the idea that expressions of spirituality were 
beyond the state doubly problematic in these circumstances. Firstly, religion was a crucial 
component of monarchical rule: not only was Buddhist theory premised on the existence 
of an absolute monarchy and a “symbiotic relationship between the government (as the 
embodiment of the State) and the sangha, the monastic order (the embodiment of the 
Buddhist Church)” (Becka 1990: 338), but the power and wealth of the state depended on 
careful intervention and management of Buddhist institutions, which in turn saw its 
resources ‘purified’ 30 . Buddhist practice and principles were inseparable from the 
Burmese state, and religious organisation, performances and rituals mobilised villagers 
and were integral to the reproduction of this social system. Writers understanding this as 
30 Known as the ‘sasana reform’. See Aung-Thwin (1979). 
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civil society conflate ancient and modern notions: on the one hand, religion underwrites 
the res publica, a civil society that sustains moral order of the state through spirituality 
and acts of devotion of ordinary people. On the other hand, the governance of these 
activities secures the attribution of civil society, their organisation as proto-Tocquevillian 
associations.  
Yet although conceptually muddled, the community-based norms woven into this form of 
organising lingered long in the social memory. As changes in state structures were felt, 
these would be transferred to non-religious charitable work later, elements to be taken 
up and combined in different ways and in different contexts as a bricolage of civil society. 
A second, more fundamental point therefore is that the absence of a Gramscian “proper 
relationship”31 between state and civil society is structurally derived, stemming from the 
fact that life in the Burmese state was yet to be transformed by the midwife of modern 
civil society – capitalism, and its separation of political rule and economic production, the 
emancipation of the population from feudal loyalties32. The unity of politics, economics 
and the organisation of society would be shattered by colonialism. 
31 Thomas writes in a footnote: “‘Proper relationship ‘[giusto rapporto]’ here refers not to a balanced 
relationship (the adjective in this case would be equilibrato), but to the relationship proper to the modern 
state qua modern state. Similarly, the equilibrium of political and civil society is a (stable) 
‘disequilibrium’” (Thomas 2009:165). 
32 Independence leader General Aung San famously cast doubt on social control under the monarchy: “The 
economic divisions of the feudal society were not… so sharply differentiated as in other countries. The 
humanising influence of Buddhism over all sections of the people; the fact of everyone possessing land of his 
own; the universality of free education for all, men and women; the co-operative basis of agricultural economy 
and village life in those days (for in those days in all matters, whether of cultivation or irrigation and what not, 
it required the co-operative effort of all in the community); the necessity for women to share the out-door 
economic life of their husbands and family jointly; the absence of large-scale trading - internal or external 
(agriculture then was purely for domestic consumption, each agricultural family being almost self-sufficient in 
the matter of foods and clothes with some cottage industries to add, and getting a few other things it needed 
by exchanging surplus produce of its own etc.,) which in turn accounted for the absence of a large trading class 
in feudal Burma; and also for lack of proper communications from place to place which again made centralised 
authority and control not so easy and not so tight; these and other factors combined to make, I think, Burmese 
feudalism to be perhaps the most enlightened of world feudalism” (Aung San 1945). 
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Empire and rebellion 
Through the nineteenth century, a series of colonial wars preceded the full annexation of 
Burma under the rule of the British Raj in 1885. Incorporation into the British Empire as a 
province of India heralded the dismantlement of the monarchical system, the imposition 
of the colonial state structure (albeit limited, “[f]or purposes of bureaucratic simplification 
and fiscal cheese-paring” to lower and central Burma, whilst colonial power in sparsely 
populated hilly regions was exercised through traditional rulers (Callahan 2009: 34)) and 
the integration of Burma into the export-oriented economic system characteristic of the 
late British Empire. This process was more or less complete before the end of the 
nineteenth century: the construction of rationalised structures of administration and 
taxation, objective national boundaries and the development of a national elite that could 
operate the new bureaucratic apparatus introduced modern social and political relations 
into Burma and challenged traditional feudal practices and patron-client ties. 
The traumatic social dislocations wrought by colonialism were profound and penetrated 
deeply: overall, “the changes in society that the new policies and structures of the 
[colonial] state allowed caused the destruction of the cohesion of Burma’s precolonial 
social life” (Taylor 2009: 79-80), including the traditional Buddhist activity described 
above. Under British rule, the state was rid of its cosmic functions as the institutions of 
government were secularised to stabilise colonial rule and facilitate resource 
appropriation and circulation in the colonial system, an act that both centralised and 
restricted political power to certain roles. There was no need to retain the political role of 
the clergy, and Buddhism’s monopoly on education, legal matters and political functions 
vanished. Adrift of the state and monarchical patronage, the rupture of the political and 
economic inverted the cosmic order and made monastic orders fully dependent on 
donations from layfolk. New groups formed to perform this role, such as the Malunze Rice 
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Offering Society, “set up by local businessmen in 1896” (Kramer 2011: 7). As imported 
religions became established, Christian, Hindu and Muslim groups began operation during 
this time and organised similar initiatives directed towards their own communities. 
Economically, the kind of creative destruction unleashed upon Burma was keenly felt in 
indigenous industry. It was badly impacted by export-oriented policies, suffering under 
the resulting “increased specialization in rice production and from competition with 
technologically superior foreign industry under conditions of free trade” (Fenichel and 
Huff 1975: 323). This was compounded by a British preference for trained, disciplined 
Indian labour in administration and industry, whilst the high command of new commercial 
enterprise was, unsurprisingly, dominated by Europeans. Such uneven development 
restricted the growth of a Burmese bourgeoisie and led to tensions along lines of religion 
and ethnicity. 
The unique aspect of these initiatives was structural: with religious, economic and social 
bodies ejected from the state, and its colonial successor limited to protecting basic private 
rights – such protections unevenly available to the Burmese – non-state group activity or 
private publics implementing activities for social goals were now both imaginable and, for 
the preservation of traditional life (albeit in alienated form), essential. In other words, the 
breaking of the holist state into a duality of public and particular yielded modern 
freedoms as an integral part of a modern exploitation. Empire destroyed traditional 
systems while making possible action for their conservation. Yet whilst early actions were 
indeed conservative, involving groups which “ranged from small local associations that 
gathered to take precepts, recite chants and listen to sermons to large organizations with 
branches across Burma and ambitious agendas to promote Buddhist education or 
Buddhist missions abroad” (Turner 2009: 16-17), colonial penetration also carried new 
ideas and approaches enabling more radical action. 
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Most importantly, the defining of Burma’s borders and the establishment of printing 
presses enabled the dissemination of critical, reflective local journalism among a (mainly 
urban and overwhelmingly Bamar) populace, developing an imagined community and the 
conditions for a nationalist movement (Thant Myint U 2001: 152; Anderson 1983). 
Alongside this, ideas and artefacts were adapted and reworked by local appropriators: 
among the new objects introduced by colonialists were organisational archetypes, the 
most prominent example being the Young Man’s Christian Association (YMCA), which 
served as the model for the development of the Young Man’s Buddhist Association 
(YMBA). As Sahlin and Wedlin note, “ideas do not remain unchanged as they flow but are 
subject to translation. To imitate… is not just to copy but also to change and to innovate” 
(2008: 219), and this imported model was “edited”, from a prototype of an evangelical lay 
organisation to a vehicle for growing nationalist sentiments aided by printing. These 
developments combined to enable the nationalist movement to gain strength and shape, 
changes similar to the development of Islamic societies such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt under British rule (see Sharkey 2013).  
This mimetic work, the copying and critiquing of ideas and formations of colonisers 
mediated emotions and social forces into forms with political efficacy. Associations and 
nationalist sentiment were ironically aided by the British ban on political activity, which 
“encouraged the growth of civil society through ostensibly religious organizations that 
had a nationalistic agenda” (Steinberg 2006: 155), such as the aforementioned YMBA and 
the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). Associational political action in 
colonial Burma was a phenomenon linked closely to class. Taylor notes that “from being 
essentially non-existent under the monarchical state, [the middle class] had emerged by 
the 1920s and 1930s” mainly through public and occupational employment, and income 
from land and other investments (Taylor 2009: 134). This was reflected in the distribution 
and interests of organisations, which were overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon and 
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consisted of a rather limited range of literature and cultural societies and associations 
providing welfare services. Professional groups and associations for indigenous businesses 
also flourished in the early twentieth century, lobbying lawmakers and shaping the 
business environment. 
Yet associational life also incubated more radical projects. The expansion of university 
education and factories saw both student and labour unions establish (and register with 
the colonial authorities, the latter confident that the growth in associations did not 
threaten colonial rule). The educated class played a vital role in disseminating Marxism 
and socialist ideas through books, journals and reading groups, most famously the Nagani 
Book Club (Zöllner 2006), and lent political purpose for labour unions initially set up for 
workers’ welfare (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007). Applied to national politics through their 
interactions with the YMBA, “almost all of the senior students in Burma’s two colleges 
were interested in Burmese politics… It was clear to these students that Burma’s colonial 
relationship with Britain was ridden with social injustices” (Ei Kyaw 1922: 20). The 
Rangoon University Student’s Union and, forming in 1935, the All Burma Federation of 
Student Unions (ABFSU), became vital associational conduits of civil and political 
demands. Students would be centrally involved in strikes, demonstrations and local 
rebellions against colonial rule through until independence; indeed, independence leaders 
and later political leaders such as Aung San, U Nu, U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein were all 
key figures in student politics. Although both nationalism and socialism formed the 
emancipatory vision for Burma, commitment to this programme was debatable. Chenyang 
argues that “in practice, the central goal of most of the nationalist elite was not to build 
up a real socialist Burma but to win Burma’s national independence” (2008), meaning 
Buddhist organisations remained central. Burma’s emancipation was thus actively sought 
via these and later organisations, with the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) 
as the vanguard after the Second World War. 
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The life and death of civil society in the parliamentary period 
International politics affected Burma deeply once again, opening the door to 
decolonisation in the aftermath of the Second World War, the resulting changes in the 
constitution of government reshaping Burmese civil society. There was an intimacy 
between the leading figures of the independence movement, collected in the AFPFL as a 
ruling political party in Burma’s post-colonial parliament, and with successors of the mass 
movements that had articulated nationalist sentiment and facilitated their rise to power. 
Over the decade that followed the country’s independence, umbrella entities were 
formed to collectively organise Burma’s rich panoply of civilian organisations into distinct 
sectors headed by AFPFL-affiliates. These included 
 the All Burma Peasants’ Organization (APBO), the Federation of Trades Organization 
(Burma) (FTOB), the Trade Union Congress (Burma), (TUCB), the Youth League, and the All 
Burma Women’s Organization… [Furthermore, although]  local peasant and business 
organizations and trade unions were not required to join AFPFL-sponsored social 
organizations, the ruling party lured them to join its affiliated social organizations (Kyaw 
Yin Hlaing 2007: 151). 
This rearrangement facilitated enactment of policy, gave ruling politicians a secure power 
base and was an important counterweight to the AFPFL’s mainly communist opposition. 
Thus, whist the parliamentary period is looked back on as a time when civil society 
flourished in Burma, it must be recognised that this neither resembled an autonomous 
Tocquevillian realm of private publics nor an active protector of a zone of freedom 
imagined by liberalism but, vindicating Gramsci’s analysis of civil society’s hegemonic role, 
was dominated by its function as the enabler for political management of the state. The 
associational life of Burma at this time is more recognisable as a set of “activities [that] 
bring… populations into a certain political relationship with the state”, activities filtered 
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through nationalist politics, rather than the private realms conceived by liberal theory, 
under the auspices of state functionaries and organisational leads (Chatterjee 2004: 38). 
In this, Burma can be said to mirror the fate of other postcolonial states, particularly India. 
Understood in this way, Steinberg’s famous charge that “civil society died under the 
[Burma Socialist Party Programme (BSPP)], perhaps, more accurately, it was murdered” 
(2001: 106) might seem overstated in that it does not perform a full autopsy on the victim 
and thus overlooks the intimacy between social formations and political society in 
parliamentary Burma. Nevertheless, whatever political function they came to serve, basic 
associational freedoms had until this juncture been generally respected; under military 
rule, they were wholly denied. Frustrated with the inability of parliamentarians to deal 
with the perceived threat to the integrity of the Burmese state posed by Chinese-
sponsored communist insurgency and ethnic insurgent movements, the Burma Army – 
the Tatmadaw – assumed the political, economic and even social leadership role it would 
retain for decades.  
After the coup was completed in 1962, all parliamentary structures, political parties, the 
press, the Buddhist Council were either disassembled or absorbed into state apparatus. 
Replacing the social organisations and federations were mass organisations designed as a 
channel for dissemination of BSPP decisions and, upwards, popular participation (within 
strict parameters). These would be “participatory institutions of the type normally 
associated with the modern state but having no independent power separate from the 
regime” (Taylor 2009: 316). Mass peasant and workers organisations were crucial here, 
but groups were also created for writers, artists, and youth.  
Most scholars in agreement with Steinberg focus on the banning of independent political 
activity and the way “many civil-society networks could no longer operate independently, 
and opposition to the military regime was eliminated, driven underground or forced into 
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open revolt” (Petrie and South 2014: 88). Political leaders were locked up and an 
extensive military intelligence apparatus percolated into everyday life, stifling the 
communicative and organisational prerequisites of the movement. Universities and their 
student unions, having been the place and medium for radical politics during colonial and 
parliamentary days, were strictly policed - the student union building was even blown up 
by the military regime in 1962. Yet the staggering number and variety of banners under 
which people marched in the various protests that took place in 1988 were a testament to 
the persistence of repertoires and social memories of associational life despite the 
strictures of BSPP rule, and the grievances Ne Win’s regime allowed to fester.  
Logics of opposition: protest and pedagogy for political 
emancipation 
Democracy and human rights protest networks 
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this research to try to fully describe the events of the 
late 1980s, let alone specify its causes, the country’s 1988 student uprising – more 
accurately, the series of protests and demonstrations that peppered 1988-1990 – 
indicated the  continuation of a social movement whose emancipatory values stretched 
back to Burma’s colonial-era nationalist movement. We have already seen how 
universities and their student unions, under the umbrella leadership of the ABFSU, had 
functioned as an unofficial political opposition during colonial and parliamentary eras. 
Despite the close control of universities during the BSPP era, student political sensibilities 
were not entirely eliminated. Student-organised demonstrations would occasionally occur 
– in response to an absence of tickets to Southeast Asian Peninsula Games in 1969, in 
response to high prices and food shortages in 1974, and in reaction to the government’s 
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refusal to give former UN Secretary General U Thant a state funeral (Koon-Hong 2014). 
These were all key events in the student social memory. 
To return briefly to theoretical matters, it is fair to say that civil society is not commonly 
associated with political protest activity, and the study of social movements is usually 
separated from civil society studies. Diamond holds that civil society consolidates 
democracy rather than engages in political agitation which might instigate democratic or 
rights-related political change; beyond academia, Aung San Suu Kyi, following her release 
from house arrest in 2010, understood civil society to consist solely of groups that 
performed acts of charity (UK Embassy official 2010. Personal communication)33. Yet it is 
only by definitional fiat that social movements or contentious politics can be sequestered 
from civil society. With reference to Vietnam and Myanmar respectively, Thayer (2009) 
and Hewison and Nyein (2010) have argued how, given the state’s determination of 
permissible civil society activity via instruments of law, governance and monopoly of 
violence, non-state actors which reject its frontiers of acceptability can be might be 
understood as a distinct variant of civil society, which the former term “political society”. 
This predicate is earned by virtue of it being composed of “organizations that seek to 
establish and expand the political space available for non-state actors” (ibid.: 16), and is 
contrasted with entities which form and operate within the state-validated “space”.  
Whilst I will go on to problematise the notion of ‘space’ and its ‘opening’ or ‘closing’ as 
inadequate analytical metaphors (Myanmar civil society had “no room to move” in the 
1990s (Liddell 1999: 54)), the basic dichotomy presented above provides a starting point 
from which to develop an institutional account of political society34. However, my 
33 This conservative perspective is further revealed in Aung San Suu Kyi’s bemusement at politics beyond 
parliament, and sometimes frustration with aid agencies that fund it. See Chapter 4.  
34 However, I avoid this term on the grounds that (a) I refer elsewhere in the text to Gramsci’s formulation of 
political society – Hewison and Nyein’s use does not conceptually mirror Gramsci’s, and (b) the ontology of my 




                                                            
intention is not simply to refer to sets of organisations grouped according to common 
intentions or objectives. Quite apart from the fact that some politically-oriented actors 
might wish to close political space35, attributing complex political motives to actors risks 
committing a scholastic fallacy. Knowledge of their environment and political 
circumstances can be fallible under the best of conditions: 
The reason I took part in the [student] movement [was] not because of political 
experience, not because of my little bit of knowledge, it was based on my and students’ 
spirit… I didn’t know political situation, but I know that General Ne Win’s government was 
very bad and not fair, so I took part in the movement. Angry, excited and emotion – I took 
part as an emotion, as an ordinary student (Interview 40). 
Of course, many political leaders have a very good sense of change and strategy, and 
mobilise on this basis. Yet it is important to situate the cultivation of these objectives in 
their richer, quintessentially social context to ensure they are sufficiently dialectical and 
reflect the evaluative basis of political sensibilities in relation to dominant structures in 
society and economy, and their transformation. This is fundamentally discursive work, the 
cultivation of a new vision of social order that can become “rooted in the popular 
consciousness with the same solidity and imperative quality as traditional beliefs” 
(Gramsci 1971: 424). Whilst there is no structural asylum, its selectivities always 
influencing agency, the relatively autonomous logic of movement or opposition 
developed is a generative mechanism that serves to orient collective valuations of the 
environment. It articulates a vision of a future social order that gives rise to certain 
repertoires of action that are retained, learned and developed by successive historical 
communities of practice. Values inspire, knit groups together and persist in spite of its 
35 “Myanmar’s most successful civil society movement in recent history has to be Ma Ba Tha” (International 
civil society consultant: 2017. Personal communication). 
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pre-institutionalisation36 by virtue of the longevity of the shared object of an oppositional 
evaluative stance – the military and its human rights abuses – and “a utopia envisaging to 
transcend social order and bring about an emancipated society” (Famiglietti 2001: 8). In 
light of this epistemology, we can refer to the agency of a politically-oriented civil society 
mediated through its own logics of opposition.  
From both a structural and agential perspective, then, there was continuity in the social 
forces animating Burma’s politics in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, it 
was all too clear that despite superficial changes, objective circumstances conducive to 
antagonism remained. Totalitarian ambitions may have been relinquished by Myanmar’s 
rulers following the BSPP’s collapse, but the emphasis on discipline and control, as seen in 
the title of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) which assumed power in 
1988, reflected a lack of trust and leadership and continued reliance on coercive 
apparatus to eliminate challenges to power. With a plethora of repressive colonial-era 
and emergency laws in the hands of pliant judges (see Chapter 4), facing threats to its rule 
from ethnic armed groups in the uplands and to its unfolding state project from political 
dissidents in the Burma heartlands, authorities had both the tools and the imperative to 
continue repression. Thousands of individuals were imprisoned, and many more went into 
domestic or foreign exile. Harassment, assault, denial of employment opportunities and 
other tactics were also employed against opposition in the human rights and democracy 
movements. Tight restrictions on organising, the near-impossibility of engaging in public 
actions without severe consequences and the close monitoring of communications 
between individuals of interest made political dissidence dangerous. This was a quite 
deliberate military-defined state strategy, summed up in one clause of the “People’s 
36 This is not a fully-developed institution, on my account, as the logic of opposition is not sustained by i.e. is 
not appropriate for the structures underpinning it. There is no alignment of the political relations between 
groups, and the economic structures by which those groups would lead. Antagonism reigns. Later versions of 
civil society in Myanmar see its forms of civil society more perfectly integrated into state power. 
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Desire” that appeared daily in printed media and public signboards, in the form of the 
exhortation to “[o]ppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of 
the nation” (author’s field observations; also see Hudson-Rodd 2008). 
Among students, a shared construal of these circumstances and the logics guiding 
strategic action to oppose them emerged out of fresh memories of the 1988 
demonstrations, the longer student oppositional history and out of the politics of physical 
space. With gatherings of over six people illegal, once reopened37, universities were, along 
with monasteries, the only physical spaces in Burma where large numbers of people 
would be able to legally congregate. They compounded evaluative stances against the 
injustices of military rule by playing host to collective bourgeois interests, especially 
regarding the quality of university education and hopeless prospects following graduation, 
although students were well aware of the poverty around them. Historically, this had 
especially affected individuals who had moved to Rangoon to study, with no familial 
sources of support (Interviews 40, 47). Yet whilst the desire for social and political change 
was common on university campuses the very real threat of imprisonment limited public 
manifestation, and one does not need to be a neo-utilitarian to appreciate that most 
understood the cost of overt public displays of political opposition to be far too high. 
During the repressive years of the 1990s, politically-oriented civil society maintained the 
kind of direct challenge to government injustice historically shaped by the ABFSU. The 
constraints on labour for political opposition and the overwhelming need for secrecy 
made challenging the legitimacy of the regime’s rule the preserve of a restricted, loose 
network of underground activists connected to the mass protests of 1988 – students 
central to this uprising becoming known as the 88 Generation – and those continuing to 
quietly organise around the remains of the (illegal) student unions. The ABFSU maintained 
37 Universities were closed for long periods on numerous occasions after 1988. 
109 
 
                                                            
an important position in “organising, distributing information, forming underground 
alliance fronts, supporting their own network (including political prisoners), and 
infiltrating the military and the government”. Significant risk meant sacrifices in operating 
practices familiar to resistance movements: 
Because we have to operate under conditions of severe repression and must maintain 
secrecy at all costs to protect our members, we unavoidably need to limit our community 
to trustworthy and reliable groups of activists. Security concerns compel us to create an 
atmosphere of inner-circle politics, which excludes many people (Min Zin 1999). 
Campus politics had schooled persons in techniques to facilitate clandestine organising; 
despite the sledgehammer response to student activism in the form of university closure, 
oppositional activists found ways to plan - “when the universities were closed in 1996, our 
pro-democracy meetings were held – quietly – in teashops” (Interview 47) – and to 
express the social position of opposition activists they occupied. As Cohen and Arato 
(1992) note of social movements in general, this work could be both expressive and 
instrumental: indeed, given the repressive circumstances an expressive achievement was 
simultaneously an instrumental one, demonstrating a regime that had been outwitted 
(Interviews  17, 18)38. Art was therefore important – satirical cartoons would be posted in 
public areas such as the telephone booth on a university campus in Yangon, slogans and 
poems would be put up around campus, hand-copied and further disseminated in lieu of 
photocopiers, while singing songs popular around the time of the 1988 uprising was also 
common. Others drew on the country’s literary traditions: 
38 Foreign supporters of Myanmar’s human rights and democratic cause also joined in attempts to challenge or 
circumvent repressive state apparatus. In addition to solo protests by individuals who had entered Myanmar 
on tourist visas, in 2007 the Danish arts group Surrend placed an advertisement in the Myanmar Times 
newspaper with the hidden message ‘Killer Than Shwe’, referring to the then-Senior General and de facto 
leader of Myanmar (Irrawaddy 2007).  
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We would often distribute poems to motivate students to participate in protests, and to 
show publicly that the students stood with the people. We would also produce more 
formal statements, and posters (Interview 47). 
The constant succession of persons arrested, sentenced and – often many years later – 
released, made for dislocated medium-to-long-term work and long-term absence of 
leadership. Given that recently released political prisoners could expect close surveillance 
from the authorities, finding additional labour for this work was far from straightforward 
despite the focus on civil disobedience and a generally non-violent approach. Any attempt 
to galvanise public support on a large scale required meticulous planning, trusted 
networks and a sound understanding of the intelligence and security services. In spite or 
because of this, highly inventive campaigns were developed – regular prayer campaigns 
mobilised thousands of worshippers, a “White Campaign” in which solidarity was shown 
through the wearing of white clothing, a signature campaign for the release of political 
prisoners and genuine national reconciliation, and “Open Heart” campaign sending letters 
describing everyday hardship to senior leadership in the regime (see Duell 2014: 118). 
Such ideas were often the brainchildren of younger students in the opposition group, 
reading texts around peaceful oppositional action: “We always made an imagination of 
how to be against the military regime, and at that time, Gene Sharp39 was very useful for 
us” (Interview 40). 
Yet such was the regime that more public options beyond these were extremely 
restricted. Protests after 1988, such as student demonstrations in 1996 and 1998 centring  
around demands to recognise the legitimacy of the student union and conditions of 
university tuition, were put down quickly and ruthlessly by the security services and 
would result in renewed close scrutiny from the pervasive Military Intelligence (MI). 




                                                            
Mobilisation and persuasive work to expand the size of the opposition was therefore 
difficult, risky and burdened by secrecy: 
We all contributed to [protest work] but we didn’t really know each other, and we 
distributed literature secretly. This was deliberate and important, as there were only a few 
of us and the more we knew the more other people would be in danger (Interview 47). 
The fruitlessness of direct action in the face of the persistence of the regime meant that 
alternative actions were increasingly desirable and also feasible. A growing transnational 
human rights advocacy movement for democracy and human rights in Myanmar 
developed through complex networks, interlocking channels both horizontal and vertical, 
and formal and informal. Myanmar exile organisations such as the Association for 
Assisting Political Prisoners (AAPP), Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and the Human 
Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIP) had were headquartered in Thailand and 
staffed by those who had fled after 1988. Information flows were enabled international 
NGOs, networks of human rights lawyers, UN Special Procedures, foreign governments 
and other diplomatic and non-formal actions were crucial nodes and channels sustaining 
networks. The internet, heavily censored and more or less inaccessible to ordinary 
Myanmar citizens in the country until well into the 2000s, was nevertheless a boon for 
Myanmar transnational advocacy: the development of the online news source BurmaNet, 
for example, would “multiply vastly the number of stories being “published”” on 
Myanmar (Zaw Oo 2006: 242). Reports would flow through chains of trusted human rights 
reporters and disseminators in Myanmar, and in the 2000s these became better 
resourced (Interviews 2, 24). Despite the surveillance machine of SLORC and SPDC, 
individuals were occasionally able to benefit directly from support of overseas 




[Our human rights group] had to go to different places where we heard there were human 
rights violations, like Medi, Thandwe. I myself did a document and presented it to the 
Special Rapporteur… We would go there by ourselves [alone] and make documents 
(Interview 24). 
Although the “boomerang effect” would certainly spin from local abuses to international 
action (Keck and Sikkink 1998), any return with resolutions was partial, and would in any 
case have contradictory effects. Whilst Burma campaign groups in the US and UK 
succeeded in pulling Western foreign direct investment from the country in the mid-
1990s, divestment and later sanctions harshly impacted the general population (Khin Zaw 
Win 2007). Transnational human rights activities inadequately reflected political economic 
reality, such as Myanmar’s increasing connections to ASEAN and Chinese investment 
flows and the fact that property regimes were politically constituted rather than 
embedded in international markets, offsetting the impact on regime coffers (Roberts 
2009). Moreover, international attention on Myanmar could result in punitive measures 
on the opposition: visits by Special Rapporteurs, for example, often meant temporary 
detention for well-known activists until the commonly named “external interference” had 
departed (Interview 40). 
Networks for political pedagogy 
 
The obduracy of the regime, the stifling of intellectual life through the closure and 
surveillance of universities, where practically no serious work in social sciences or 
humanities was pursued, and an acute awareness of the difficulty of protest after 1998 
would also lead some toward an alternative modality of political engagement, but one 
which again drew on earlier repertoires. Private reading and discussion groups had a 
history which again stretched back to colonial times. In later decades they played an 
important role in student union politics and communist agitation during the 1960s and 
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1970s (Interviews 1, 2, 10). Numerous informal circles would meet at teashops on 
university compounds to quietly discuss national and international affairs, with discussion 
points centering around topics such as the justness of Ne Win’s military coup, and 
American aggression in the Vietnam. They were a focal point for recruitment into the 
banned Burma Communist Party (BCP) – with major communist works having been 
translated and published by the Nagani Book Club during and after colonial rule (Zollner 
2006), texts by Marx, Engels and Lenin would be distributed and discussed, although 
usually in a more private setting (Interview 10). 
Whereas these reading groups were directly reproducing a challenge to state power, 
serving to sustain the communist challenge, the variants which arose in the 1990s and 
2000s were more intellectual in focus. Intelligence services were generally indifferent 
towards these groups and the content of texts; indeed, during the 2000s political science 
was even read by political prisoners while in jail (Interview 26). Photocopied popular 
political texts were increasingly obtainable in Yangon through the 1990s and 2000s and 
set the basis for discussion – works by Thomas Friedman, Samuel Huntington, Francis 
Fukuyama, Alvin Toffler and even Edward de Bono were among the works translated and 
pored over by leading members of a new generation of activists40. The popularity of these 
authors and their works demonstrated the centrality of notions of liberty and economic 
development to the urban-based democracy movement rather than leftist currents, 
indicating frustration that Myanmar was denied the fruits of globalisation enjoyed by 
neighbouring countries. More simply, it reflected the anodyne subject matter readily 
available: only a handful of translators pursued such work, and texts which reflected the 
international zeitgeist were those which tended to be commercially viable. 
40 The translator of these works had also been an active member of the Burma Communist Party, and 
imprisoned during the 1970s. 
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For both security and comfort, and on grounds of interest and providing a window on the 
world, discussion of national politics and opposition strategy generally took place 
elsewhere. Group discussion centred on national politics could attract unwanted 
attention and, equally, sow unease among members who were more interested in its 
educative aspects. Texts that might be deemed to indicate a security threat, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were distributed covertly, usually as part of 
campaigns. Yet despite the SPDC attention on strategic rather than ideological threats, 
these groups clearly had a direct opposition function. Although bookish activity itself 
posed little immediate threat to the military regime, reading groups – which some 
interviewees half-jokingly referred to as “cells” – were popular with politically active 
individuals in Yangon and Mandalay and would obviously serve to maintain relations 
between activists. 
These groups were formative for many of those who participated in Myanmar’s 1996 and 
1998 student protests: 
During the repressive era, even though we cannot form a formal association we engaged 
in civil society through some other semi-organisations like art and culture, literary or 
reading groups. We published underground booklets. During university years we sat at the 
teashop and discussed all day, this is how I gained political knowledge and argumentative 
skills… there were informal groups, semi-organisation; very small but very active. I think 
that all of the famous writers and political activists [in Myanmar] were politicised like this 
(Interview 31). 
By the mid-2000s, these groups were supplemented by formal education programmes 
devised and implemented by international organisations, such as the British Council and 
American Centre. These offered deliberately constructed programmes that introduced a 
wide range of social science topics with an international flavour, such as introductions to 
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globalisation, economics, human rights, international governance institutions, and used 
texts and other resources unavailable outside. Taught by educators learned in social 
sciences but employed professionally as English language teachers, a variety of specialist 
teaching techniques ensured that political education went alongside the highly valued 
acquisition of English language skills. Delivered on diplomatic premises and with students 
selected by networks of trusted nominators, safety was more or less assured.  
Whilst the British Council gained a reputation for its quality of education, the book club at 
the American Centre 2005-2007 was more popular with activists – and indeed was led by 
activists, receiving participants on an invitation only basis. Texts such as Machiavelli’s 
Prince and Sun Tzu’s Art of War were deliberately selected for discussion for their focus 
on change and political strategy (Interview 49). Whilst both institutions were in public 
buildings, careful planning and the regime’s disinclination to disturb activities on 
diplomatically linked premises limited the threat of disruption by authorities. Nor were 
they indicators of a liberalisation in Myanmar’s politics: for example, while citizenship 
teacher training programmes were run frequently over a number of years in the British 
Council, when in 2007 one inspired graduate made the mistake of starting his own 
programme, he was summoned to the Ministry of Education to give details of his 
curriculum, to cease activity, and to then to make subsequent reports of his activities to 
the Ministry. 
Indeed, such was the difficulty of working in public that independent places of learning 
able to operate openly raised suspicions. Myanmar Egress, for example, was a formal 
organisation that did not threaten the state-building project and, arguably, supported it. 
Its website details how it was “set up in 2006 by a group of Myanmar nationalists 
committed to state building through positive change in a progressive yet constructive 
collaboration and working relationship with the government and all interest groups, both 
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local and foreign” (Myanmar Egress 2017). The organisation was rewarded with status 
and operating space, if not influence, but at the expense of legitimacy in the eyes of many 
activists (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2014), for whom gaining the tacit approval of and understanding 
from the military government meant Egress was acting against the long-term interests of 
the country (Interview 19). Nevertheless, its provision of education opportunities and 
claim to be building an aspect of a broader reconciliation process gained it international 
support, the organisation benefiting from some of the early funding to civil society groups 
made available by donors such as the European Union in the mid-to-late 2000s. 
Logics of accommodation: community development and 
education 
Logics of opposition in civil society can be contrasted with logics of accommodation. 
Again, while it is possible to understand this as a simple contrast between actors that 
reject state boundaries and those that accept them, this tells us little about the conditions 
and relationships in place to produce and sustain this modality of civil society41. Values of 
civic-minded communities of practice which generally eschewed direct opposition to the 
state had solidified over generations in Myanmar, as early responses to colonialism 
demonstrated. Stifled by three decades of totalitarianism, the disintegration of state 
welfare apparatus meant that pragmatic individuals and groups would focus mainly on 
service provision to needy populations, ill-served by Myanmar’s inadequate, resource-
strapped public services. Basic health, education and social service work such as free 
funeral provision42 would draw from earlier repertoires of social organising, most notably 
ideals of civilised society of pre-colonial times, including “village-level associations and 
41 The depiction of a distinction is, in any case, somewhat didactic, as in actuality differences were much more 
nuanced; there was certainly a mixing of their practitioners. 




                                                            
networks whose members conceive of and undertake their work in ‘traditional’ ways”, 
and which, lacking bureaucratic-rationalised and programmable structures, “‘fall beneath 
the radar’ of Western observers” and are overlooked as real civil society (Petrie and South 
2013: 4). By 2011 this was no longer the case, with non-formal health and education 
services highly organised in many rural and ethnic areas and an important focus of donor-
led development efforts. 
Yet control over social matters remained crucial to the maintenance of military rule, too 
important to cede to social groups. Although coercive tactics were fundamental, if there 
was any semblance of ideology to accompany and legitimise continued military rule then 
it was fashioned around the ideal of state unity and development. Having rolled back 
state socialist architecture after 1988, the military replaced the mass representative 
bodies that characterised BSPP with new conduits into civil society in the form of 
government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) such as Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare 
Association, and most importantly and extensively the parastatal Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA). Registered as a social organisation, in 2007 
membership approached a staggering 23 million, nearly half the country’s population, 
ostensibly to participate in social welfare work (Network for Democracy and Development 
2006). In actuality, this was a military-backed entity, and “[paralleled] the administrative 
structure of the state” with “a hierarchy of offices” (Steinberg 2001: 111).  
All Town and Village Peace and Development Committees [consist of] USDA members, so 
in the formal sense, they are all USDA. How much they all adhere to the USDA is a different 
matter but I still think the link is pretty strong - they feed into each other (Interview 48).43 
The USDA’s local achievements and good works made headlines in state-run newspapers. 
Its centres around the country provided English language and computer skills tuition, even 
43 This paragraph is developed from Sheader (2008). 
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management training for executives. A more notorious political function was the USDA’s 
active recruitment of thugs – the Swan Arr Shin44 – to intimidate and disrupt NLD 
gatherings gatherings. Yet even if it crowded out development-oriented civil society and 
harassed political actors, as Kipgen notes, “the formation of USDA… did not change the 
prospect of the government opening up space for civil society organisations” (2016: 55).  
Indeed, there were marked changes in the 1990s which, although scarce by standards of 
comparable developing countries in the region, such as Cambodia, saw international 
NGOs (INGOs) permitted to set up small offices during SLORC and SPDC military 
administrations. As I detail further in Chapter 4, their presence boosted developmentally-
oriented civil society. However, INGOs came under close surveillance and were restricted 
in their operations and movements. Intolerance of “interference in internal affairs” 
restricted standard activities such as policy advice. Some received public criticism from 
Burma campaign groups for enabling regime continuity turning and even complicity in 
human rights violations, such as World Conservation Society’s partnership with the 
government to create a national park near a site of intense civil conflict (see Rabinowitz 
2002: 151). 
The growth of Myanmar’s domestic development community was spurred in more 
bottom-up fashion too. In a strikingly similar way to how imported concepts contributed 
to the growth of the nationalist movement in the early twentieth century, community 
development materials and learning from taught programmes on leadership training, 
capacity building training and community management taking place among ethnic 
refugees and Myanmar exile populations in Thailand found their way into Myanmar itself 
(Interview 1). Ethnic armed groups fighting for self-determination controlled large 
swathes of territory in Myanmar’s Karen, Kachin and Shan States in the early days of the 
44 Usually translated as ‘masters of force’. 
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SLORC regime, with parallel state structures in place and ambitions for the development 
of service provision, especially in education (Interview 16). This meant the circulation and 
dissemination of materials was usually attached to ethnic or faith-based networks, 
meaning it was to some degree out of sight of state intelligence – even in urban centres 
such as Yangon, language and location would keep training and workshops more or less 
exclusive.  
Removed from its political context, content was uncontroversial and sensitive topic areas 
could be omitted from training sessions in Myanmar. For a young generation that had 
grown up in the BSPP era, this was a significant opportunity, and the focus on community 
development, capacity building and self-study became a familiar one through the 1990s 
and 2000s. This type of activity was non-confrontational, rationalising its right to operate 
not through basic – and dangerous – principles of rights and justice but in accordance with 
a development narrative that also undergirded the regime’s claim to rule. References to 
human rights were excised: the Yangon-based Capacity Building Initiative (CBI) resisted 
attempts by its employees and teachers to incorporate training on human rights and 
rights-based approaches to development even into Myanmar’s early reform years after 
2011 (Interview 38). 
Training would therefore take place in cities where facilities were located and could be 
implemented or ‘cascaded’ in activity locations later. Entities set up as businesses or even 
early local NGOs were responsible for coordinating training. Given the impoverishment of 
state education and continued lack of international opportunities, there was a high 
demand for the acquisition of new ideas: 
These were self-learning programmes… 16 modules for organisational development, office 
management, human resource management,  programme management... It was very 
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useful for community-based organisations [and] they only needed to attend the workshops 
and trainings at the weekends, everybody loved to join (Interview 1). 
Furthermore, the activity was relatively non-confrontational – models, techniques and 
skills taught went ostensibly unattached to political objectives, looking to circumvent 
rather than directly confront the state. Little if any content or form of this activity was 
directly crafted to the operational or ideational needs of human rights and democracy 
activists. At the same time, this did not mean these early educational activities were risk-
free nor completely devoid of political impact. Persons sympathetic to the political 
opposition but unable or unwilling to risk participation, usually for family or economic 
reasons, were attracted to development work (Interview 14). Moreover, the very 
inapplicability of foreign, somewhat alien developmental and professional concepts in 
Myanmar held a mirror up to authoritarian government and revealed its failures. Whilst in 
Hewison and Nyein’s terms they therefore constituted (merely) civil society rather than a 
politically-oriented civil society, in a highly constrained environment these courses were 
not straightforwardly the vehicles of depoliticisation they were accused of being 
elsewhere (see, for example, Louth 2015). 
Early local non-governmental organisations 
Such educational initiatives fed into the development of the first local NGOs (LNGOs) that 
were born around this time. In 2007, South wrote  
since the early-mid 1990s, the NGO sector in particular has undergone a significant 
regeneration… [and involves] more-or-less officially registered local agencies, as well as 




This was a notable development from the BSPP era, in part forced by the appearance of 
new social problems such as HIV / AIDS, and the extent of poverty-related development 
issues. The spiralling cost of living following the switch from a socialist to free market 
economy coupled with the continued militarised orientation of national budgets, away 
from social provision, had enormous social costs. As South again notes, “[i]n some cases, 
[NGOs] have been assisted by enlightened state employees, who may work surreptitiously 
towards non-SPDC sanctioned ends” (ibid.). 
Yet although bona fide NGOs – legally registered, salaried staff, a hierarchical structure 
and specialist bureaucracies and administrative departments – did indeed appear in the 
1990s, this does not in itself constitute the emergence of an NGO sector if this is to mean 
anything more substantial than a small population of local NGOs. The work of these 
organisations would continue to be subject to invasive scrutiny, they were unable to input 
into state policy while politics and the impracticalities associated with a state under 
international sanctions, unconnected to international banking and telecommunications 
systems, massively disrupted material bases and severely restricted the reach and scope 
of activities. State-association relations were therefore marked by complexity and 
inconsistency, so despite the appearance of a repertoire of formal organisation among 
development-oriented civil society actors, absent were the structures and selectivities 
required to institutionalise this approach. The ability to actually realise projects was not 
down to the powers or strategies of the organisation but still depended on authoritarian 
government and the idiosyncrasies and whims of its rule. Firstly, the history and identity 
of the individuals and group involved were highly salient. Orthodox development work or 
relief activities undertaken by individuals or groups associated with opposition political 
activity would be perceived as potentially political by the state and activity curtailed. The 
‘wrong’ connections would disrupt the most innocuous of community development work: 
activities which revealed links with the NLD or with ethnic opposition groups, however 
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tenuous, could completely derail project work. A committed care providing group for HIV 
/ AIDS care in Yangon, for example, led by long-time NLD member Phyu Phyu Thin, was 
regularly disrupted and harassed. 
Secondly, significant time, money, knowledge and connections were need to navigate the 
labyrinth of bureaucracy to work openly. This created among Yangon LNGOs the urban 
class bias noted in other country contexts (see Fowler 1991: 73) and could cast doubt on 
alignment with the interests of the poor or marginalised they were set up to serve. For 
example, to avoid the inevitable scrutiny that would come from registration with the all-
pervasive General Administration Department (under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs), many would set up as businesses or private educational establishments. 
Those that did apply to register as organisations would sometimes make use of insiders 
within the civil service to ensure that when the application for registration reached a 
certain point in its processing, it would be returned to the bottom of the pile. The social 
capital that enabled access to such knowledge and contacts was of course restricted to 
those with well-placed, trustworthy government contacts in their extended families.  
Early LNGOs would also need to take account of the USDA and GONGOs, which might help 
secure access to permission required to pursue activities but might also attract unwanted 
attention. Consent or acquiescence of certain levels of the military command structure 
would invariably be required at some stage, and variation in local conditions, sensitivities 
and personalities across space and time made planning difficult. Despite its portrayal as a 
united entity impervious to the influence of external events, internal wrangling and 
external threats would shake the regime. The need to make personal connections to get 
public work done meant that any major political turbulence, such as the purge of Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt and the Military Intelligence network in 2004, could have severe 
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ramifications for organisational work. Periodic crackdowns on the National League for 
Democracy would cast the net of suspicion widely. 
The inhospitable climate for civil society activity generated by regime structures selected 
for informal, ‘traditional’ civil society or local, community-based social welfare activity 
(undertaken by community-based organisations (CBOs)), and meant that they continued 
to be far more prevalent and significant (at least in terms of the phenomena of 
organising) than NGOs during the 1990s and 2000s. This was reflected in estimated 
numbers which, for CBOs, was estimated to be as high as 214,000 by the early 2000s 
(Heidel 2006: 43). A passion for engaging in ‘social work’ came to be a commonly-heard 
sentiment through the 2000s, particularly among the growing urban middle class in 
Yangon. Caring for the elderly, delivering rice to orphanages or poor communities, 
organising school lessons for street children were all common activities and, however 
partial, contributed towards alleviating some of the worst symptoms of military rule and 
human rights violations without directly challenging authority.  
They do the work because they want to help the people. Nothing more. It’s not about 
politics, it’s not about government, it’s just about helping. The people are so poor and 
nobody is doing anything, so we do something (Interview 46). 
Whilst often ephemeral, lacking the internal structures and emergent capacities of formal 
NGOs for larger-scale projects, these membership-based groups possessed the flexibility 
required to navigate the unpredictability and excesses of SPDC officials. With significant 
movement of ethnic groups into Yangon and surrounding areas, work might be 
additionally motivated by a sense of commonality with a network’s ethnic group. EAW, for 
instance, originally formed to help locally-identified victims of human trafficking from the 
Karen ethnic group: 
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At Karen meetings, some issues come up like Karen girls are trafficked, they don’t have a 
contact… they would call me – “OK, this is a case, someone needs your help to go back to 
their home”. We picked our own money and gave help to that girl to go back home 
(Interview 34). 
2007 and beyond: ‘space’ appears 
By the mid-2000s the dual logics of opposition and development were entrenched under 
the single banner of Myanmar civil society. The intransigence of Myanmar’s military and 
longevity of authoritarian rule made for an uneasy ecology, a paradoxically hospitable 
environment hosting an “apparently durable coexistence of non-governmental 
associations and the state” frequently found “in many non-democratic political systems” 
(Lewis 2013: 327). However, given its state of pre-institutionalisation, for opposition and 
accommodation oriented groups alike the exercise and impact of collective civil society 
agency depended on the contingencies of the state – strategic calculations were often just 
best guesses. 
Yet such was the ossification of circumstances in Myanmar that even slight perturbations 
had disproportionate effects. In the 2000s, state-structural change – discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4 – and certain instances of force majeure produced significant variations in the 
fortunes of institutional actors. Initially, apolitical stances brought increasing rewards: the 
exercise of agency by politically-oriented civil society was not only stymied by regime 
actions, in an absolute sense, but would come to be considered as relatively ineffective 
when contrasted to actors willing to avoid politics and rights claims. Divisions had first 
been hardened by nationwide mass demonstrations in September 2007’s Saffron 
Revolution, which led to the arrests and imprisonment of hundreds of (mainly young) 
activists and students and to (temporary) disruption of plans for the scaling-up of 
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pragmatic development work between international actors,  authorities and local 
organisations (civil society strengthening project team leader 2016. Personal 
communication). Initially sparked by rises in fuel prices, the violence meted out to 
protesters, journalists, bystanders and, most shockingly, to monks, and the implausible jail 
sentences handed out in the aftermath of September 2007, reinforced the value of 
pragmatic approaches. 
Less than a year later, divisions between approaches would be further clarified. Cyclone 
Nargis struck Southern Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady Delta region in May 2008, killing over 
100,000 people. Locally-led relief work involved hundreds of local groups, many of which 
had formed in a matter of days, stepping in to distribute locally-collected aid, tend to 
injuries and the burial of the dead and assemble temporary shelters while the 
government blocked international aid and delayed its own response. An immense 
humanitarian operation under intractable circumstances, with the usual logistics of 
coordinating such work involving accessing remote wetland villages, was made 
significantly more difficult and time-consuming by intense military scrutiny. For local 
actors with political backgrounds or possible intentions, difficulties were compounded: 
The SPDC initially stood idly by during the outpouring of local support to help the cyclone’s 
victims, but soon reintroduced control through checkpoints and close monitoring of aid. 
Later on, the SPDC targeted activists for harassment, arbitrary arrest, and—in a number of 
cases—lengthy prison sentences for their organizing activities and expressing views that 
the SPDC viewed as threatening its control (Human Rights Watch 2010: 44). 
For the government this was less a natural disaster to attend to, more a political situation 
to manage and control. Yet for many organisations and civil society entities that became 
active into and during the reform era, the learning points offered by the Nargis aftermath 
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constituted a vital opportunity to grasp what civil society should and should not be doing 
if it was to make a difference in the ‘expanding space’: 
In Myanmar there is a lot of space where we can work… The government is restrictive but 
they are trying to decide if we are good or bad, are trouble or not… They don’t give us 
much trouble when we are working for the community. We don’t tend to ask permission 
and we just do by ourselves (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2010: 99). 
Such “space”, in other words, appears skewed in favour of certain actors over others. 
Sensitivity around civil society actors that made “trouble” by mobilising for political goals 
would begin to reach levels of paranoia. In 2010, for example, a group of volunteers from 
community-based development groups visited Pakistan for a global civil society event 
organised by an international organisation. Following workshops intended for activists 
working in communities at risk of radicalisation, some returned with the notion that 
politically-oriented groups seeking democracy and an end to authoritarian rule could be 
deemed to have been radicalised and should be separated from responsible civil society 
actors, disseminating these perspectives in their own workshops (Active Citizens 
programme participants 2010. Personal communication). With hundreds of activists newly 
imprisoned after the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis and support for non-state 
welfare activities steady, Myanmar’s civil society appeared to be settling for self-control. 
Even as late as 2011, Kramer observed that  
The authorities in Burma are wary of civil society actors getting involved in political 
activities. This is a very sensitive issue for the government, and they have clamped down 




In fact, the nadir of official intolerance of politically-oriented civil society had been 
reached during Cyclone Nargis, and the gulf of acceptability separating the two logics 
would soon narrow remarkably. Landslide approval of the country’s third post-
independence Constitution in a widely discredited June 2008 referendum was followed by 
preparation for a general election in November 2010. In the months leading to the poll, 
urban-based political discussion and pedagogy networks, as well as development-oriented 
networks, were galvanised by the prospect of political change and began to explore 
possibilities of work beyond preaching to the converted. Given the national scale, there 
was potential to reach much further than previously while the state-sanctioned nature of 
the process promised opportunities to work more openly than previously. 
A generation had passed since the last election and inexperience made for serious 
tensions between police and civil society actors, meaning a great deal of furtive, careful 
organisation which most local politically-oriented actors were already well-versed in. 
Engagement consisted of two main activities. Firstly, voter education, with an emphasis 
on the substance of voting and the democratic project of which it is part, rather than 
merely procedural aspects particular to the 2008 Constitution. Most of these workshops 
and meetings were branded as “civic education” and incorporated an overview of the 
constitution. With an explicit reference to rights now included in the Constitution, an 
exploration of human rights and citizenship was now possible, and proposals to local 
embassy funding committees, such as the UK Embassy’s Peace, Democracy and Human 
Rights Programme (PDHR), would be dominated by human rights and democracy 
education projects. Secondly, election observation was undertaken by a number of groups 
and individuals, with one large Yangon-based NGO funded by various international donors 
to organise – surreptitiously – the largest and most comprehensive observation initiative. 
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Whereas observation attempted clandestine operation and resulted in harassment and 
detentions on or around the election date, the former was more open and public than 
could have previously been imagined. “We were questioned by police”, said one civic 
education trainer, “but we just told them we are telling people about the constitution. 
They let us continue. They even stayed and told us that they had also learned something!” 
(Project officer 2013. Personal communication).  Certainly, such actions reached only a 
tiny fraction of the electorate. Lidauer (2012: 100) estimates that “up to 15 different CSOs 
in the country offered civil society and voter education programmes.” Apart from well-
established and well-connected organisations like Myanmar Egress, who trained some 
2000 people during the election run-up, most of these organisations were in actual fact 
very recent inventions, small groups that had previously existed on the quiet as discussion 
and educational networks but were now able to assume public activities (Interview 19). 
Furthermore, as information was ‘cascaded’ following workshops via newly trained groups 
and networks – a device to increase beneficiary reach, and better secure funding – direct 
organisational instruction did not exhaust activity. Politically-oriented civil society actors 
nervously enjoyed freedoms to discuss and critique constitutional arrangements, the 
workings of parliament, party political processes and the rights of the individual; some, 
moreover, would become involved in the process themselves as political party advisors. 
Civil society in a new ‘space’ 
In April 2012, a year after the military proxy party USDP had formed a governing 
administration, by-elections were held in a transformed political landscape. The release of 
most political prisoners and the easing of political surveillance meant that elections, this 
time contested by the NLD, provided a key test for Myanmar’s new-found openness. 
Electoral observation work involved high-profile activists from the 88 Generation 
Students, whose Myanmar Election Network was composed of members from several civil 
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society organisations. Freely able to monitor, collect eye-witness reports and disseminate 
findings, the “group [was] satisfied with the whole electoral process now being finished 
without any major risks including violence and unrest [sic]” (Election Monitoring Network 
2012: 7). 
The 2012 by-elections thus marked the beginning of a rehabilitation of politically-oriented 
civil society. Their activity was apparently no longer off-limits; indeed, it was now the 
more accommodation-oriented civil society that was on the backfoot and having to 
situate their work within the flux of state development activity. Funding for domestic civil 
society actors expanded as donors such as AusAID and Open Society Foundation began to 
channel resource away from the Thai-Burma border and into Myanmar (The National 
2012; Burmalink 2015). New domestic and international links between organisations 
surged, while open meetings were held in a variety of public locations and key political 
issues discussed, reports on once sensitive topics published, and often circulated in new 
private media or over an uncensored internet. Although later chapters will describe 
ongoing tensions throughout the reform era, with hardened behaviours among various 
actors persisting, the normalisation of public political participation appeared well under 
way. Lidauer observes how self-circumscription to welfare activity was left behind, as 
“civil society actors, be they journalists or members of formal or informal organisations… 
found new ways to get politically engaged” (2012: 109). 
Developments were as swift as they were unprecedented, and generated excitement 
among analysts of Myanmar’s political development. Understanding and contextualising 
this apparently dramatic shift requires a sober unpacking of the social forces involved, yet 
the emotion which accompanied the thaw between state and non-state actors meant 
actors and commentators alike tended to attribute change to agents: “The space and 
possibilities for civil society is up to us. We can widen this space. It is not ideal, but it 
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depends on our creativity” (interview in Kramer 2011: 15). Rather than interrogate the 
meaning of such claims, many academic commentators on Myanmar would repeat them, 
placing explanatory weight on the actions and activities of civil society actors alone, on 
how their agency “opened spaces of discourse and action that have the potential to 
support and influence, but also oppose, political reforms” (Lidaur 2012: 89). According to 
the critical realist explanatory logic presented earlier, explaining the actual change in 
(civil) society activity should direct attention to the real mechanisms which generate it. On 
the account given above, the ‘space for civil society’ collapses into the exercise of agential 
powers, an elisionism or central conflation downwards into the agent, making for a wholly 
unsatisfactory account of social change. The metaphor of space – a potent and 
commonplace trope among civil society advocates in reform era Myanmar – appears here 
as an empty empirical plane, devoid of structural content. 
In contrast, Hewison and Nyein, writing as the prospect of political reform in Myanmar 
was emerging, offer a more cautious assessment, recognising that while the existence of 
various civil society actors “may lead to an expansion of political space… this opening 
requires action by the state” otherwise “the role of these groups is likely to be 
compromised or complicit” (2010: 31. Emphasis mine). In Myanmar, after 2009, this 
appeared to have happened. This highlights two important points which I will develop in 
Chapter 4: firstly, the idea of the state as both actor(s) and structure – exercising state 
power to reconfigure structures. Secondly, such structural change can be expected to 
affect generative mechanisms previously relatively isolated in the value-driven discursive 
politics of civil society, by altering the strategic selectivities which underpinned the 
formerly stable – all too stable – value-driven logics of accommodation and opposition. 
Relations of antagonism, sustained in discursive politics, would be undermined as changes 




In Myanmar, the changes so refreshingly perceptible to actors after 2010 were only an 
empirical marker of deeper shifts that had slowly rearranged the structural terrain over a 
number of years, changes that some argued to have positively changed the ‘enabling 
environment’ for civil society. Yet if we understand an expansion in the space for civil 
society as consisting of a socio-political transformation that at least entails greater respect 
for basic civil and political rights, then structural change might be expected to enable not 
only freedom of association but also – if it really is a space – to foster conditions to 
overcome other inequities of power. However, new structures, beyond new political–
constitutional rules, mean that certain actors and identities are privileged over others. I 
examine this in Chapter 4, showing how the resulting ‘space’ is complex and ambivalent in 
terms of the power it sustains. Indeed, it can be seen to generate the very forces that 
NGOise civil society. 
Conclusion 
 
This account of Myanmar’s civil society has described its somewhat tragic history since 
colonialism through depicting the emergence of two analytically distinct logics or ‘ways of 
doing’ civil society – a politically-oriented and a developmentally-oriented civil society. My 
objective in this chapter has been to focus on the agential side of the institutional 
dialectic, describing the logics, approaches and the values and social identities in civil 
society. 
In each tradition, actors drew upon historical antecedents: a developmentally-oriented 
civil society drew upon civic values embodied in (historically) Buddhist notions of 
community-based charity and giving, largely avoiding rights claims in order to better 
ensure uninterrupted provision of welfare under authoritarian government. A shift to a 
capitalist economy and authoritarian politics after 1990 gave a double boost to this 
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approach – the removal of totalitarian support systems (however paltry) created need 
while a disinclination to foment political change meant they were regarded as benign 
entities. They facilitated links and support to expand and formalise efforts by connecting 
with INGOs. Politically-oriented civil society finds its roots in the early associations which 
flourished and were politicised under British rule. Its repertoires of opposition included 
mainly student-led underground political networks, which sought removal of the military 
and the resolution of various state pathologies believed to be linked to military-
institutional interests. Discussion and reading groups were less manifest in their 
opposition and, drawing from traditions of non-formal education as well as communist 
cells, worked instead to inculcate a critical pedagogy in a politically inquisitive youth. 
Whilst developmentally-oriented civil society actors were far from content with the 
regime, strategic action was geared towards nothing more than accommodation with the 
state structural selectivities. The values and actions of those embracing logics of 
politically-oriented civil society, meanwhile, positioned actors in pursuit of their 
dismantlement and reorganisation. An absence of respect for human rights throughout 
much of Burma’s history distanced agential powers from meaningful interaction with the 
state and made for decades of grim continuity. A sudden reversal of fortunes in 2009, 
however, saw politically-oriented civil society begin to undertake public activities on a 
wider scale and with greater openness.  
Caught on the hoof, some of Myanmar’s civil society activists and scholars sought to 
attribute this ‘expansion of space’ to politically-oriented civil society itself. Yet no 
explanation appears as to why such actions were so suddenly efficacious; from a SRA 
perspective, the ontology of change involves both sides of the institutional dialectic. 
Having introduced the dominant agential forms of Myanmar civil society, in Chapter 4 I 
focus specifically on the structural changes which abolished checks that had stymied the 
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agential powers of Myanmar’s politically-oriented civil society. Yet this does not entail 
unmitigated freedom, and nor is structural change limited to legal or constitutional 
reform; indeed, only an understanding of broader social structures to which the state and 
its projects are related will allow us to see how mechanisms of NGOisation begin to 
emerge in Myanmar, and thus how the distinct logics of civil society come together in a 















Chapter 4. Reform, and the emergence 
of the institution of organisation 
Introduction 
Logics of opposition and of accommodation were the binaries characterising relations 
between Myanmar’s state and non-state actors through the SPDC era. This stability was 
reproduced by state response (or its non-response), demonstrating how “authoritarian 
regimes last in part thanks to certain forms of discontent… the way they are expressed is 
an integral part of authoritarian governance” (Froissart 2014: 219). The stability of the 
regime meant time-worn techniques for coping with or challenging state structures could 
develop, albeit with occasional adaptation in politically-oriented civil society, such as 
innovative campaigns and the popularity of liberal reading and study groups, and the 
introduction of the local NGO form in development-oriented civil society. 
Towards the end of Chapter 3, I showed how these binaries of civil society began to erode 
as politically-oriented civil society moved above ground and – rapidly by Myanmar 
standards – became directly, publicly and apparently freely involved in the promotion of 
democratic politics and human rights. The claim that this could be understood as actors 
making more political ‘space’ for themselves was briefly criticised as presenting a wholly 
unclear picture of civil society development in Myanmar, offering no explanation of how 
civil society actors so suddenly overcame decades-old strictures, and instead redefining 
the problem through a central conflation of structure and agency. Improvement in 
respect for (certain) civil and political rights, especially since the 2010 elections, 
transformed conditions for civil society actors, but also altered the basis on which logics of 
civil society action operated. In moving from underground to above ground, oppositional 
norms that mediated action and agency for democracy and human rights during its 
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historical struggle now appear largely incongruous. In their place, a more formalised, 
public NGO form with its own distinct powers and requirements has become 
commonplace in Myanmar. Estimates of NGO or CBO, or the catch-all CSO, numbers 
continue to be reported with wild variation, due to the avoidance of the formal 
registration process and a lack of consensus on what these terms actually refer to. One 
well-placed estimate was around 1,000 registered NGOs by 2016 (Interview 43), their 
work spanning a range of social and, by now, political and human rights issues. CBOs, 
meanwhile, were said to be well over 200,000 in 2004 (Dorning 2006). Although we lack 
precise figures in this regard, the appearance and expansion during the 2000s of an INGO 
and donor-led civil society strengthening ancillary industry out to build the capacity of civil 
society actors cannot be doubted.  
Yet although, undoubtedly, a vast improvement on the conditions described in Chapter 3, 
that a supposedly politically liberated civil society should see actors converge around a 
single form rather than carve their own trajectories of development demands explanation 
and examination. In pursuit of this, I employ the critical realist-inflected institutional 
approach outlined in Chapter 2 to illuminate both the nature of the NGO itself – its sui 
generis powers and liabilities – and the development in Myanmar of the wider 
institutional field which provides the structural setting for that organisational form to 
flourish in the first place. These are not lone phenomena but have appeared as part of 
broader state change. This chapter therefore has twin aims: firstly, it explores the 
dynamics of state power in Myanmar and in particular its attempt to rearticulate social 
forces in civil society. What precisely is this change in the state, and how did it arise? Can 
coercive state-social relations be said to have been replaced by a relation of consent?  
Secondly, in light of state change, I abstract the necessary, internal relations between 
relevant social entities to develop a regional ontology that characterises the institutional 
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field, constituting the structural determinants of the institution of the NGO. Structures, 
concepts and beliefs that generate change are explored through explanatory critique: 
what are the key structures at issue here? How did they replace the relations of 
antagonism which underlay earlier normative orietations? How did outcomes of earlier 
social interactions complicate their instantiation and operation? With a clearer 
understanding of the structural terrain towards which actors develop strategy and by 
which certain practices become institutionalised, and an appreciation of how the political 
and social forces have shaped it, I show how the so-called ‘space for civil society’ has a 
structured topography that serves as a vector for NGOisation, which itself must be 
understood more broadly than the mere adoption of the NGO form. It is within this field 
and the institutional milieu it fosters that the actors investigated in the Chapter 5 case 
studies make strategic decisions. 
Setting the context: state change in Myanmar after 1990 
Given the brutality of military rule in Myanmar and the apparent continuity under SLORC 
and SPDC of an institutional dominance born in the 1960s, most analyses of Myanmar’s 
government have focused on understanding the obduracy of the regime – its internal 
politics and the tensions between “hardliners” and “liberals” or “soft-liners” (Kyaw Yin 
Hlaing 2009; Bunte and Portela 2012), the relative power of the Tatmadaw as the only 
modern institution in Myanmar (Callahan 2009), and the likeliness of its continued 
domination through a “hybrid regime” (Selth 2012). Such is its dominance that Steinberg 
labeled the military a “state within a state”, an opinion buttressed by the privileged access 
of military functionaries to the best schools, healthcare and other trappings of a 
patrimonial system (Steinberg 2012: 224). To refer to the Thein Sein government which 
came to power in 2011 as reformist, for many, is therefore deeply problematic. Turnell, 
for instance, articulates the standpoint of many who are dismissive of any transformation: 
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The singular unity of Myanmar's military rule seems likely to persist. All the elements of 
the oppressive apparatus remain in place, as do the incentives that cement the military, 
business and other elites to the existing arrangements (2011: 89). 
Yet whilst the military would retain many of its privileges, focusing solely on this (a) 
overlooks the enormously important changes which resulted in real progress on civil and 
political rights, and (b) conceals wider structural changes that enabled privilege and 
political power to be retained in spite of (a). Employing a Gramscian approach to the state 
sets its transformations within broader social constraints and contexts, including the place 
of social agency. The state’s organisations and apparatus are not seen as “technical 
instruments of government” but are understood in a way that “relates them to their social 
bases” in “the economic system and civil society” (Jessop 1982: 146); this illuminates the 
importance for civil society actors of the shifts made by SLORC and SPDC during the 
course of military rule. My objective in presenting this is not a normative assessment of 
the military’s reformist agenda, less still any exposé of the military’s purported plan for 
perpetual domination, but to situate civil society in this developing structural context. 
The constitutional and political changes in Myanmar that signalled the end of the SPDC 
and the installation of a civilian regime mark the culmination of a state project realised 
over two decades. This reconfigured the relationship between government apparatus, 
civil society (in its broader sense) and the economy, however troubled and contested this 
apparent normative departure would prove to be. Whilst the state form continued to 
ensure the dominance of the Tatmadaw, this would be additionally secured through an 
economic power bloc nurtured by the military. For whilst state structures and bourgeois 
interests and actions are never unified simpliciter, in the Myanmar context the 
development of this relationship was more direct and explicit, less organic, than in many 
other nation states, resembling a corporatist project. 
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The socialist economy collapsed in the 1980s mired in stagflation, international isolation 
and an underdeveloped national economy, with the private sector crowded out by state 
economic enterprises (SEEs) and encumbered with bureaucracy. Whilst socialist states in 
Eastern Europe generally restructured through the gradual inclusion of long-existing 
informal market systems into the formal economy, any straightforward liberalisation 
process in Myanmar was complicated by legacies of self-sufficiency policies and state 
isolation, hence the absence of an active bourgeoisie. Facing this set of contingencies the 
switch to a new mode of production was not a simple matter of rearticulating relations 
between political society and dominant class fractions, but in the latter’s very creation: 
Since a “fluent, responsible middle class” was absent, it was necessary for the state to 
“build it up”…  Privatisation would thus be gradual and directed to create large-scale 
“national entrepreneurs” capable of taking on major industries (Jones 2014: 148). 
In a broader Marxist sense, there is nothing unique about the connivance of state-
business interests in maintaining the state. Despite the expectation that the capitalist 
state is largely absent from the economy, even under laissez-faire conditions it plays a 
crucial role in securing the conditions for particular accumulation regimes and fending off 
threats from dominated classes (Poulantzas 1973, in Jessop 1982: 153-210). The 
development of “national entrepreneurs” in Myanmar was, however, quite unique. A 
Privatisation Commission established in 1995 oversaw the selling off of SEEs and other 
state assets such as land and buildings over two phases between 1995-2007. Beneficiaries 
of sales of mining, energy, timber, fuel retail and industrial manufacturing were primarily 
businesses “owned by individuals with close personal and business connections with the 
highest levels of the ruling elite” (Ford et al. 2016: 30), and large conglomerates owned by 
the Burmese military itself - the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and Myanmar 
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Economic Corporation. Close patronage networks were developed between these 
entities.  
Importantly, crony privatisation also undergirded the Tatmadaw’s approach to partly 
unifying the disparate patchworks of ethnic populations across Myanmar through 
inclusion into the state-capital nexus, a process sometimes referred to as “ceasefire 
capitalism” (Woods 2011). By 1997, 16 ceasefire agreements had been made between the 
Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups; whilst popular demands for federalism went unmet, 
rebel army commanders laid down weapons for material opportunity in a variety of 
sectors both licit and illicit, including logging operations, opium farming, jade mining and 
other lucrative extractive enterprises. This had the concomitant effect of splintering 
ethnicity-based movements into rival factions, holding different allegiances to the state. 
Any subsequent attempts at transformation of the state would have to be done amidst a 
set of formidable constraints, with the symbiosis between the military and new crony elite 
commanding a concentration of economic power in the hands of a small oligarchy and the 
political power to design a constitution that preserved gains (Bunte 2011; Callahan and 
Steinberg 2012). 
The state project defined new relations between its own elites and newly constituted 
concentrations of ‘independent’ economic power. Yet this initiates tendencies not under 
the complete control of any one group. Firstly, although extra-economic accumulation 
and transfers of state-owned assets would be an initially important method of securing 
resource, it was not necessarily compatible with the interests of the new business class in 
the long-term which, like any other bourgeoisie, would be increasingly market dependent. 
Secondly, state power continued to rest on the most fragile of social bases, with the 
military largely despised among the general population. In a Gramscian sense, cultivation 
of a genuine historical bloc requires attendance to levels of production and politics; the 
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exercise of ruling power is hegemonic insofar as it is consented to not only by dominant 
fractions of capital, but also by those groups and classes dominated. This requires 
compromises and concessions on the part of ruling elites. Yet organic relations between a 
leading party and civil society were to be found between the latter and the NLD in the 
Burman heartlands, with various armed groups leading in ethnic areas. Pro-democracy 
campaigners of 1988, and the generation that followed, also held widespread support. 
Persuasion and ethical consolidation central to hegemony and integrating society involves 
mundane everyday matters of statecraft, like “taking systematic account of popular 
interests and demands, shifting position and making compromises on secondary issues to 
maintain support… and organizing this support for the attainment of national goals which 
serve the fundamental long run interests of the dominant group” (Jessop 1982: 148).  
The complexity of government that such an integral state requires was ill-suited for 
Myanmar’s corrupt, bankrupt welfare system and the chronic disinterest and 
disconnection of the generals from the conditions of the bulk of the population. During 
implementation of the state project through the 1990s and 2000s the consent of 
subordinate groups would therefore remain absent, and the military would fall back on 
familiar repertoires of neutralisation and co-optation. We have seen how the former 
involved systematic human rights violations against civil society actors, the latter the 
inclusion of armed groups in ethnic hinterlands in networks of patronage but also 
tolerance of developmentally-oriented civil society which did not disturb the operation of 
state power. The efforts of GONGOs and the mass-based USDA had little or no effect on 
negative sentiments of the population towards the military, especially in urban areas – 
attendance at anti-NLD rallies and the disruption of demonstrations depended on paid 
labour and thugs for hire. Whilst many welcomed the fresh, less hostile perspective on 
political transition encouraged by Myanmar Egress, this barely affected the disaffection 
felt toward the regime. Across civil society institutions, there was intense antipathy and 
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opposition towards military rulers and business ‘cronies’45. In addition to activist groups, 
Buddhist monasteries were under close watch, especially after the 2007 ‘Saffron 
Revolution’, as were universities. 
Concessions would therefore be given to development oriented civil society, social 
welfare groups and in fact, especially through the 2000s, increasingly towards civil society 
actors which did not pose an immediate danger to the unfolding state project. The aim 
was not to court an unlikely approval, but to ensure non-interference in the solidification 
of the bloc and its conditions for reproduction. Constrained and closely supervised 
participation of the international community was also acceptable and relatively harmless. 
Unacceptable, on the other hand, were actors who threatened to destabilise the state 
project, and harsh punishments would be meted out for (broadly defined) acts of civil 
disobedience. Thus any relaxation of the persecution of politically-oriented civil society 
had to wait until plans for a new constitution and elected government were realised. 
Procedural enactment would involve the coercive power of the military bureaucratic state 
apparatus and its outer ditches of its mass-based associations. The reach of the USDA 
helped manipulate an overwhelming endorsement of both the 2008 Constitution and the 
military-backed USDP in the 2010 general election, both critical steps in cementing the 
new order. 
The intended result, a self-described “disciplined democracy”, was envisaged as a 
carefully-designed superstructure for military rule and, as such, 2010 elections written off 
as a “sham” by many Myanmar watchers and democracy and human rights groups (see, 
for example, Clegg 2010; National Democratic Institute 2010). Yet other Southeast Asian 
nations had experienced waves of often contradictory and disorienting shifts in the state 
and governing regimes after the eclipse of colonialism, something which the institutional 
45 A term used very frequently in Myanmar’s among those critical of this state-business nexus. 
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dominance of the military regime had seen Myanmar largely avoid46. Despite important 
elements of continuity in the military’s presence in government, the redrafting of the 
rules of government would herald a major change in terms of the relations between the 
Myanmar state and forces of civil society. 
The new latticework for civil society  
Changes in the state form during the SPDC era were therefore not limited to alterations in 
the constitutional architecture but involved attempts to organise a reconstituted historic 
bloc. This initiated social forces which impacted on the form, orientations and practices of 
civil society. As this state project was gradually cultivated and enacted over the course of 
the SPDC administration, and especially after 2000, modalities of civil society through 
which subordinate groups found support or representation were quietly polarised: a 
normative bifurcation of civil society into a legitimate, depoliticised development-
oriented form, and a far less acceptable politically-oriented civil society. Groups which 
posed genuine hegemonic threats to the unfolding state project were neutralised, while 
concessions and circumscribed tolerance were on offer for more benign actors.  
Neither politically-oriented nor accommodation-oriented civil society, therefore, can be 
said to have created its own space; rather, the SPDC state project together with its 
intended and unintended effects reorganised the relations within which civil society 
actors were positioned. These set the structural field against which civil society would 
develop in the USDP reform administration after 2011, a latticework of relations between 
organisations, government and donors. This is not simply a relationship between groups, 
but between different groups, their needs, interests and values, and an economic system, 
a first attempt at fitting a capitalism in which cronies and military would dominate – or 
46 Explanations for state change or stasis, such as the persistence of authoritarianism in the face of 
modernisation, are of course enormously varied and reflect basic theoretical proclivities. See Robison, 
Hewison and Rodan (1993) for an excellent summary as the debate relates to Southeast Asia. 
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certainly retain their spoils – with politically emancipated Myanmar society. This demands 
management of political and cultural conditions in which subaltern groups were now free 
to organise, in a way broadly consistent with modern government, and with the broader 
requirements of the reproduction of the historical bloc itself. In Gramsci’s words, “what is 
involved is the reorganization of the structure and the real relations between men on the 
one hand and the world of the economy or of production on the other” (1971: 263). 
Three interrelated structural relationships can be can be abstracted and examined within 
this latticework, each having their own distinct effects on civil society agency and agential 
projects: fiduciary, legal and ethical relationships. The forces which impact Myanmar’s 
civil society would no longer be those of an authoritarian state that requires no ethical 
component, but come to be more typical of those found in democratic liberal capitalist 
social formations in which formal, instrumental relations and hegemony are pushed to the 
fore47. In the rest of this chapter, I argue that the historical development, operation and 
effects of these relations in Myanmar, from 1990 to the present day, offer a more 
informative, content-rich and causally meaningful account of change in civil society 
activity than the ‘expansion of space’ thesis. Indeed, as their effects bolster particular 
social identities and institutionalised ways of doing civil society while delegitimising and 
deinstitutionalising others, grasping their ontology is essential to appreciating how the 
contours of this space favour certain institutionalised forms and orientations of civil 
society over others. In short, this is the key to understanding the trajectory of Myanmar’s 
politically-oriented civil society and the early appearance of phenomena associated with 
NGOisation. 
47 This is not to suggest that Myanmar transformed into a liberal state in such a short space of time, but that 
the new sets of relations into which politically-oriented civil society was implicated were liberal solutions to 
social and political development. These gave rise to institutionalising social forces. In this way, civil society 
actors were pressed – mainly by donors – to the forefront of liberal democratic development, while state elites 
were able to remain recalcitrant.   
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Relation 1: Donors, CSO capacity and the development of 
fiduciary structures 
 
Until relatively recently, Myanmar made for a significantly – sometimes impossibly – 
challenging environment for international agencies to engage in the kind of civil society 
strengthening programmes commonplace in neighbouring countries. As Figure 2 
indicates, donor activity was very limited during much of the SLORC and SPDC period of 
rule. Prior to 1990, the self-sufficiency policies of the BSPP restricted international 
presence, meaning that for decades Myanmar had been a largely peripheral site for 
international development actors and the implementation of new development 
paradigms. This trend continued under SLORC, which assumed power around the time 
civil society was being venerated as a “magic bullet” for the West’s development industry 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996b). Unlike Eastern Europe, in 1988 Myanmar’s subaltern failed 
to secure a regime conducive to liberal development norms encapsulated in the New 
Policy Agenda (NPA). The prominence of the military and cronies in the national economy 
complicated efforts to develop the efficiency of the private sector as an instrument for 
economic growth and poverty reduction, while the policing of non-state actors and 
absence of democratic channels of participation strictly curtailed the involvement of civil 




Figure 2: Net Official Development Assistance received by Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, 
1990-2012 (World Bank 2017). 
The absence of these twin poles of the NPA, fulcra of development in other parts of the 
world, was doubly problematic. Firstly, official development assistance (ODA) was 
cancelled by the West (including Japan) in the wake of SLORC’s assumption of power and 
human rights violations. Financial support for Myanmar would fall far below that of its 
comparable neighbours for decades. Unlike the US, the EU’s Common Position did not 
completely prohibit engagement: aid was permitted when it could be shown it would not 
benefit the regime, but not only was this highly unlikely but it also ran up against lobbying 
of solidarity groups toward supportive MPs and senators in the West. Secondly, aid 
cancellation was only one of a range of tactics – alongside withdrawal of trade privileges, 
arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and so on – to achieve behavioural or regime 
change by politically isolating and economically crippling the regime (with significantly 
detrimental effects on workers) (Haacke 2006). Such actions and their stated goals of (at 
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least) achieving political change in Myanmar made for a highly-charged political context. 
Political conditions on aid were seen as “low-intensity warfare” by the SPDC: “‘as a 
sovereign independent country we do not like to be pushed around’” (Hla Min, in Haacke 
2006: 64).  
Yet despite discouraging circumstances, as part of an initial public relations drive early in 
its rule, Myanmar’s military rulers had “expressed interest in having international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) undertake relief and development projects in the 
country” (Arnott 1994). By 2005 there were “41 INGOs employing about 3,500 people in 
Burma/Myanmar… 7 have staff over 200”. Most were small missions, with a combined 
“total budget of around $30 million”, a stark contrast to “Cambodia, with a population of 
just 15 million” and “about 115 INGOs with a budget of $110 million” (Stallworthy 2005). 
The retaliatory actions and diplomatic tensions described above made, therefore, 
pragmatically awkward circumstances. Whilst officially permitted, regime distrust of 
foreign – especially Western – interests meant a close supervision of INGO activity, 
constricted room for geographical and thematic manoeuvre and strained, exhausting 
relations with central government. Legality of operations depended on obtaining a 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) – a standard requirement in most development 
circumstances, but one which the military’s overriding concerns with security and non-
interference in domestic affairs turned into a highly time-consuming and problematic 
piece of documentation 48 . These applications, along with separate organisational 
registrations, approvals for projects, travel permission and recruitment of international 
staff had to be steered through numerous different government ministries and 
48 Summed up in the sinister proclamations of the “People’s Desire”, seen on street billboards and in daily 
newspapers:  
* Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative views 
* Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of the nation 
* Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State  
* Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy. 
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coordinating bodies. Completing this work was expensive and enormously time-
consuming. 
Official restrictions and exacting procedural constraints accentuated the practical 
importance of one aspect of the NPA’s modus operandi, that of ‘partnerships’ between 
INGOs and their local counterparts, (and, in more typical circumstances, with public 
authorities). “Joint principles of operation” released by a group of humanitarian INGOs in 
2000 specified how they sought “to operate in a way that supports civil society and builds 
the capacity of human resources in the country… enhancing both the technical and 
organisational capacities of our beneficiaries” (International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs) Providing Humanitarian Assistance In Burma / Myanmar 2000: 
Section 7). Beyond relief work, such a principle was equally important for those INGOs 
and their donor supporters engaged in development activity, focused in Myanmar in 
sectors such as agriculture, basic health, education and micro-finance. Here, the 
sustainability of project outcomes would often depend on continued interactions 
between local organisations, beneficiary communities and local (military-infused) 
government. Practically, engaging local groups helped to circumvent some of the overt 
restrictions on international entities – the more work local actors could be trusted to get 
on with, the less foreigner-military interaction there would be – and therefore became a 
vital element for any kind of success in the country. 
 
The ontology of empowerment  
It has been frequently asserted – and often challenged – that donors and INGOs falsely 
assumed that Myanmar civil society was weak because there were few NGOs, and even 
fewer with the capacity to carry out the functions internationals would commonly assign 
them (see Kramer 2011). Yet this perception was driven by practical need rather than 
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deficient conceptualisation, and if the required capacity didn’t exist in civil society then it 
would need to be built. Chapter 3 showed how social welfare groups and nascent NGOs 
had emerged in 1990s Myanmar, thanks to the abandonment of BSPP infrastructure and 
to new information and teaching materials. This would be further developed by 
international actors, as needs demanded, through more formalised civil society capacity 
building efforts among Myanmar’s local welfare groups. As both a delivery instrument for 
INGOs and donor efforts, and as a stand-alone objective insofar as empowered civil 
society organisations were an integral goal of INGO projects, building the capacity of 
these associations was of crucial importance. 
The ontology of empowerment or capacity building49 and the political economy assumed 
by its intended outcomes can be clarified here by critical realism. Two possible objects can 
be said to exist as targets for empowerment or capacity building work: firstly, work can 
aim towards improving organisational ability to accomplish certain tasks e.g. improving 
the organisation’s capacity to raise money through applications for funding can be 
strengthened by staff training, better communications with donors and so on. Secondly, 
work may focus on the organisational structure itself – this is often called organisational 
development (OD), and much of its objectives involve the rearrangement of relations 
between different organisational positions e.g. articulating a reformed division of labour, 
drawing up new departments, or the development of a more hierarchical system of 
accountability. These two objects of capacity building can be understood respectively as 
improving the strategic deployment or refining the quality of organisational powers and, 
more fundamentally, the bringing into being of those powers or capacities themselves. 
Like any capability, the NGO’s sui generis powers are dependent on internal structures – 
the arrangement of its staff and its other resources according to particular relational 
49 As is common in international development practice – and indeed in broader skills development – I use 
these terms interchangeably. 
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configurations so that it forms an organisation and yields the required organisational 
powers. 
Pursuing these twin objectives through the 1990s and 2000s was vital in the production of 
a community of civil society actors in Myanmar with the core abilities to fulfil the panoply 
of duties and expectations ascribed to them by virtue of the function of civil society 
organisations in development activities. In other words, the organisational powers 
deemed priorities are closely informed by the politics and ideologies that lay behind 
conceptualisations of civil society50, by virtue of a more fundamental organisation of 
state, society and economy. First and foremost, certain specific capacities are necessary 
for the reproduction of a civil society organisation itself. As Howell and Pearce remind, 
“civil society organizations can neither raise money through taxation like government nor 
generate profits through capital accumulation like companies” (2002: 108). The material 
base that supports activities and organisational reproduction – especially the livelihoods 
of the staff providing organisational labour – is, by and large, secured through donor 
grants awarded either directly or indirectly as partners in projects51. By virtue of the NGO 
structure and its emergent powers, entities are, and indeed must be, able to form 
contractual relationships with other entities – primarily donors or other (I)NGOs – and to 
meet contracted deliverables, usually through the enactment of projects52. The structures 
and attendant emergent powers required to enter into such a fiduciary relationship and 
to carry out contractual obligations are integral to being an NGO. 
50 Further discussed and critiqued in Chapter 6. 
51 Other sources of funding, of course, exist – governments may make unrestricted funds available to 
organisations (with the original source often being donors); market solutions are increasingly common, with 
NGOs becoming taking on the guise of a social enterprise and raising funds for activity through the sale of 
services. See Edwards (2008) for a critique of this supposed panacea for both eliminating social problems and 
securing the existence of autonomous, effective civil society. 
52 Philanthropic gifts, social enterprise, membership fees are other means of securing a material base. Yet 




                                                            
There are significant contradictions bound up in the NGO-donor relationship. Frequently 
commented upon is the purported dependency of NGOs on donors, making the former 
prone to fulfil donor agendas rather than their own and eroding the autonomy of civil 
society. This appears surprising as liberalism sequesters civil society in its own realm, 
obscuring the real relations that make it causally effective. Acknowledging how such 
efficacy is rooted in structures binding state to civil society negates liberal reasoning. A 
further contradiction exists in the tension between the social or philanthropic values that 
inspired the creation of the entity, and the demands and conditionalities attached to the 
provision of resource given for the fulfilment of this mission. These conditions form part 
of the objective environment, the world of concern through which values develop, just as 
much as the suffering that generated the original impetus for social action. 
Numerous development scholars have understood this tension in terms of accountability. 
Kaldor (2003), for example, contrasts the moral and procedural accountability of civil 
society – responsibilities towards beneficiaries versus the management and systems that 
realise these responsibilities. Uphoff (1996) sees contractual relationships as 
overwhelming those relating to social responsibilities towards the communities NGOs 
seek to serve: “there is a fiduciary relationship between NGO staff and trustees and those 
who provide NGOs with their funds which is greater than their obligations to recipients of 
NGO benefits” (ibid.: 21. Emphasis added). The realist presentation above shows more 
clearly how the distinctions between these two relationships are qualitative as well as 
quantitative. The substantial relations of NGO-donor rather than those pertaining 
between NGO-beneficiaries are writ large in the NGOs distinctive interests and powers, in 
its social identity. The fiduciary relationship is a necessary relationship, internal to NGO 
social identity, determining NGO real interests and empirically securing its reproduction. 
Most importantly for our purposes, this demands a configuration and powers explicitly 
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driven by the need for better contractual and project management, rather than better 
fulfilment of democracy and human rights, or other political ends.  
In Myanmar, whilst fiduciary structures and the politics organisational development 
would initially impact developmentally-oriented actors, politically-oriented civil society 
would later encounter and be enabled and constrained by these structures. 
Modalities of empowerment in Myanmar 
The expansion of empowerment and partnership or grant opportunities therefore went 
hand-in-hand. In 1998, the first large-scale training programmes for local NGOs was 
developed and implemented by World Vision and Save The Children as the Myanmar 
Developed Resource Program, later to become the autonomous Capacity Building 
Initiative (CBI), bringing in new INGO consortium partners. CBI provided trainings to local 
groups, often linking with groups working as partners in INGO or UN projects, which, 
together with their publication of the first Directory of Local Non-Government 
Organizations in Myanmar, initially recording 30 LNGOs, helped publicise their 
existence53. CBI training focused on skills considered to be fundamental in professional 
development work – project cycle management, strategic planning, leadership, project 
monitoring and evaluation, financial management, personal skills development and so on. 
Courses would be certified, a huge draw to a hopeful young professional class most 
impacted by university closure. 
As capacity grew in local civil society, it was anticipated that more accomplished and 
mature organisations would be able to ‘take ownership’ of these projects without the 
paternal oversight of gatekeeper INGOs; in other words, increased resource could be 
managed by local non-state actors. Thus Australia-based Burnet Institute’s work in HIV / 
AIDS, UNDP’s Human Development Initiative, the Spirit in Education Movement operating 
53 CBI’s criteria for inclusion in the directory were “being willing to be in the directory, having an office in 
Yangon, being a non-profit organisation, independent and with a clear leadership” (Jaquet and Caillaud 2014). 
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through ethnic and religious networks on the Thai-Myanmar border and SwissAid’s work 
in providing small grants and training for community-based work were all crucial in 
providing skills and knowledge-focused work with financial resource and expertise. 
Bilateral and multilateral assistance supported expanded health and education projects in 
country – multi-donor funds included the Three Diseases Fund (3DF) and Multi-Donor 
Education Fund – and both involved the input of local groups. Growing bilateral activity in 
the 2000s saw large direct grants go to development INGOs in Myanmar such as Marie 
Stopes International, CARE International, Save The Children and World Vision, an 
increasing portion of which would be directed towards capacity building for local groups. 
Working in partnership with INGOs or, for the handful of more established 
professionalised fully-fledged local NGOs, obtaining their own grants direct from donors 
or – more commonly – through sub-grants from INGO projects, was itself an education in 
internal organisation for modern civil society work. Interacting with locally trained 
professionals, overseas experts and with the various rubrics and technologies provided by 
senior ‘partners’ enabled distinct sets of skills and knowledge to transfer through to local 
groups. The virtues of partnership included the dissemination of modern project 
techniques and evidence-based pragmatic approaches to delivering services, benefits 
regularly highlighted in reports to donors. Although authoritarian government meant that 
Myanmar in the 1990s and 2000s did not exhibit the channels of participation and 
guarantees for human rights assumed by liberal development partnerships, donors and 
INGOs operating there could nevertheless confidently state their commitment to 
“enhancing the capacity of individuals working within our individual organisations, across 
a wide variety of skills, including technical skills, critical thinking, problem solving and 
leadership skills” and “to enhancing both the technical and organisational capacities of 
our beneficiaries” (International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) Providing 
Humanitarian Assistance In Burma /Myanmar 2000: Section 7). 
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This process was both hastened and considerably expanded by the impact of Cyclone 
Nargis in May 2008. Humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts brought funding and 
partnerships with INGOs, but this came alongside other less tangible and more lasting 
improvements available for many organisations that participated in humanitarian and 
reconstruction efforts. Whilst foreign INGO staff found access to cyclone-hit areas 
difficult, secondment arrangements in urban offices enabled project management and 
financial management techniques to be passed on to local groups. This was continued 
after Nargis by the establishment of the Local Resource Centre (LRC), a coordination body 
which sought, amongst other things, to “link local organisations to donor funds and 
technical expertise” and “provide support to local NGOs in proposal writing, reporting and 
procuring supplies” (Hedlund and Myint Su 2008). As an autonomous entity, the LRC 
would continue to play an important role in ‘empowering’ civil society but also in 
‘expanding space’ for civil society in later years. 
Despite continuing political constraints, local organisations were recognised as becoming 
better run and better resourced. Commentators were able to speak of a burgeoning NGO 
sector while those visiting Myanmar for the first time would remark on surprise at the 
‘vibrant’ civil society and a clash with expectations of total regime control. As 
opportunities grew, locals who cut their teeth in large INGO operations in Myanmar were 
in a position to move into or to found local organisations, bringing with them modern 
techniques and evidence-based decision-making that held the promise of overcoming 
decades of clientelism and deference to traditional authority. 
International aid organisations employ and train several thousand Myanmar staff, who 
through their work are exposed to modern management styles and techniques otherwise 
little used in the country. This is real capacity building: the experience of participating in 
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organisations that are entrepreneurial and results-oriented, in which performance and 
talents determine promotion and authority (International Crisis Group: 2008).  
Proposals submitted to donors, and indeed the business cases developed by donors to 
justify requests for programmatic funds to disburse to civil society, would similarly look to 
the future: when the time came to participate, local NGOs would be ready. Disseminating 
existing knowledge and skills for organisational and project management to new civil 
society actors was thus a core part of many organisations’ bids to early funds made 
directly available to Myanmar civil society, promoted through instruments such as the 
European Union’s 2010 call for proposals under the Good Governance Country-based 
Support Scheme54. Partnerships with local NGOs were necessary for INGOs to access 
these and similar funds. As funding remained higher than the historic average after 
Nargis, a common trend in INGO applications to donors and to multi-donor initiatives such 
as the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) launched in 2009 was the 
highlighting of the skills transfer that would ‘build capacity’ in local actors. As one 
diplomat commented in 2010, “We encourage large NGOs (non-government 
organisations) to sub-contract work to smaller community groups” (Macan-Marker 2010). 
With more INGOs and more donors expanding operations in Myanmar through the 2000s, 
sharing the same need for trustworthy, empowered, accountable local partners, so the 
core fiduciary structure was expanded and fortified55. By virtue of the operation of 
strategic relations set in motion between this structure and agents in civil society, 
standard powers and capacities required of responsible partners were selected for. Little 
was left to chance as these organisational capacity needs were articulated to local actors 
through training and workshops. This institutionalisation process would soon expand to 
54 This was the EU’s European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, renamed for Myanmar so as not 
to draw state attention and not to scare off potential applicants. 
55 Other relations are possible, such as the social enterprise. 
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include those with political or human rights goals, and long-time Myanmar development 
workers urged this approach on. International actors should 
explore partnerships with domestic organizations and groups that enhance the capacities 
of local organizations. At present the capacities of local organizations are relatively weak. 
International agencies should commit themselves to strengthening local capacities 
through cooperating in analysis of the local context, training, joint planning and 
implementation, and through consultations and mentoring of partner staff (Tegenfeldt 
2006: 226). 
The impact on politically-oriented civil society  
Politically-oriented actors were for the most part excluded from these internal 
development processes, and thus initially unaffected by fiduciary structural selectivities. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the nature of oppositional work kept them fluid and out of 
sight, making formalisation a largely inappropriate option, while INGOs were unwilling to 
risk their status in country by involving them. Myanmar exile groups had formalised 
activity but, in contrast to the technical rubrics used to assess funding claims among 
Myanmar’s development cadre, decisions to support here centred on “whether a 
potential grantee organization was “committed to democratic development” or “working 
towards democracy”” (Duell 2014: 116). Within Myanmar itself, these criteria would also 
be employed by the few funders supporting groups inside Myanmar, especially UK and US 
embassies. Small grants56 for short missions or activities such as closed-doors training in 
human rights reporting or the upkeep of offices were rarely subject to the same level of 
scrutiny or expectation as those working on components of larger development projects. 
Support for more radical political activity among the 88 Generation and student groups 
56 Although they might make no official announcement of grant schemes, US and various European embassies 
would regularly receive speculative applications for sums of up to a few thousand US dollars.   
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generally came from overseas, from exiles who had set up new lives in Japan or the USA, 
with monies sent through the hundi57 system (Interview 40). 
The marginalisation of politically-oriented civil society was problematic for development 
work: whilst the absence of a democratic regime could hardly be directly attributed to 
development NGOs, in better accommodating populations to life in an unjust political 
system, this humanitarian response faced the accusation of entrenching military rule (see 
ALTSEAN 2002). This rattled programme directors: often at the behest of ministers in 
donor countries prior to signing off a programme contribution, consultations would be 
conducted in secret with senior opposition figures, mainly from the NLD and 88 
Generation, before project commencement. Such passive participation was about as far 
as it went. An inherent political conservatism dogged development activities well into the 
late 2000s. Initiatives such as CBI, founded under the most constrained political times, 
feared contamination by politics and avoided what might be seen as routine progressions 
into training in rights-based approaches to development. A proposal from Myanmar 
Egress to cooperate in delivering such training in 2010 was met with the standard 
perfunctory statement that CBI is “not involved in politics”58 (Interview 38). 
Improvements in political conditions following the completion and enactment of the SPDC 
state project, politically-oriented civil society actors had become sufficiently public that 
they too began to encounter structurally embedded capacity expectations. They had a 
great deal of catching up to do: 
[Around 2009/2010] we were, as an Embassy, working with small civil society groups or 
small local NGOs. The problem is they don’t really have a capacity to systematically 
57 A trust-based system of international money transfer. 




                                                            
implement projects. They have a real, very strong will and commitment to do things but… 
they are not really systematic, they cannot really report factually (Interview 7). 
With politics increasingly open, agents would need to possess the powers and capacities 
demanded by a fiduciary regime if they were to be successful as organisations. In their 
absence, trust and ideological sympathy initially overrode risk. After early support through 
embassy grants, contracted work rapidly increased during the 2012 by-elections with 
direct support from specialist democracy-focused US foundations, such as the Carter 
Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy and George Soros’ Open Society 
Foundation. Lacking physical offices in situ, these agencies checked the suitability of 
actors through local contacts or field trips to Yangon, and were often willing to take risks 
with new organisations lacking track records in grant management. 
Grant opportunities for democracy and human rights promotion work and investment in 
capacity building and civil society strengthening would increase rapidly after Myanmar 
passed the acid test of a democratic 2012 election. Projects included the EU-funded 
Supporting Participation, Accountability and Civil society Empowerment (SPACE) project, 
which aimed to “strengthen the organisational capacity of Civil Society Organisations 
across 11 states and regions in Myanmar and support them to implement programmes on 
issues that affect their communities” (European Commission 2015), and the DFID / SIDA-
funded Amatae project59. The latter, launched in late 2012 as part of the Burma Civil 
Society Strengthening Programme, provided core funding and organisational capacity 
development support to “organisations working on social and political issues across the 
country” (Amatae 2016a).  
Amatae’s professional, depoliticised perspective on capacity is captured in one of its later 
products, an “organisation capability self-assessment tool”. This identifies “nine 
59 I was involved in this project. 
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capabilities that Amatae CSO partners believe are characteristic of organisations working 
to become stronger, more adaptable, more accountable, more transparent and therefore, 
more sustainable”:  
• Community focus 
• Organisational culture 
• Governance 
• Leadership and management 
• Strategic planning and programme management 
• Human resource and development 
• Financial management and sustainability 
• Stakeholder engagement and communications 
• Advocacy 
(Amatae 2016b). 
Suggestions for featured capabilities came from grant-receiving organisations, and can 
thus be expected to closely reflect systemic demands experienced by participating groups. 
Sustainability, the capacity to reproduce the organisation, becomes the critical factor in 
assessing the strength and value of an organisation, and is understood as the sum product 
of a manifold of powers emergent from the sound structures found in organisations fitted 
to fiduciary selectivities. Whilst these may yield organisations which survive and even 
thrive, this fact and the qualities themselves are wholly decoupled from political strategy 
or political objectives. Can we assume that these capabilities are equally relevant for the 
achievement of any and all political goals civil society actors might have? Or are political 
ambitions expected to be rearticulated so they can only be achieved with the assistance 
of these qualities? I explore these questions in the case studies in Chapter 5.  
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Despite the centrality donors occupy for many civil society theorists and practitioners, the 
significance of the relations they foster for the NGO must be seen alongside other 
structural factors which, together, shape a terrain on which structurally-oriented agency 
must become attuned to a new institutional order so as to stay relevant and effective. In 
light of this dialectic, in Chapter 3 I argued that political space was not solely an outcome 
of political agency. Nor, I argue against those who have observed the “recent evolution of 
the enabling environment for civil society in Myanmar”, is it “the legal and regulatory 
framework and the political environment within which civil society operates” (Jaquet 
2014: 2) – important factors, but a limited understanding of structure. Rather than an 
empty, Newtonian expanse on which autonomous agents freely act, political space is a 
terrain constituted by the emergent properties of sets of relatively durable relations 
between social positions. That particular modalities of action in pursuit of particular 
political objectives become, if not impossible or illegitimate then at least unwise, indicates 
the appearance of a new normative order. 
 My focus now shifts to two further structural changes between government and civil 
society actors. Firstly, the repeal of repressive legislation on civil society actors and 
subsequent establishment of a legal structure that constitutes civic associations as rights-
holders and government as duty-bearers; and secondly, the development of policy 
instruments to enable civil society to work with government, including the development 
of capacity in officials and other state representatives to engage with autonomous 
groups. This constitutes an ethical structure that establishes CSOs as advisors and the 
governing regime as advised. Together, these changes would see politically-oriented civil 
society come in from cold exclusion, design and perform activities which the donors 
above would be interested in funding – civil society activity would, finally, be structurally 
oriented and these structures strategically selective, consolidating an institution of 
organisation. The improvement in respect for human rights, governance and participatory 
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opportunities this change constitutes is, however, counterbalanced in each case by visible 
and no-so-visible contradictions of newly inscribed power relations – the reorganised 
space for civil society contains forces which ensure that actors, along with beliefs and 
ideas about civil society, democracy and human rights, come “to play a highly ambivalent 
role in respect of power” (Stammers 1999: 997).   
Relation 2: The legal dimension – organisations as rights 
holders 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, while civil society became an important development 
actor in Eastern Europe and other parts of South East Asia, legislation in Myanmar – often 
drawn up in colonial times – was used to police, restrict and ultimately stifle civil society 
activity. Working with a wholly compliant, even subservient judicial system, particular 
sections of the legal framework were routinely used to imprison dissidents and those 
threatening military rule. Routine activities of civil society actors could fall foul of 
numerous laws, the application of which was often driven by political considerations, 
thereby contributing to the climate of fear in which even the most accommodation-
oriented civil society work took place. For instance, freedom of association was contained 
by the Unlawful Associations Act (1908), authorising the Head of State to declare any 
association illegal and thereafter criminalising those in contact with it. This is of particular 
concern for civil society in conflict-affected areas. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Emergency 
Provisions Act (1950) were notoriously loose, targeting “[a]nyone who […] causes or 
intends to disrupt the morality or the behaviour of a group of people or the general public 
or to disrupt the security or the reconstruction of stability of the union”. Freedom of 
expression was harshly curtailed through Article 505(b) of the Myanmar Penal Code 
(1861), penalising those judged to be “making statements causing undue public fear or 
alarm” and the Printers and Publishers Registrations Act (1962). The SPDC caught up with 
161 
 
changes in media and telecommunications with the Electronic Transactions Law (2004), 
under which 88 Generation activists were sentenced to 65 years following emails sent to 
the UN Secretary General in 2007 (Amnesty International 2011) 60. 
Against this background, the Thein Sein administration’s replacement of the 1988 
Associations Act (Law No 6/88) with the Registration of Organizations Law (2014) came as 
a welcome surprise. Whilst the punitive laws described above, and others regularly used 
to punish political dissenters, remained on the statute books, legal registration would lift 
the applicability of the 1908 law described above. As mentioned in Chapter 3, few NGOs 
would register under the 1988 Law, preferring to remain small and relatively 
undetectable, to draw up specific MoUs with government departments, to work personal 
relationships with the authorities or operate as businesses – a ‘solution’ that actually 
made life highly unpredictable for “tolerated but illegal” associations, thus generating 
pressure to minimise conflict (Jaquet and Caillaud 2014: 88).  
The 2014 Law eventually presented a straightforward, less invasive process to register 
applying organisations. Both the law itself and the open, inclusive process by which it was 
drafted received widespread praise from domestic and international actors. Requirements 
are straightforward. The legislation asks any applicant seeking legal status for their 
association to provide information shown in Figure 3, part of the checks Registration 
Committees must undertake according to Chapter IV Section 8(a), ensuring the entity 
does not undermine “rule of law and state security”. Most notable are the requests for 
information on objectives, activities, committee members and organisational structure / 
article of association, which together constitute a generic blueprint to be followed so that 
legal status can be conferred. 
60 Since 2013, Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law (2013) has functioned as the cornerstone of 
















Figure 3. Information required from applicants seeking to officially register an association 
under Myanmar’s Registration of Organizations Law (2014). 
The final version of the law was very different from early drafts, which had included 
punishments of fines and prison terms for those found to have joined groups operating 
without registration. Finally, instead of threats and in line with international best practice 
the enacted version focused on the rights and subsequent legal protections accruing to 
those entities which chose to register, including support from the state (“necessary 
support from respective ministries in line with law”), the right to international donor 
support and the right to file suits (balanced by the capacity to be sued – donors 
supporting the development of the registration process were, in part, driven by due 
diligence concerns (Interview 9)). Through this legislation, so long as “the applicant has no 
Chapter 4: Registration of local organizations 
7. If an organization wants to register, the chairman of the organization, secretary or 
the responsible person shall apply to the relevant registration body in accordance 
with the wishes of the organization and furnish-  
(a) name of the organization; 
(b) location and contact address; 
(c) date of the organization's foundation; 
(d) objective; 
(e) number of the organization's executives; 
(f) number of the members; 
(g) [information on] money and assets owned by the organization; 
(h) The organization's activities; 
(i) charter of the organization; 
(j) other specific items; 
(k) date of the application. 
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reason to damage the Rule of Law and State Security” 61 , individual civil society 
organisations therefore become legal subjects, rights holders with a set of legal claims on 
the state and wholly part of the polis. Unlike previously, when mass parastatal 
associations and GONGOs received preferential government treatment, all organisations 
have equal status before the law. With recourse to the courts system, they are protected 
against the kind of violations on associational freedoms by authorities that characterised 
authoritarian rule under SPDC. A repeat murder of Myanmar civil society is legally 
proscribed. 
As such, this legal development was, unsurprisingly, broadly welcomed by many local and 
international observers, putting an end to constant uncertainty and risk (whilst 
maintaining concern and criticism at the retention of existing punitive laws mentioned 
above, and fresh legal constraints on civil rights brought by new Acts, such as Section 18 
of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act62). CIVCUS, an international 
organisation which provided comparative international legal information to support 
Myanmar NGOs involved in consultations in the legal drafting process, summarised the 
opinion of many international observers when it reported on the Law’s impact, and on 
other legal developments, including relaxation of media restrictions: 
Civil society [in Myanmar] has been able to benefit from expanding space, thanks mostly 
to political changes at the highest levels of government. This enabled - still incomplete - 
regulatory and legal reform, leading to noticeable increases in freedom of expression, 
61 It is also important to note that in key areas there is no corresponding legislation which might force groups 
into obtaining registration: for example, international donors are not legally bound to only fund registered 
groups. They would, of course, have their own fiduciary and due diligence related reasons for such 
stipulations. Grant applicants are increasingly expected to have registered status. 
62 This punished those leading or participating in public demonstrations which had not been granted 
permission by local police, a process requiring an official request to demonstrate being made at least 5 days 
prior to the protest and, amongst other information, disclosure of the chants to be used during the action (see 
Human Rights Watch 2015). 
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association and assembly. Issues, once considered taboo, can increasingly be discussed by 
CSOs (Jaquet 2014: 1). 
Contradictions in the legal space 
A public sphere is under construction, a ‘realm’ in which organisations representative of 
various sections of public opinion can propound on the issues of the day. Together with 
funding, this should create “a virtuous cycle in which rights to free association beget 
sound government policies, human development, and (ultimately) a more conducive 
environment for the protection of individual liberties” (Jenkins 2001: 252). Yet it is at the 
legal conjuncture newly constructed between government and civil society where 
normative liberal assumptions become most visible, and from where contradictions in 
these presuppositions become evident. This phenomenon is noted by Stammers, who 
argues that “it is in their institutionalised/legal form that ideas and practices in respect of 
human rights are most likely to sustain relations and structures of power” (Stammers 
2010: 997). Here, I avoid Stammers’ idealism to locate the source of institutionalisation in 
the state-civil society structure, rather than in human rights themselves. 
Firstly, on the one hand, the 2014 Law appears blind to the political content of 
organisation’s projects. Concerns remain at the powers given in 17 (a) with regard to how 
“The Union Registration committee shall decide if the applicant organization has no 
reason to damage the Rule of Law and State Security”, but given the hundreds of 
organisations now successfully registered, many of which are staffed by former political 
prisoners (see Chapter 5, Case Study 2), worries have generally proved unfounded. 
Anxiety and apprehension also surrounded the very concreteness of a legal relationship 
with a state infrastructure known primarily for its capacity and predilection for 
surveillance and interference towards non-state groups, yet this has not proved to be an 
issue, problems of recalcitrance or over-zealousness among officials markedly decreasing 
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under the Thein Sein regime. Moreover, human rights organisations now have a legal 
assurance for their collective existence and, as such, the limits of state power vis-à-vis 
society are now established through the ascription of a guarantee on the existence of civil 
society organisations and a protection for their self-ascribed normative functions. 
However, this self-delimitation of the exercise of state power, the legal codification of the 
rights of civil society and its associations, can only proceed by a sovereign exclusion of 
collective activity which falls outside of the regulatory framework. Some of these have 
been explicitly codified into the 2014 Law itself: “organizations that pursue religious and 
economic activities only” and organisations registered as political parties or under other 
existing laws do not qualify for the Law’s protections (Chapter VI). A new set of 
institutional boundaries for legitimate civil society are juridically defined, enabling 
organisations keeping within them to function and pursue activities as an entity with the 
full rights and protections provided by the law. Whilst I do not wish to push this argument 
in a wholly biopolitical direction, a similar act of “inclusive exclusion” that Agamben 
(1998) highlights is at play here. Activities and forms of organising which cannot be 
regulated produce a domain for rights-endowed actors and activity under the regulation 
of the state. Organisations and activity outside of this zone of legality and legitimacy may 
fall under the auspices of other legislation or, especially important with regard to 
politically-oriented civil society activity, are subject to legitimate state violence as a threat 
to rule of law. It thus comes to be managed by laws and regulations related to the security 
and maintenance of the state. 
Secondly, it is precisely because ‘space’ has opened and the environment liberalised that 
activity beyond that sanctioned by new laws becomes necessary in the first place. Political 
and economic development in Myanmar has not only had civil society organisations and 
their activities as its object but has also opened up areas of the lifeworld to the exercise of 
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property rights held by private actors63. Whilst injecting capital into desperately poor 
parts of the country, for many these investments have also had detrimental 
consequences. For instance, some of the most urgent human rights issues to appear in 
the wake of reform have centred around labour exploitation in new export processing 
zones and accelerated marketisation of land for agribusiness and mining as part of new 
capital accumulation regimes for Myanmar’s economic development. 
The lifting of EU sanctions and the restoration of US Generalised System of Preferences 
for Myanmar exports has proven to be a massive boost for Myanmar’s garment industry: 
in 2015, exports to the EU totalled €423 million, 80% higher than 2014 and including many 
familiar Western high street brands. Despite sanctions, the number of factories has grown 
to over 400, and the current 350,000 workers employed in the industry is anticipated to 
soar to 1.5 million by 2024 (Theuws et al. 2016: 8; Myanmar Garment Industry 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, it is Myanmar’s low labour costs that are proving attractive, with Myanmar 
positioned “towards the very bottom of the wage ladder vis-à-vis other [garment, textile 
and footwear] producers in the region” (ILO 2016: 2). Even then, the lowest minimum 
wage in Asia is routinely flouted and the “hodgepodge of laws” regulating labour practices 
(Greenlee 2016), especially around unionising, are often circumvented by factory-based 
lawyers (Interview 41) and the termination of contracts of active union members (Action 
Labour Rights 2016: 23-24).  
Regarding land, since 2011, new laws shifted the modality of accumulation from extra-
economic accumulation, by investors in cahoots with the military regime, towards ‘fairer’ 
market-based endeavours secured through legal and transparent relations. The Vacant, 
Fallow and Virgin Lands (VFV) Law (2012), Foreign Investment Law (2012), Special 
63 Marx understands rights as integral to capitalist society, not simply in their production of an egoist subject 
but in that their creation of the formal equality between agents as possessors or buyers of labour power, and 
as such necessary for the reciprocal acts of exchange to take place without coercion.  (See Brenkert, 1986.) 
Whilst I do not draw on this argument here, my position moves closer in Chapter 6. 
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Economic Zone Law (2012) and the Farmland Law (2012) loosened regulation on the sale 
and purchase of land, the latter legislation creating a market in tradable Land Use 
Certificates. National firms, including companies owned by the Tatmadaw, began to 
partner with foreign investors in land deals. Yet the glut of investment for massive 
agribusiness projects, mining, special economic zones (SEZs) and port construction which 
followed has been built on wholesale dispossession of traditional farmers, ecological 
destruction and displacement of ways of life of traditional peasants and fisherfolk, with 
evidence of generations of customary land use in most cases rendered meaningless (see 
Woods 2013; Franco et al. 2015). 
Market forces, or projects enacted in the name of economic development, unlike military 
generals and polluting companies, are an unwieldy object for civil society organisations to 
tackle and, despite the production of an increasing number of professional reports, such 
as those referenced above, have tended to be met with the collective responses more 
associated with social movements than the exercise of the project capabilities of NGOs. 
Several locations in Myanmar have become well-known sites of unrest around these 
issues in recent years, such as the Wanbao-UMEHL joint venture at the development of 
the Letpadaung copper mine (see Amnesty International 2017), the Dawei deep-sea port 
and SEZ construction project involving Myanmar and Thai governments and companies 
(Melo 2016), and the industrial zones around Yangon (see Progressive Voice 2016; 
Theuws et al. 2016). In these and other locations, efforts on behalf of land and workers’ 
rights have rarely centred around formal organisations, but have been led by local farmer 
groups or labour activists, drawing in support from networks of human rights defenders, 
students and environmental protesters.  
This is not unusual. Historically, as Chapter 3 showed, political agency has been 
distributed among and exercised by political parties, trades and student unions, human 
168 
 
rights defender networks, communist movements, separatist and paramilitary groups and 
so on, and by coalitions of these agents. Civil society is not exhausted by entities that have 
opted for voluntary legal registration; rather this represents merely one of the points 
along an extensive spectrum of forms and activities. Yet a widespread emphasis of the 
material importance of legal change, of making the organisation – the “purposeful, role-
bound social unit” (Fowler 1997: 20) – the focus of critical attention and the foundation 
for the enabling environment for civil society, whilst placing these under the paternal 
management of the state and incorporating the NGO within the state’s support structures 
(discussed in the next section), means other actors, forces and repertoires are pushed to 
the periphery, beyond the protective framework established by the law and indeed 
appear perilously close to becoming “bare life” (Agamben 1998). It is here where strikes, 
demonstrations and other acts of civil disobedience persist; listening to the voices of 
those on the margins, a very different assessment of the ‘space for civil society’ in 
Myanmar can be heard: 
Current government strategy is not very different to how it has always been: stifle 
independent voices, restrict the right to freedom of expression, and shrink the space for 
civil society activity and legitimate criticism of power (Assistance Association for Political 
Prisoners / Burma Partnership: 2014)64. 
Celebration of the ‘space for civil society’ based around the liberation of the organisation 
enabled by the Registration of Organisations Law (2014) therefore sets liberal normative 
parameters for the trajectory of civil society agency. These provide a new set of standards 
against which responsible civil society, acceding to the rule of law, can be assessed; 
indeed, it is against the equality and impartiality of the rule of law that the legitimacy of 
protests and campaigns at Letpadaung and within the student movement for education 
64 It is notable that the CIVICUS report celebrating the opening of space for civil society, referenced above, was 
released only months before the AAPP report that discussed its constriction!  
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reform were challenged by Aung San Suu Kyi. Her invocations to Letpadaung locals “to 
respect ‘Rule of Law’ and sacrifice their lands for Burma’s development” (Prasse-Freeman 
2016: 88) were some months later supplemented by complaints to international donors 
regarding resource directed to gatekeeper organisations that have supported grassroots 
human rights defence work. In other sections of the state, there was a “perception by 
some senior military officers that [Burma Communist Party] agitators are pulling the 
strings of… protest movements and conflicts” (Civil society project consultant. Personal 
communication, June 2015). Both confrontations indicate elite impatience with popular 
protest. 
It would be churlish to hold that agents are expected to be determined, in some sort of 
legal discursive fashion, into becoming like-minded liberal civil society organisations 
simply by virtue of a regulatory framework. Not only are protections for NGOs beneficial 
for those groups, but also its empirical consequences depend greatly on ontic variations in 
agency and other contingencies – many registered organisations have a radical 
background and, as mentioned above, are able to support activity they would not be able 
to undertaken themselves. I take up these points in the next chapter. However, two new 
social forces are emergent from the state’s legal intervention: causally, the legal base and 
rights assurance offered can be understood as a driver of organisational logics of 
appropriateness. Secondly, more politically, the exclusion of certain repertoires and 
modes of organisation from the newly constructed domain of legalised civil society 
activity relegates such action to the periphery, or even outside, of what is considered 
legitimate civil society activity, thereby distilling organisational norms and conventions 
that can be catalysed through external funding support. 
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Relation 3: The ethical dimension – civil society actors as 
advocates 
Fundamentally, the state is able to legislate NGOs because of the institutional division of 
the public / political realm from the private, of politics from economics, and as non-party 
political forms, whatever influence civil society comes to have within the state is down to 
political decision. ‘Normal’ channels of influence between these two constructed zones 
were more or less absent under SPDC rule, leading to creative alternative repertoires, but 
as part of democratic reform, more formal, substantive relations with government are 
developed. Indeed, for many donors and organisations this is what the legal and fiduciary 
structures developed in recent years are for. Integral, then, to the ‘expansion of space’ 
and a crucial part of democratic reform has been Myanmar civil society’s inclusion in new 
processes of governance – for both development and politically-oriented organisations, 
this has taken the form of an advocacy relation.  
During authoritarian rule, interaction between SLORC or SPDC and those claiming to 
represent subaltern groups was rare and, usually, antagonistic. Military government 
anywhere is not given to reaching out to the populace, but the duration and penetration 
of military rule in Myanmar, the factionalism and clientelism through which senior leaders 
governed and absence of concern and incentive in addressing social problems generated a 
“profound distrust within the military of civilian leaders and civilian-controlled institutions 
at all levels” (Steinberg 2013: 151). The charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi and 88 Generation 
student leaders in the democracy movement posed a permanent threat of unrest. Tightly 
controlled channels for public input such as the National Convention65 and the mass 
association of the USDA and sector-specific GONGOs were disparaged by opposition 
groups. Separation of a governing elite from the governed was entrenched by the move of 
65 The National Convention was a body of over a thousand ‘representatives’ which met regularly to contribute 
to the SPDC Roadmap for a return to popular rule. It was widely regarded as a sham. 
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the state capital from Yangon to the purpose-built Nay Pyi Taw in 2005, some 200 miles 
from the main population centre. 
Legacies of opacity, distrust and sheer inexperience66 and inability in dealing with critical 
input67 led to expectations that the reform administration would be cautious and ill-
prepared to reach out to civil society. Reform government-NGO communications were 
officially opened with civil society groups in January 2013, when President Thein Sein 
made a high-profile appearance at a meeting at which he “[called] on the civil society 
groups to intensify their participation in nation and state-building activities”. Pre-empting 
antagonism, the President emphasised he was “not suggesting that civil society 
organizations must agree with us on everything... just inviting you all to work with the 
government in different areas that we agree on” (Zaw Win Than 2013). Whilst this was 
certainly not the first time the government institutions would cooperate with citizens’ 
groups – innovative programmes like the DFID-funded Pyoe Pin project had since 2008 
managed to facilitate small but meaningful changes in certain sectors through ad-hoc 
coalitions of civil society, commercial and state actors – this announcement indicated the 
possibility of more inclusive and effective cooperation. This contrasted markedly with the 
previous mediation by personal relationships, constrained by political sensitivities and 
fear at every turn: in short, this would be a major shift in the practice of governance. 
A governing class disconnected from the needs and concerns of ordinary people made 
bridging the information gap crucial for designing credible reforms. With powers and 
66 “As donor agencies and international NGOs have been given more scope for operating inside Myanmar, civil 
society has benefited more from capacity building activities than the government has” (Rieffel 2012: 44). 
67 An unwillingness to deliver information contrary to the ambitions and expectations of anxious leaders 
already anxious from decades of international pariah status also stems from older cultural traditions in 
Myanmar, in particular the Mangala Sutta. This part of the Theravada Buddhist canon deals with “adopting 
correct mental cognition by means of good practice that fosters harmony”. Along with general effort to 
legitimise military activity through traditional Buddhist teachings and essentially making Buddhism the state 
religion, the mangala was also had more utilitarian benefits in becoming “a core component in measuring 
appropriate political behaviour… explaining many a Burmese custom such as cultural responses to 
embarrassment (anade)” (Houtman 1999: 130-131). Bad news or inconvenient facts were not routinely 
presented to those who might be considered to require such information. 
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resource acquired through the programmes and processes described above, many 
organisations which had previously focused on service delivery and had, as much as 
possible, avoided politics, argued their case with government: the Eden Centre for 
Disabled Children, for example, moving from charitable provision of vital care to 
advocates of inclusive education during formation of the 2014 Education Act, while the 
Phoenix Association moved from clandestine provision of health services for persons with 
HIV and AIDS during the latter years of the SPDC regime to providing key input on the 
National HIV Legal Review in 2014. Promoting the engagement of civil society actors in 
Union and regional level policy making was a key driver of the European Union’s Civil 
Society Roadmap (2015), for example, and a component of DFID’s Burma Civil Society 
Strengthening Programme (Interview 9). Demonstrations and campaigns continued, 
however, and politically-oriented civil society actors retained a close connection with their 
networks and constituency grievances, especially on land and labour issues. After 2013, 
however, solidarity would involve them also in representation of these interests at the 
highest levels of government, something mirrored in other parts of the world where 
“NGOs, as a consequence both of their ‘tamed’ character and of their experience as 
service providers, are able to act as interlocutors on issues with which new social 
movements are concerned” (Kaldor 2003: 17). 
Some advocacy channels were formalised by third party governance infrastructure. The 
government entered into new international agreements that involve formal, time-bound, 
deliberative processes as part of institutional arrangements. Most surprisingly, this 
included the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which involved civil society 
representatives forming one node of the tripartite Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG). Less 
formalised were civil society inputs into domestic legislation, which has seen consultation 
occurring at various points of the lawmaking process. Ministers, parliamentarians and 
senior civil servants have met with civil society representatives when draft laws have 
173 
 
already been produced, as in the case of the first version of the Registration of 
Organisations Law (2014) discussed above.  
In both, inexperience and decades of mistrust created early obstacles. What may have 
been inability within government appeared to civil society participants as reluctance to 
break with authoritarian practices. Continuing with the example of the Organisations Law 
(2014), the draft law was released by the Public Affairs Management Committee in July 
2013 with an invitation to review and respond, yet within a two-week time period. The US 
Campaign for Burma reported a Myanmar women’s leader as saying that a “two-week 
review period was a big constraint for activists, who had to scramble to review the law 
and formulate political strategy” (US Campaign for Burma 2013). A second version 
followed with a lengthened period of consultation, which saw MPs and the Public Affairs 
Management Committee (charged with handling the consultations) meet with 275 
organisational representatives, before the signing into law of a final, widely deemed 
acceptable, version in July 2014. A similar extension of consultation periods occurred in 
the development of other legislation with significant civil society input, most notably the 
National Land Use Policy consultations. The quality of this engagement changed also, from 
a small number of strictly managed workshops to a more open, discursive process, leading 
to the development of six drafts prior to enactment in legislation. 
Civil society actors worked on commissions with government representatives in the policy 
drafting process itself e.g. in the development of education policy in the membership of 
the Joint Education Sector Working Group, part of the Comprehensive Education Sector 
Review (CESR) and the Education Promotion Implementation Committee (EPIC). Whereas 
international involvement in support of the Associations Law was in the background and 
mainly through provision of international legal perspectives from organisations such as 
the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), the CESR saw civil society 
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representatives alongside international experts, often hired on short-term consultancies, 
and professors from Myanmar universities. Far more sensitive was the convening of a 
Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners (CSRPP) in 2013, to define 
the term ‘political prisoner’ in order to assist a government commitment to their full 
release. Still looser, more ad-hoc activity was involved in the pursuit of a legal aid bill, 
which since 2010 involved study visits, informal meetings and international expert 
interaction with local civil society and government representatives over a number of 
years. Consultations have also involved groups other than established CSOs, with 
discussions around the Social Security Act, the Health and Safety Act and the Factory Act 
all involving trades union representatives. 
Advocacy, therefore, involved a variety of activities across numerous time horizons at 
different points of decision-making processes. Such shifts in governance practices were 
likely to be closely linked to managing perceptions. The passing of a flawed 2008 
Constitution by a fixed referendum followed by a rigged election hardly bodes well for 
democracy, and the Thein Sein government would be saddled with accusations of 
illegitimacy throughout its period of rule. Not only were there instrumental reasons for a 
change in governing strategy – recognition of the government by the international 
community, restoration of diplomatic links and removal of most economic and political 
sanctions – but in having extended an invitation to civil society to participate in 
governance (tacitly, by their political emancipation, and also literally) it was simply no 
longer possible to organise relations with potentially restive groups and subaltern 
constituencies through coercive measures alone. The opening to advocacy work indicated 
tentative moves towards a Gramscian “proper relationship”, that “combination of force 
and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating 
excessively over consent” (Gramsci 1971: 80).  
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The possibility of hegemony 
Quite apart from the novelty of such shifts in Myanmar governance, these processes and 
outcomes of internationally-supported activities – instruments for which both state 
officials and civil society actors were being readied for – must be seen in their unique 
global historical and political context, rather than a simple “efflorescence” of civil society 
within a space that has allowed it to finally realise its democratic potential (Mercer 2003: 
748). Myanmar re-established its international links amidst much-changed conventions 
around governance, in which economic development and human rights mutually support 
one another and through various governance apparatus incorporate the voice of citizens 
into the everyday practice of rule. Participation ‘alongside’ the state and private sector 
involves a variety of thematic instruments. Civil society actors may encounter enabling 
environments as part of specialist governance mechanisms: overseeing resource 
management (such as EITI), government transparency (the Open Government 
Partnership) and in logging and forest products (the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT)), to name but a few Myanmar now formally participates in. Inter-party 
engagement is meant to facilitate co-ordinated, participatory, inclusive and accountable 
decision making. Less formally but with more immediate results, the reform 
administration brought non-state actors into legislative development. Together, these 
instruments appear to channel the results of civil society strengthening initiatives and the 
legal reforms which have allowed NGOs to flourish above ground. Power appears 
dissipated and disseminated among a much greater variety of actors, and the involvement 
of a range of voices seems to negate the idea of a state forged from the vested interests 
of state officials or the demands of capital. 
Despite – or, indeed, because of – this progress and increasingly loud voice under USDP 
rule, the foundations of elite rule would be only partially challenged. Participatory 
mechanisms can be understood alongside democratic reform as the cultivation of a 
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national-popular dimension to augment or solidify continued elite domination under 
changed conditions. We can make sense of this situation from a Gramscian perspective 
through a number of analytical components. Advocacy mechanisms are part of the 
“hegemonic apparatus” 68  through which dominant classes cultivate and maintain 
leadership. The drive, initiative and knowledge of civil society actors could be fashioned 
into a key hegemonic instrument, part of the social glue that would hold together the 
reorganised social and political formation in Myanmar’s constitutional democratic future; 
in other words, it is “the realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new 
ideological terrain” (Gramsci 2000: 192). We can speak here of ideology because the 
operation of CSOs here presupposes and reinforces certain fundamental ideas about 
political and material conditions of civil society required by advocacy channels to function. 
These include the legitimate form of the state, the role of civil society, the limits of 
democracy, the ‘correctness’ of relationships between civil society organisations and 
political parties, and so on. In terms of hegemony, in the course of their correct 
functioning, social actions performed and mediated by these ideas realise particular forms 
of political organisation, while possibly demobilising or drawing away from others, and 
reproduce the social formation. The logic moving and motivating actors here is an 
NGOism that serves as a connecting membrane to established social and economic 
structures, enabling actors involved to articulate social, political and economic problems 
from the perspective necessary for their successful advocacy. This serves to shape the 
solutions they might come to offer, while others are marginalised or made inconceivable. 
Insofar as “created spaces” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007) are successful, the intellectual 
leadership of civil society is harnessed within a hegemonic bloc that better manages 
subaltern demands they claim to represent. The state takes on an increasingly integral 
form through the unification of civil society and political society. 
68 ‘Apparatus’, for Gramsci, is meant in a strategic sense, and does not pertain to the policy-making 
mechanisms discussed in this section. 
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Of course, the distrust between popular masses and dominant forces in Myanmar is such 
that the above paragraph may read as utterly divorced from political reality, rather than a 
description of concepts made true through practice. Yet rather than Myanmar’s civil 
society forces rallying to support the economic leadership of the military, it is the 
perceived progressive actions and values of international actors such as the World Bank, 
UN and other bilateral state development actors which legitimised the platforms 
developed to corral the power and force of civil society, and which have been 
instrumental in developing and setting to work these institutions and approaches to 
governance based on partnership and consultation, and the liberal understanding of the 
state upon which it rests. As the Thein Sein regime so clearly continued to wear the 
colours of the only site of organised power in Myanmar, one whose historic detachment 
had precluded the development of any organic bonds with the governed, not only did the 
economic and geopolitical interests of powerful global actors intersect with those of the 
‘reformers’ in the Tatmadaw elite, but their participation was also vital to secure the 
support of intellectuals from politically-oriented civil society. The absence of trust so 
commonly referred to in Myanmar is an absence of leadership in the wider Gramscian 
sense of hegemony, a disinterest and inability to forge ethical-political alliance or unity 
through consent that has historically led to government by domination and concession. 
International bodies emerged as important strategic enablers of this relation in the 
institution of organisation.  
Possessing technical expertise in building state capacity and functionality, UN bodies, the 
World Bank, the EU and bilateral actors funded or promoted sensible government 
relations with civil society. Advocacy interaction between civil society and lawmakers was 
funded through programmes such as DFID’s Pyoe Pin and Amatae. The EU’s Roadmap for 
Civil Society in Myanmar, furthermore, sees the “relationship between CSOs and public 
institutions” evidenced by the “establishment of formal mechanisms for consultation 
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between civil society/general population and the Government (Union and State/Region 
and local levels) and the Parliament and frequency of their operation” (European Union 
2015). Authorities, to be sure, were encouraged to recognise the benefits to government 
from such relationship but, in their dependence on donor funding, the impetus to shift 
position and engage in “policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation” (ibid.) fell most 
strongly on civil society. The exhortation for “quality partnerships… to promote the 
networking and alliances” between state authorities and civil society was highlighted in 
new calls for proposal, such as the Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 
programme (European Union 2014a), buttressed by strong opinions from staff: 
[Civil society] criticising constantly, in playing the role of the watchdog of the government, 
and criticising the government for not complying with the human rights framework – this 
has to change. They really need to start working constructively together towards a 
common goal and common objective… they will need to work with the duty-bearers, with 
the government (Interview 8). 
Civil society actors were therefore encouraged, through financial mechanisms, to be the 
standard-bearers for liberalism through development and participation in partnerships, 
while the state was able to assume its own pace. Yet historical and geographical 
contingencies also provided fertile ground for liberal hegemony to take root in civil 
society: the experience of socialism under the BSPP, the centrality of a bourgeois liberal 
vanguard in the form of the NLD, the influence of the USA and Europe in the democracy 
movement, antipathy towards cronyism and embrace of moves towards a freer market 
that would, hopefully, undermine their vested interests, as well as Myanmar’s 
geographical and political positioning among the tiger economies of ASEAN against which 
its relative and absolute fall from perceived historic greatness was felt harshly. This 
explains the ease by which the core political work of civil society came to quickly centre 
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around formal institutional work required to maintain the Constitutional state apparatus - 
voter education, election monitoring, engagement with Union election officials, 
constitution teaching, and so on. This became a major area of support for international 
donors, channeling millions of dollars towards civil society before the 2015 elections. A 
number of local organisations, such as Peoples’ Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), 
were nurtured after the 2012 by-elections through the fostering of new fiduciary, 
professional and academic connections. Myanmar’s politically-oriented civil society 
became an active, highly-organised force in the 2015 general election: support from 
USAID, DFID, NED, NDI and the EU went to a plethora of local entities and INGOs 
partnering with politically-oriented Myanmar NGOs and, crucially, state institutions – 
especially the Union Election Commission (UEC). 
The main focus of attention is the empirical performance of new mechanisms, rather than 
their unstated assumptions and protection afforded to established structures. All too 
often the consultative frameworks of good governance instruments leave “unchallenged… 
the wisdom of the ‘accumulated knowledge’ that market forces provide the best means to 
satisfy human wants and desires” (Jessop 2001b: 4). At the same time, despite progress, it 
is undoubtedly the case in Myanmar that the elite profiting from established business 
practices remains significantly constituted by public officials (Shoon Naing 2017), and 
whilst mechanisms such as EITI might ultimately leave intact the authority of private 
economic power they can also challenge networks of established, corrupt interests. Yet it 
remains the case that “public participation is essential to the success and potential 
positive spillovers of EITI” (Aaronson 2011: 50) and other such mechanisms, and such a 
terrain therefore tests the strategic capacity of both corrupt officials and those civil 
society actors remaining close to subaltern groups and who retain a deep distrust of the 
dominant class. Whilst the advocacy channels assembled might constrain mobilisation and 
strategising for counter-hegemonic objectives, they can never preclude the ingenuity of 
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actors. For example, participation by civil society representatives in the first EITI Multi 
Sector Group meeting in 2013, “attended by over 150 participants representing a broad 
range of ethnic groups, environmental and land networks”, was made conditional on the 
release of 69 land activists from prison, much to the fury of state officials (EITI project 
officer. Personal communication, March 2017). 
Using the relative autonomy of the political realm in such a way therefore becomes all-
important, but the tilt of the new strategic terrain towards the maintenance of state 
power mitigates against autonomous development of civil society, and of human rights 
and democracy. Furthermore, whether or not actors come to participate in these created 
spaces, the very existence of advocacy structures between government and civil society 
changes the strategic context faced by civil society actors by its privileging and legitimising 
of a particular identity, approach and normative orientation, eroding the legitimacy of 
logics of opposition. At the same time, it is crucial to note that the instruments and 
processes which have appeared as a manifestation of the advisory relation developed 
‘between’ state and civil society and the themes and issues to which they have been put 
to use, have yielded important progressive outcomes. My objective in this section, 
however, is to illuminate the forces which impose transformational limits on these results, 
a force which pulses through the liberal conceptualisation of the state and civil society 
more generally. In particular, by placing civil society organisations ‘alongside’ market 
actors as if its counterweight, the legitimacy of mobilisation and leadership for radical 
approaches to socioeconomic problems and the development of a political consciousness 
capable of grasping these, is stymied (Wood 1990). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically explored the changes in social and political structures and their 
impact on the normative orientation of politically-oriented civil society. Historically, the 
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appearance of a particular latticework of relations that constrained and enabled Myanmar 
civil society actors in new ways was a product of a change in state form. Myanmar’s 
development since 1990, through two decades of authoritarian military rule followed by 
reform under a nominally civilian government, periodises the mediation of state power 
through different sets of relations. The Tatmadaw’s state project, designed by its senior 
generals and rubber-stamped by the National Convention over nearly two interminable 
decades from 1990, changed the constituent parts and the relations of Myanmar’s 
political society. As this project slowly materialised and was then implemented, different 
combinations of coercion and consent, compulsion and compromise, were in evidence.  
The result is a set of fiduciary, legal and advisory structures that form a latticework of 
relations between NGOs, government and international donors (and, to a lesser extent, 
INGOs). Once in place, emergent powers impact actor behaviour by virtue of structural 
selectivities that incline actors towards particular strategic orientations. Whilst it is 
possible to analytically separate these three structures, their emergent mechanisms and 
their outcomes, the congruence of these structural logics sees them work together to 
overdetermine an institution of organisation and a logic of appropriateness that gives the 
space for civil society a distinctive terrain. Whilst no group is forced to form supportive 
relations with government, to restructure in pursuit of NGO capacities or even to register 
as a legal entity, the resulting enabling environment is conducive for these solutions to 
Myanmar’s economic, social and political development. Immanent critique of these 
structures has illuminated the distribution of power inherent in the enabling 
environment. Just as the structures enable collective agency to intervene in social and 
political issues through providing material and honing agential power, through equal 
protective rights and participatory opportunities, they constrain agency to the politically 
achievable by institutionally underwriting practices that depend on forms of collective 
agency suited to particular tasks – but not to others. Development of alternative 
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trajectories of development for Myanmar’s politically-oriented civil society is constrained, 
an argument I develop further in the case studies in Chapter 5. 
I have linked the development of these structures and the growth of the institution to a 
favourable historical and geopolitical setting for the liberal civil society promoted by 
development agency interventions. This can be contrasted with, for example, the hostility 
of a dominant leftism in Latin America’s non-state actors in the 1980s (Baker 2002); such 
differences mean that these structures cannot be understood as universal source of 
NGOisation. Nor do structures reveal the fate of civil society actors – institutionalisation 
will depend on contingencies at the micro level, and structural orientation can be directed 
to overcoming or circumventing strategic selectivities. Yet although these structures have 
differential effects on civil society actors, such is their objectivity that they cannot fail to 
impact civil society actors in some way. They are, after all, ‘the space for civil society’, and 
even groups on the periphery may come to be affected: in Gramsci’s words, “subaltern 
classes are subject to the initiatives of the dominant class, even when they rebel” (2011: 








Chapter 5. Interactions: Civil society 
and the institution of organisation in 
Myanmar 
Introduction 
Despite the charge that Myanmar’s constitutional and political developments merely 
masked military dominance in perpetuity, they yielded important changes at the 
structural level with significant effects for civil society-led human rights and democracy 
promotion work (involving actors I have collectively termed ‘politically-oriented civil 
society’). Such shifts in internal relationships – the institutional field – between civil 
society groups, government and donors give rise to new selective mechanisms. These 
objective changes mean that antagonistic logics, together with the sets of practices or 
norms they invoke, developed amidst earlier structural complexities, look awkward in 
such new conditions. A fresh set of strategic approaches and forms of organisation based 
around NGO norms of influence and engagement with government are now structurally 
appropriate. 
Questions therefore arise over the continued relevance of different variants of civil 
society organisation described in Chapter 3 – social welfare networks, political reading 
groups and underground opposition groups. Old habits die hard, and agents must work to 
adjust to new selectivities in structures, a process involving the mediation of reflexivity, 
learning and habitus in the service of institutional dissemination. As Archer notes, “actors 
themselves change in the very process of actively pursuing changes in the social order” 
(Archer 2010: 274), a double morphogenesis, but what they change into is (partly) out of 
their hands: structures are more or less conducive or unfavourable towards some agential 
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forms and projects over others69. Whilst such a realist account of social and – a fortiori – 
agential change does not grant a special place for the normative in causality, structural 
change has normative implications. Chapter 4 showed how the emergent institution has 
consequences for the scope and direction of civil society-led political transformation, and 
for the changing form and powers of civil society actors. Norms and values are central to 
the mission of human rights actors: if the institution of organisation does not offer a 
praxis conducive to these, then this should catalyse the dialectic towards structural 
change; however, if the institution appears attractive, useful, or inevitable, then agential 
constitution and strategic direction may change. The durability of structures, embedded 
as they are in a new state formation, makes the latter outcome more likely. It is here, 
therefore, where the structural account given thus far produces tendencies toward the 
NGO form and the “institutionalization, professionalization, depoliticization, and 
demobilization of social movements” it implies (Choudry 2010: 17-18). 
As Choudry cautions, however, NGOisation studies must pay heed to local variation. In 
critical realist terms, this means respecting the emergent powers of both actors and 
structures that constitute social interactions, and the way this dialectic takes place on the 
back of historical outcomes. Institutionalisation is not homogenisation, and the causal 
necessity of mechanisms does not entail determinism, with the impact of structural 
powers across actors mediated by historical and agential contingencies. Following the 
depiction of historical politically-oriented logics in Chapter 3 and description and analysis 
of the reform structures constituting the institutional field in Chapter 4, this chapter seeks 
to assess the variable impact of the institution of the NGO on different variants of 
politically-oriented civil society in Myanmar by examining strategic changes in political 
agency as new structural selectivities influence. 
69 This term is here used to refer to agential intentions, rather than the technical projects of the development 
industry. Both will appear in this chapter. 
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Undertaking case studies of politically-oriented networks and groups is important for 
political, structural and methodological reasons. Respectively, as repositories of 
intellectual resource directed towards criticism of the apparatus and distribution of status 
quo power (at least, in this case, during Myanmar’s periods of authoritarian military rule), 
civil society actors have been historically significant, expressively and instrumentally 
(Cohen and Arato 1992). By their history, learning and leadership of subaltern struggle, 
they are a nexus for the kind of feeling and knowledge – and therefore emancipatory 
political potential – that characterise Gramsci’s organic intellectuals: 
A human mass does not ‘distinguish’ itself, does not become independent in its own right 
without, in the widest sense, organizing itself and there is no organization without 
intellectuals… without organizers and leaders (1971: 334). 
Secondly, such groups are of potential significance to radical political change by virtue of 
the structures and emergent powers that distinguish their social formations. Chapter 4 
showed how the norms and practices that ‘empowered’ early NGOs were linked to the 
emergent powers of newly-developed structures, meaning these civil society actors could 
readily enter into – or be co-opted by – development-based narratives of civil society. The 
configurations of politically-oriented civil society were developed to avoid or confront 
state power; becoming similarly receptive or amenable may mean sacrificing unique 
capacities and historical social identity. 
Resistance can be easily romanticised. But, thirdly, it is noticeable that Myanmar’s civil 
society developed and reproduced itself outside the sub-system of the global norms and 
conventions of the international development industry, or what has been called the “non-
profit industrial complex” (INCITE! 2007). Insofar as original, indigenous practices and 
repertoires are able to contribute to the development of an alternative to elite-driven 
political society, simple resistance can give way to more constructive political work. This is 
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not, however, to sanction a crude cultural relativism (Parekh 1992), and Chapter One 
called into question the liberal idea of institutional autonomy; instead, civil society’s social 
identity, powers and interests was shown to depend on relations with other objects. 
These structures, and their evolution, mean that neither history nor futures are made in 
the circumstances of our own choosing, and conditions for Myanmar’s politically-oriented 
civil society groups would change radically after 2010. My objective in these case studies 
therefore centres on how unique forms and logics of politically-oriented civil society actors, 
developed in wholly different circumstances, prospered, failed or evolved as the structures 
of Myanmar’s political and social environment changed. Their fate is revealing not simply 
of NGOisation, but more broadly of frictions or harmonies encountered in attempts to 
reconcile political objectives and strategies to particular circumstances; specifically, of 
how choices in the normative directions taken by civil society are constrained and enabled 











Case study 1: When volunteers meet projects – the humanitarian 
group  
Introduction  
Chapter 3 showed how, under SLORC and SPDC, politically-oriented civil society actors 
were repressed, whereas development-oriented actors, social welfare-focused networks 
and service provision groups enjoyed more freedom. Although useful and to a certain 
extent unavoidable, such normative categorisations can overlook nuance and difference 
(hence the critical focus on institutions and logics of appropriateness). It is not impossible, 
for instance, to use the strategic fit of developmental logics to advance more 
controversial aims whenever possible. As an organisational development trainer reported 
of his time working with groups in 2009, “When they talked about their activity, they 
would say ‘Well, this is what we do on the surface, but this is what we really do’” 
(Personal communication. November 2016). 
This first section focuses on one such group, referred to here by the acronym EAW70. I 
begin by describing the political circumstances of the group’s genesis, and its defining 
welfare-oriented features. I then move on to a more analytical examination, describing 
how its direction of development were shaped by emergent powers of structures, explore 
the effects on the group’s appearance, the responses of its members (later, its 
employees) and the normative implications of these shifts, reflecting on their significance 
with regards to the approach taken to political and human rights issues. 
70 As is true globally, the vast majority of local NGOs in Myanmar are known by the acronym form of their 
multi-word names. I have employed the same convention here in the anonymisation of the case study 
organisations; as each name is a pseudonym, the abbreviation does not correspond to any long form.  
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Origins 
Although this research focuses on the political groups which have emerged in the main 
urban centres of Myanmar, such has been the movement of ethnic peoples around the 
country that groups supporting minorities whose traditional homelands may be hundreds 
of miles can be found in Yangon and Mandalay. These may articulate a variety of interests 
and demands – for peace, expressions of self-determination, complaints against 
exploitation and militarisation of ethnic lands, or may stage cultural events. Others 
provide support for ethnic peoples living in the local area. Until reform, ethnic groups 
espousing political ideals were mainly found beyond Myanmar’s borders, leaving those 
within to alleviate effects of war, displacement and discrimination against ethnic groups. 
EAW was launched in 2003 by a small group of friends and relatives voluntarily 
contributing time and other resource to respond to promote the interests and meet 
certain needs of ethnic Karen women, later expanded to include all members of 
vulnerable communities71. The group was based in Yangon, and responded initially to 
instances of the problem of human trafficking among the Karen population living around 
Yangon, offered training opportunities for disadvantaged women72. Their work began as a 
very limited operation, a “family type of organisation” (Interview 35), and was partly 
borne out of ideas and information coming out of community development work 
conducted with populations in Myanmar and refugee groups over the Thai-Myanmar 
border. Despite the group’s independence, it had the backing of the political 
administration which had formed to manage the social and development affairs in the 
ethnic group’s (shrinking) independent territories, and among refugee populations in 
Thailand: 
71 Indeed, the organisation has little interest in the ethnic nationalist cause. 
72 The term ‘Karen’ refers to a number of ethnic groups, mainly residing in Myanmar’s southeastern Karen 
State. Claims for self-determination against the Myanmar state have meant the region has been affected by 
conflict since Myanmar’s independence, a cause led by the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing the 
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). 
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4 or 5 friends decided that we need… a Karen woman organisation because there is no 
woman organisation to develop and make empower our women, so under the [Karen 
political administration] they encouraged us to form a Karen women’s committee 
(Interview 34). 
EAW exemplified the difficulties of the absence of a sound material base to enable the 
group to function. With few grants available during this time, the group was entirely 
volunteer-run, meaning that occasional pay or no pay was standard. The volunteers were 
themselves their own organisers, implementers and – often – funders. The novel, 
somewhat piteous solutions employed reflected the broader difficulties in the country: 
We contributed our money and our selves. Sometimes we collect old clothes, materials and 
some contributions from our friends. We sell them, we make a fundraising, when we got 
[enough] money we gave capacity building training, leadership for women training 
(Interview 37). 
Yet the group had a number of factors working in their favour. Some members were in 
full-time positions in a Yangon-based INGO, and their experience created a “regime of 
competence” (Wenger 1998: 137) in the group, skills and knowledge in basic 
organisational management that meant activities and planning could be well organised. 
Furthermore, they had a well-placed set of contacts to draw from. Such social capital was 
partly historic - good English language skills were a legacy of Christian missionary activity 
and political sympathies with persecuted minorities meant that Karen were well-
represented in local administrative positions in Yangon’s foreign embassies73. Personal 
connections gave EAW access to quality second-hand goods passed on by international 
staff for income generation activities and, later, to early knowledge of grant 
73 Again, this disproportionate representation has historical roots. “Claims to protect the rights of ethnic 
minorities had been one of the bases of the legitimacy of the colonial state”, and leading to “special rights of 
employment” under British rule and underpinning divide-and-rule tactics (Taylor 2009: 288). 
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opportunities. Early funding from the US Embassy in Yangon in 2006 for microfinance 
projects and women’s leadership training workshops was an early introduction to grant 
management. Membership fees of around 3 USD per year and occasional donations from 
international visitors74 constituted additional income, as well as the mobilisation of 
resource-in-kind, such as provision of training venues, through social, religious and ethnic 
community connections. Funding for activities was, however, generally small, haphazard 
and generally inadequate, meaning that each member would have to perform a variety of 
organisational roles – fundraiser, trainer, treasurer and so on.  
Although borne of material necessity, this kind of loose configuration, like that of the 
others in this case study, reduced its exposure to the repressive state apparatus – little 
was visible or (literally) concretised, although its activities were not those which would 
usually prompt serious state scrutiny. Training for Karen women centred around 
innocuous topic areas – ‘soft skills’ such as business marketing, women’s leadership, even 
livelihoods skills such as handicrafts. Funding would also support the schooling of children 
displaced through conflict. More uniquely, the group would use its networks to 
investigate alleged cases of the trafficking of Karen women into marriage or prostitution: 
with confidence in its connections and a deep distrust of authorities, relatives of alleged 
victims would prefer to report to EAW rather than to the Myanmar police. 
The charisma, skills and social standing of the leader of this group not only meant that she 
was a key figure among Karen women in Myanmar but was also known internationally, 
given the disapora population in Thailand where hundreds of thousands had fled during 
armed conflict in Myanmar. Many of EAW’s early ideas on volunteer management and 
community development, the creation of self-help groups in Karen communities and so 
74 The Karen were the first ethnic minority to be converted to Christianity in Burma, by American Baptists. 
Whilst only 35% of Karen in Myanmar are Christian, this contrasts with over 90% of Karen living in the USA. 
Christain diaspora are therefore instrumental in making connections between Christian Karen groups in 
Myanmar and American benefactors. 
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on came from the larger, well-funded Thai-based Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO). 
Further afield, connections furnished through the refugee diaspora provided a bridge to 
connections in the USA.  
The turning point: Cyclone Nargis and professionalisation 
EAW identify three changes in the social and political environment which prompted 
adaptation in the organisation – Cyclone Nargis in 2008, political reforms and the 
opportunity to get involved in the peace process after 2010, and the “transition to 
democracy” after 2015 general election (EAW 2016). 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 is commonly referred to as the initial critical turning point for civil 
society in Myanmar. The change was not only quantitative, although civil society actors 
took charge of the bulk of the relief operations, but also qualitative as new ideas on 
organisational management and civil society activity were widely introduced. EAW 
demonstrate one way that civil society matured during this time. It shifted from a 
volunteer-based group working on small-scale, local and often episodic initiatives to an 
entity that suddenly found itself a leading part of a large-scale relief operation in cyclone-
hit villages. A total of ten full-time staff and around 100 volunteers would be involved in 
this effort, managing a range of operations – rebuilding houses, schools, erecting water 
tanks and other reconstruction tasks, but also the documentation of human rights 
violations in Nargis-affected areas, such as forced labour in clean-up operations. 
New full-time staff had quit paid positions elsewhere in order to concentrate on EAW 
work full-time, while more donors were approaching with offers of funding. Once the 
Nargis relief efforts were completed, funding had enabled them to move from a 
temporary office in the Ayeyarwady Delta to a permanent office in Yangon. Most full-time 
staff positions were retained; together with premises and other overhead costs, this 
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demanded regular organisational income and what had originally been a volunteer group 
was on course to remain – and expand – as a professional organisation.  
The decade between EAW’s inception in 2003 and the full onset of the reform era in 
2011-12 saw the establishment of key routines and structures that would be familiar to 
anyone working in local NGOs worldwide, a significant change from earlier when the 
organisation “didn’t have any policies” or systematic procedures to manage work but 
instead functioned through needs-based voluntary commitment (Interview 35). Changes 
included the drawing up of financial and human resource guidelines; implementation of 
strict lines of approval for staff expenditure; the setting up of a governance board with 
diverse representation from Myanmar’s charitable, religious and private sectors; and 
regular weekly, monthly and quarterly management meetings for progress updates.  
Setting up as a full-time professional organisation enabled a more systematic approach to 
designing and implementing projects but could in no way guarantee funding for those 
initiatives. However, as Chapter 4 detailed, with the possibility of political change on the 
horizon a number of donors had positioned themselves accordingly – funding for human 
rights project work had increased since the 2010 election and, although the semi-civilian 
government which took office in early 2011 was slow to implement significant reforms, 
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and, later, other political prisoners, meetings with CSOs 
called by the President and statements regarding rule of law indicated a more hospitable 
climate for civil society. There was thus a steady increase in opportunities for the 
organisation as donor activity grew within the country and funding for work more in line 
with EAW’s human rights interests increased: for instance, voter education and election 
monitoring before and during the 2010 election, women’s empowerment training and 
civic education in previously inaccessible project areas, as movement across Karen State 
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became less problematic, and projects aimed at assuaging religious tensions in the 
aftermath of inter-communal violence in 2012 and 2013.  
Project implementation work, by its nature short-term, was also accompanied by an 
expanded role in more continuous activity: from 2013, as government ministries became 
more open to forming relationships with non-state actors, so policy advocacy work 
expanded, both directly with government ministries and indirectly through INGOs or UN 
agencies, especially around women’s participation in the peace process, on the 
Associations Law and on the planned National Census. EAW also took a leading role in 
CEDAW shadow reporting, taking over this task from an organisation based across the 
border in Thailand. 
Like numerous organisations that expanded activity in recent years, EAW began to turn 
attention to the internal development of the organisation to better secure and manage 
such contracts. Support came through an internationally funded organisational 
development programme supporting the building of internal capacity in Myanmar local 
organisations. By the date of the award of the grant in November 2013, turnover had 
increased by 240% since 2011; project-focused work only brought marginal benefits to the 
structure of the organisation itself, and in some ways proved to be a distraction from it. 
From this project, EAW aimed to look internally and “strengthen the institutional capacity 
of EAW that capable to empower lives of women and children [sic]” (EAW 2013). A set of 
specific technical outputs were envisaged through this grant. This would include: 
• an upgrading of “financial management system, policies and procedures” and 
“human resource management system, policies and procedures”;  
• with an increase in the number of individual projects, the organisational ability 
to keep overall track of the impact of these projects was becoming important: 
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this meant developing a “monitoring and evaluation system, a guideline, 
procedure and database to ensure the quality of data and information 
enabling to feed to decision makers, donors, stakeholders and beneficiaries for 
informed decision”; 
• and, with the demand on the organisation and its growth seemingly 
unstoppable, a “design for future programs/projects including an operational 
management guideline and a 10 year strategic plan” (ibid.). 
The former EAW leader has become something of a champion for the process of 
organisational development (OD), which demands that entities reflect on their internal 
configuration and strengthen according to their findings: 
I always advocate that OD is very important… our organisation has reached to a certain 
extent to operate. We have financial rules and guidelines, and HR, and also operations, so 
we have the staff and head of departments. Two weeks a time we have management 
meetings, we stick to schedule, keep to our donor deadlines (Interview 34). 
The shift from a voluntary, membership-based group to a professional organisation was 
not made overnight. This was a slow, progressive change with a steady expansion in the 
number of paid positions determined by the funding available. Certain important aspects 
of the original organisation were retained: mindful of the contribution which the 
volunteers brought to the organisation’s work, the professionalisation of the group simply 
enabled the voluntary support scheme to expand and be better managed. EAW welcomed 
interns and international volunteers identified through VSO, the latter providing 
experience and expertise in managing a professional organisation. Facilitated by an in-
house training programme, new employees were frequently found from within the ranks 
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of the volunteers, a further way via which EAW could benefit individuals from the Karen 
women community (the great majority of employees also being from the ethnic group).  
However, not all volunteers were enthusiastic about the apparent shift from a voluntary, 
member-based group to a professional organisation: 
When we changed to professional org, some staff left. They said we are 24-hour 
volunteers, we are not followers of someone. They didn’t want to arrive at the office and 
sign in 9-5, but they were happy to do volunteer work (Interview 34). 
The voluntary approach had originally meant many in the group were attached to 
“working in a flexible way”, which the introduction of a modern organisational methods 
and procedures disrupted: 
When I joined the organisation [in 2013]… it was already in a transition but it was a 
family-run organisation. It’s quite challenging to introduce policies, rules and regulations 
in an organsaition in which family members, people somehow connected - friends, 
neighbours, nieces, aunties… when you introduce policies it changes the dynamics in the 
organisation…  I think it has changed something fundamentally in the organisation – we 
are no longer a group of friends or family members who are working together. No, we are 
now transforming, or growing, into a medium-sized local NGO, a professional organisation 
(Interview 51). 
Whilst some responded negatively to these changes, departing for other work, others 
found the rationalisation of work beneficial and even liberating: 
When I joined, I was the only one manager, taking care of HR, finance and everything! It 
was very difficult – who was travelling? Other project staff followed them – very difficult! 
And with no proper policy, how could I take action? (Interview 35). 
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These internal changes have been accompanied by other important developments. One 
notable change in 2012 was the name of the group, from an early version which 
highlighted the need for action to one which focused on ‘empowering’ communities. 
Once reassured about the state regulatory framework for NGOs, the group embarked on a 
long process to register their organisation with the Myanmar Home Office, a process 
completed in April 2016. The decision to formally register was reported to be down to a 
combination of factors – certainly donor expectations played a part, but more importantly 
was the legitimacy this conferred in the eyes of state officials. An increase in work meant 
a concomitant growth in movement between regions, a task made bureaucratically easier 
by registration; legitimacy also facilitates invitations to participate in government forums 
and meetings. 
These are much more than symbolic transformations signifying EAW as a professional 
organisation in contradistinction from its origins; rather, they play a critical role in 
instrumentalising the notable internal development, augmenting and enabling greater 
opportunities to use the formidable repository of internal skills, management and 
evaluation systems, a redoubtable track record and a clear structure – including an 
independent board – which have made it one of the most respected small organisations 
working on human rights issues in Myanmar. 
EAW has thus undergone significant structural changes and, allied to this, a considerable 
expansion in its work. In the next section, I argue that it has also changed the nature of, 
and set limits on ambitions for, human rights work; for now, the question must be why 
these changes have been made. In interviews and documentation seen, a number of 
reasons were offered – the need to implement programmes which were seen to be 
effective but technically demanding, such as microfinance and livelihood initiatives over 
the direct teaching of human rights; the need to develop systems that would free up time 
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for leadership to focus on broader advocacy work; and, more simply, the sustainability of 
the organisation and its expanding payroll. The standard NGO work of writing successful 
proposals, managing and administering contracts to the satisfaction of benefactors, 
measuring and evaluating the impact of organisational work and so on is time-consuming 
and technically demanding. Such is the responsibility required of these tasks that reliance 
on voluntary contributions of time and effort would be both foolhardy and self-defeating: 
any due diligence assessment by donors, appraising financial and management systems, 
policies and track records, would make it an unlikely funding recipient. An absence of 
these and the suitably experienced personnel to see their implementation – the capacity 
to manage funds – would negatively affect prospects of receipt. A combination of 
professional input and carefully assigned and managed voluntary labour, on the other 
hand, is one that is likely to appeal. 
A symbiotic relationship therefore developed between the growth in EAW’s 
organisational project and advocacy work; its management systems, policies and 
procedures; and the staff required to put the systems into place. Expert-led input on 
internal management enabled EAW to recognise these holistic requirements and to 
ensure that such pieces were fitted together in practice: 
You can write a policy but the policy has so many consequences and you also need systems 
to make the sure that policy is implemented. To give you an example… [an annual leave 
policy] needs a system to monitor how many leave days people have taken, and you need 
to update that (Interview 35). 
It was observed by another member of staff that such a change placed new demands on 
the organisation that could only be handled by additional staff, who observed that “now, 
one HR manager is not enough – [we need] an admin assistant to help the HR manager” 
(Interview 36). Other aspects of work brought similar demands, such as the collection of 
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data for monitoring and evaluation purposes and financial management. Whilst the 
spreadsheets and systems developed for these were subject to complaints when 
introduced, their benefits were reported to have been noted by staff who saw these 
technologies were “helpful for their implementation, for their activities” (Interview 35).  
Yet the observation that technically demanding tasks require professional input only 
pushes the problem further back – why the need to shift to these kinds of projects in the 
first place? Who had set these new terms of engagement by which organisations pursue 
human rights objectives? Looking to the actions of other agents, such as the decisions of 
management or to ‘donor demands’, again leaves us asking why they have this particular 
content, a character which is mirrored globally. The shift in approach taken by EAW as it 
matured is symptomatic of bureaucratic phenomena associated with aspects of 
NGOisation, and understanding its emergence and impact demands a relational approach. 
 
A new normative direction: the institution of the NGO and 
(imagined) communities of practice 
The metamorphosis of EAW from a voluntary, self-funded, community-oriented group to 
a respected, professional, internationally-funded organisation makes an impressive 
narrative. Many of the major developments in the organisation, such as its move to a 
professional full-time staff, its investment in capacity, official registration and expansion 
in work appear in retrospect to form an upwards spiral arising from sensible decision-
making and assiduous, intelligent grasping of opportunities presented. It has been 
transformed from its early configuration and orientation, which reflected the limits of 
organisational and political possibilities and also the self-help ideals which motivated 
thousands of voluntary networks operating in Myanmar, such as free funeral service 
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providers and blood donation groups. Yet unlike many of those so-called ‘grassroots’ 
groups which organised to provide the most basic of services in villages and townships 
across Myanmar, its willingness to grapple with the repercussions (not yet the causes) of 
human and women’s rights violations, its articulation of the needs of a repressed minority 
and links with banned groups inside and outside Myanmar lent its work political 
resonance.  
Serving an imagined community of ethnic Karen motivated hundreds of volunteers into 
active service with the group, following up on reports of trafficked persons, engaging with 
security personnel where necessary and gathering information on human rights abuses. 
Military constraints made for a wholly volunteer owned and led initiative, driven by the 
volunteer’s own sense of what was possible, led, coordinated and managed according to 
voluntary norms throughout the group.  Whilst this made for somewhat episodic and 
unpredictable social action, it also constituted an extensive resource base beyond the kind 
of professionalised input associated with the NGO. Positioned somewhere between the 
underground political action undertaken by opposition groups and the highly orthodox 
livelihoods and community development work of legitimate development NGOs, it was 
work which demanded the careful construction of relationships with individuals, 
organisations and communities on varied spatial scales – locally, among representatives 
based in Yangon; regionally, among the beneficiary ethnic communities; and 
internationally, among benefactors and members of the ethnic and Christian diaspora. 
Such resource could potentially be deployed towards a wider political project when 
circumstances changed. At the very least, no particular organisational or political direction 
was pre-ordained.  
EAW would find directional influences initially through an imagined community. Along the 
Thai-Myanmar border, organisational models hitherto unsuitable for pre-reform 
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circumstances had long been institutionalised. These groups served refugee populations 
and reported on Karen human rights issues at a time when doing so in Myanmar was a 
perilous activity, and had developed the kind of administrative and managerial systems 
required for external funder assurance and (upwardly) accountable disbursal. Interviews 
highlighted the important learning role which KWO, mentioned above, served for EAW. 
With over 50,000 fee-paying members and multiple international funding partners, KWO 
influence on EAW went much further than provision of technical knowledge for human 
rights reporting. Both its size and its command of important organisational development 
processes such as strategic planning and strategic partner meetings meant it functioned 
as an important source of inspiration and a technical template for EAW.  
Whilst KWO might be a reflexive object for EAW, appropriating its norms and approaches 
would make no sense while the context in Myanmar remained structurally incompatible. 
KWO and other organisations offered a viable template only as significant structural 
changes began to impact on EAW. Organisations like EAW do not simply amend 
configuration according to “isomorphic drivers” within actual organisational fields – in 
other words, it is not simply that they are compelled by norms or uncertainty to mimic 
other organisations that constitute its environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Rather, 
it is that deeper changes in social structures set loose forces and shake up environments 
in such a way that strategic guidance is called for. Ethnic and women’s identity group links 
facilitated the connections and proximity required to access this organisational 
intelligibilia.  EAW would later participate in the Myanmar-based Women’s Organisation 
Network (WON) network, consisting of 37 women’s organisations, while the EAW 
Director’s service on the governance boards of six other local organisations, mainly 
focusing on women’s rights, further embedded EAW within the particular set of norms, 
conventions, problem-solving logics and other components associated with the NGO. 
These provided solutions to problems set in motion by a series of objective changes. 
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The normative impact of the fiduciary structure 
Embrace of an NGO-based logic of appropriateness appeared in the wake of a glut of 
relief funds, and with it contracts, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. International aid 
entered a country structurally and institutionally ill-equipped to use monies as donors 
expected. SPDC-led efforts made use of the military-affiliated USDA and were thus dogged 
by allegations of corruption and misuse. Tight restrictions were placed on the movement 
of foreigners, making INGO interventions – through which the bulk of funds flowed – 
reliant on local intermediaries. EAW’s connections and reach into affected communities, 
located in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta with its large Karen population, their understanding of 
the attitudes of local officials, and an educated, politically-astute group leader fluent in 
English made them highly sought-after partners75. 
Significant in this instance was not the move into humanitarian relief work, something 
which had motivated EAW volunteers from the outset and informed their approach to the 
politics of human rights promotion and protection, which eschewed confrontation and 
antagonistic repertoires. Rather, it was the change in the group itself that the 
management and deployment of these funds demanded. Funds given were not donations 
to the ongoing work and the independent programmatic objectives of EAW as a voluntary 
group but were assigned to the delivery of specific components of work laid out in legal 
contracts, and needed to be managed and administered as such. This demanded an 
adaptation of internal structures, systems and procedures so the entity could enter into 
contracts INGOs and receive funds, with individual contracts ranging between USD 10,000 
– 50,000. The fiduciary structure, whilst very much present in Myanmar for well over a 
decade, was previously peripheral to EAW’s volunteer-led work; now, given the nature of 
75 On the importance of professional capacities such as English language ability in achieving the demands of 
social movements and rebellion, see Bob (2009). 
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the financial support arriving in the wake of Nargis and their involvement, it became a 
principled enabling and constraining element of organisational agency76.  
EAW required the capacity to enter into contract as an organisation, as “a persistent 
whole formed from a set of parts that is structured by the relations between these parts” 
(Elder-Vass 2010: 17). It is the parts and, importantly, the relationships between them 
which give the entity its causal powers that enable it to meet its contractual agreements. 
For EAW, this meant developing both the role positions and delimiting the “position 
practices” which those posts, and the relations between them entailed (Bhaskar 1979: 
41). These are “slots” which individual persons may slip into and assume particular 
powers and responsibilities by virtue of the function ascribed – organisation directors with 
power of attorney; finance managers with powers to submit, accept or reject budgets and 
financial reports; project managers with the power of oversight and direction on specific 
packages of organisational work; and the arrangement of relationships between these 
parts to form a collective entity which can enter into relationships with other actors.  
This aspect of institutionalisation freed the group from its earlier limitations and allowed 
it to take on more work, whilst at the same time setting in motion path-shaping forces 
that would largely confine its future human rights work within institutional parameters. 
Through this professionalising process, EAW would leave behind a quite disparate and 
haphazard approach and solidify as a wholly new kind of entity. Former volunteers used 
to dealing with an assortment of tasks on an ad-hoc basis would take charge of specialised 
areas of responsibility. There was thus a radical change in the group as new sets of norms, 
gathered in role profiles, for former volunteers were created and loaded into paid 
positions. The shift may be seen to reflect a similar evolution in organisational life as 
76 It must be said that the urgent need to get humanitarian assistance into Nargis-affected areas initially 
overrode many of the typical due diligence and risk-management safeguards that make typical contract 
management an exacting process for civil society groups. 
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witnessed in the West, where volunteers came to be “regarded as amateurish “do-
gooders,” as relics of the past to be replaced by paid professional staff” (Anheier and 
Salamon 2001: 43). 
Volunteers did not disappear completely however but assumed a new guise, firstly in the 
form of international volunteers recruited through Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). 
Once again, this mirrors phenomena of modern charitable labour in the West, where an 
increasingly demanding, professional setting demands a particular specific repertoire and 
deployment of specialist skills and knowledge. “Corporate volunteering” makes use of the 
skills of expert individuals drawn from the private and public sectors that can disseminate 
these skills among staff (Hustinx and Lammertyn 2012: 179-80). Volunteers could also be 
found in the organisation’s ‘extended self’. Beyond the EAW office, local volunteers are 
integrated into projects through EAW-supported community-based organisations (CBOs) 
and women’s groups. Instrumentally important for project implementation, these outer 
satellites were carefully developed along lines that could be clearly traced back to their 
parent organisation. 
Politics and power in the project 
The NGOisation thesis concerns politics and power, not organisational development per 
se. What, then, are the political implications of the professionalisation induced by 
fiduciary selectivities? Particularly notable is how the shift to full-time, professional 
contracted work also signified an alteration in the way that human rights issues were 
tackled. Whereas the EAW previously engaged in ongoing efforts with relation to human 
rights on the basis of direct relations with other members of the Karen community, the 
growth of contracted work meant human rights objectives came to be mediated through 
the repertoire of the project. In this way, decisions for the form and substance of action 
on human rights are decoupled from the community and articulated through the 
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demands, design and administration of “discrete packages of resources and activities” 
(Fowler 1991: 145). Whilst limiting, at the same time this greatly increases the actions 
that organisations like EAW could be involved in. 
Projects are, to a great extent, planned, managed and evaluated in much the same way as 
in any other industry. Its migration from commerce to development work at multiple 
levels and varied scale is down to its “‘distinctive competence’” 
[which] lies in its claim to deliver ‘one-off’ assignments ‘on time, to budget, to 
specification’, relying on careful planning and the firm control of critical variables such as 
resources, cost, productivity, schedule, risk and quality (Hodgson 2004: 85). 
The project form not only speaks loudly and clearly to results-focused, risk-averse donors, 
but its conventions and routines are intimately linked with the contract as a method of 
obtaining, rationally planning and distributing the labour for human rights. Despite being 
an innovation developed outside the lifeworld, projects, done well, can obviously be 
conducive to improvements in human rights (at least, one can expect they will ‘do no 
harm’). Practically, different funding agencies or large international organisations offering 
partnerships have their own particular priority areas, selected for their own particular 
internal reasons. The EU’s European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, a 
(2016) call for proposals offered   
• Rural development / Agriculture / Food and nutrition security 
• Education 
• Governance / Rule of law / State capacity building 
• Peace-building support 
as broad categories of actions eligible for support. These were selected through a quite 
separate, overarching bureaucratic process as “the four focal sectors as identified in the 
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EU's Multiannual Indicative Programme” running from 2014-2020, an output of “extensive 
discussions with Myanmar/Burma stakeholders, including at the EU-Myanmar Task Force 
in November 2013 and during the Asia Programming Seminar… and is in line with the 
government’s own development objectives” (European Union 2014b: 4).  
Such a process, delinked from popular constituencies and mediated by sets of high-level 
concerns, is not unique to the EU. By integrating human rights organisations like EAW into 
such programming, the ethical substance of civil society imbues political agreements with 
moral credibility. In the reverse direction however, for the NGO, it radically constrains the 
parameters of what can be thought to be practically – and politically – possible. This is 
only partly a case of submitting to a donor agenda – indeed, in practice, many, including 
the EU, are sympathetic to ideas that might fall outside of thematic guidelines, and an 
equally restrictive parochialism is in place for the NGO: selections of projects are more 
likely to be made on the basis of pragmatic factors – networks of contacts, results from 
earlier projects, experience of the organisation and so on (Interview 8). 
More constraining is the inherent project instrumentalist reasoning by which human 
rights issues are grasped and actions organised. It is clearly not the case that all human 
rights issues are equally amenable to successful projectisation, and certainly not on the 
scale possible for individual local NGOs like EAW. While project framing devices – aims, 
objectives, budgets, and so on – may render a human rights problem epistemically 
comprehensible and practically manageable by an NGO, a successful project does not 
necessarily lead to successful resolution of a human rights problem. The empirical 
appearance of a democratic or human rights issue is deceptive; like the iceberg, there is 
much going on beneath. Enmeshed in layers of interwoven social, political and cultural 
complexities on multiple scales, the sources of human rights issues can elide the project 
intervention without impacting on results, and can often perpetuate the very factors – 
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often structural – which led to the problem in the first place77. Systemic social and 
political change may be wholly incompatible with the short-term, geographically 
constrained dictates of the project. 
One consequence of fiduciary selectivities, then, is the tendency, then, to select what is 
manageable, “linear and predictable” for the constraints of the project form and for the 
demonstration of results rather than to organise and develop activities towards ends 
which would seek to understand and overcome any structural basis of human rights 
problems and development issues (Desai and Howes 1996: 101). With project 
management driving agendas, grassroots organisational development reflects the 
professional development in EAW itself: CBO volunteers undergo training in the “concept 
of community development”, the “role of CBOs and CBO development” and “the qualities 
and characteristics of effective and strong leaders”; for the organisations themselves, 
“CBO guidelines were developed, covering CBO structures, roles and responsibilities and 
good governance” (EAW 2016). The improvements in the project management capacities 
of the organisation and network consolidated the shift towards more projectisable 
development themes, centred around women’s participation in livelihoods, microfinance 
and maternal health.  
Whilst this fitted well with post-Nargis reconstruction themes, it also introduces strategies 
for coping with and better managing poverty in the marginalised communities served by 
EAW, rather than politically organising to transform these conditions. The depoliticisation 
evident here and remarked on in other studies (see, for example, Neff 1996; Carroll 2012) 
is redoubled through the modes of professional organising in the EAW’s CBO networks 
which are an integral part of these projects. Rather than the subject of a new democratic 
77 The norms of the issue-driven, project-based logics have been challenged in recent years by new approaches 
to development associated with ‘Thinking and Working Politically’ and ‘Doing Development Differently’ 
movements among development practitioners (see Green 2017). 
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flourishing, they become an object developed specifically for better project management, 
an intermediary between donors, EAW and the much sought after results:  
[The CBOs] suggest us different activities but sometimes we also need to focus, we need to 
discuss with our donor because they come with different objectives, because the design 
[for the project] already exists (Interview 42). 
CBOs are on the receiving end of shifting priorities in donor-funded activity – peace-
building, interfaith harmony, civic education, the sharing of farming techniques – and the 
difficulties inherent in addressing deeply-rooted human rights issues in the restrictions 
imposed by the project form. For example, the nine working groups established in a 
recent EU-funded activity to address religious tensions, were abandoned immediately 
after funding ended with “so many things to do” remaining (Interview 42). The groups 
have had more success in civilian monitoring of ceasefires; funding for this remains quite 
constant, a consequence of the importance of peace compared to other human rights 
issues. 
By late 2015, almost the entirety of EAW’s available funds was ‘restricted’ i.e. directed 
towards contractually-delimited, project-based activities78, underscoring the need to 
ensure that systems and roles are in prime condition to enable the continuation of the 
organisation. There is then an intimate, recursive relationship between the form human 
rights work takes, the development of systems and routines to undertake, manage and 
manipulate these activities and the resulting depoliticisation of the subject. For example, 
whilst voluntary agency for human rights continues to play a key role in EAW, agents do 
so as a bearer of functional roles and responsibilities within particular projects and 
contracts, rather than as bearers of their own aspirations for collective action. Driven by 
78 Most contracts specify that use of funds towards activity not specified in the contract would be deemed 
ineligible costs, and thus liable to penalty or return of that portion of funding to the original donors.  
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the force of fiduciary structural selectivities, institutionalised through hired experts and 
the situated outcomes of the enactment of conventions employed by similar 
organisations such as KWO, the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of EAW’s 
configurative form and the strategic deployment of its powers sees an accommodation to 
existing structures. Yet this does not necessarily preclude political action through other 
means. 
The consolations of agency and status 
After the radical shake-up of its voluntary network, and the ensuing professionalisation 
and reorganisation of internal structures toward better administration of contracts and 
projects, little would be initiated outside the discursive parameters of the project. Yet 
these activities have their own emergent products, and a significant ‘value-added’ of 
project activity is the collection of information – on problems, on communities, on 
relationships – accrued informally and formally, through the results gathering processes 
of monitoring and evaluation. Expansion of projects, new activities, greater organisational 
reach, more direct and indirect project beneficiaries means an increase in information and 
in demands for that information to be put to good use in advocacy or advisory role – 
expectations on civil society as embedded in the new state form (see Chapter 4). Well-
known for their extensive grassroots connections, EAW’s social capital consolidated their 
status as important and trusted interlocutors with state representatives and legislators 
during Myanmar’s early period of reform, and in consultations with visiting international 
delegations. A key member of the Myanmar Network for Free Elections (MYANFREL), an 
active participant in the discussions which framed the Registration of Organizations Law 
(2014), and on the board of the National Census Committee.  
However, it is important to note that individuals in EAW continued to be highly active in 
oppositional political activity – each admitting of varying degrees of challenge – during the 
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reform era (and earlier). They collected data for Myanmar’s 2016 CEDAW shadow report, 
and, furthermore, EAW representatives participate in a number of the civil society 
networks which have appeared in Myanmar over the past decade. In addition to the 
Peoples Network for Constitutional Reform (PNCR), they are most prominently part of the 
Women’s Organisation Network (WON), formed of numerous participating organisations 
and which has taken a provocative public stance on many issues. Statements issued 
following the rape and murder of two female teachers in Kachin State in 2015 and against 
the four so-called Race and Religion Laws, added to the Network’s combative reputation 
in defence of women’s rights. With a prominent role in WON, the EAW Director was on 
the receiving end of threats following these announcements. 
Indeed, with a reputation for human rights defence among extensive connections with 
INGO and diplomatic circles as well as with the Karen groups, the Director’s personal 
reputation for fierce, outspoken loyalty to victims of human rights abuses and vitriolic 
attacks on the powerful is well-known. At ethnic peace forums in 2014 and 2015, the 
praise heaped on ethnic leaders was broken by her questions on allegations of 
widespread corruption and on controversial developments which sought to exploit peace, 
such as the Norwegian-backed ‘Peace Dam’ on the Salween River, running through Karen 
State. “Norway? We used to know them as, like, peace activists. And now they would like 
to do dam in the Karen State… ‘Dam for Peace’. And then I said “Bullshit. ‘Dam for Peace’ 
– bullshit!’” (Interview 34). 
This is beyond the typical rhetorical moderation that one comes to expect from leaders of 
now-professionalised NGOs. Again, we see the importance of values and agency, able to 
exercise influence despite the institutionalised forces pushing in a different direction. 
However, it is crucial to note that such work takes place beyond the organisation rather 
than through it, in spite of its structures and powers rather than because of them. The 
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technocratic capacities of the NGO itself are inadequate for such campaigning and 
influencing work. Although research and reports which bolster campaign messages are 
regularly produced as part of projects, the NGO becomes valuable here as an enabler for 
other actions which do have efficacy, not least by giving activists the means to a 
livelihood. One recent study of networks in Myanmar picked up on this point: 
Despite the increased openness, many organizations found that, individually, they still had 
little influence on power holders at the national policy level as well as on private 
businesses, many of which had strong links with government authorities or the military. 
Building on informal networks and linkages with other organizations, they came together 
to identify innovative ways to overcome these challenges (Phuah et al. 2016: 4). 
The tensions between different ‘locations’ of labour for human rights, within the 
organisation and beyond it, and inherent difficulties in combining the power of each, were 
noted in interviews. For example: 
[The organisational work and the advocacy work] is always linked, but sometimes it feels 
that there are two different things: the external world and managing the organisation. It’s 
important to keep it together but it’s not always easy (Interview 36). 
This reported detachment of EAW from the wider world, for the logics which organise its 
work to divert it from the organisation’s original interests and vision, mirrors the 
depoliticisation of its CBO partners. In its strategic orientation towards new, project-
selective structures, EAW’s successful disaggregation of social problems and motivating 
values into manageable pieces does not guarantee their reassembly in a form which has 
the desired causal impact (Reed 2000). Real impact, in the critical realist causal sense, 
demands repoliticising the resources garnered through the organisation. Indeed, the 
challenges involved in the Director’s direct political engagement and activity, the original 
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inspiration behind the organisation, eventually became a reason for her to relinquish her 
position and successfully run for a parliamentary seat. The strength of relationships with 
other entities and communities which first attracted support for the organisation became, 
under different political circumstances, a reason to depart for formal politics. Dual 
restrictions are imposed on the empowered organisation: politically, the separate zoning 
of state and civil society imposes a radical separation from political parties; professionally, 
project-based activities and specific organisational capacities are incompatible with 
participation in mass social movements. That such a move from civil society to 
government was made by other civil society leaders testifies to the limitations of a 
strengthened civil society, its empowered organisations and the form of the state in which 
they participate. 
Conclusion 
EAW’s impressive evolution from a self-funded volunteer network to a stable, 
professional NGO in a mere few years is not merely down to individual or collective 
decisions but through involves the dissemination and institutionalisation of norms 
appropriate for changes in the strategic selectivity of structures. EAW’s first reported 
turning point, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, marked the strengthening of 
institutional structural mechanisms, most notably those emergent especially from 
fiduciary structures. These would constrain and enable the organisation in its ‘choice’ of 
powers and the subsequent development of systems and routines to put these to work, 
elevating the project as the primary repertoire and set of normative organising principles 
around which human rights and developmental objectives would be framed.  
Whilst the impact of the project, although always constrained by geographical, temporal 
and thematic boundaries, qualitatively and quantitatively varies, I have here stressed the 
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way in which the dominance of the project repertoire reflects NGOised logics. The 
fiduciary mechanisms sustain an institution of organisation which professionalises social 
agents like EAW – turning its voluntary networks not only into paid positions but ones 
with discrete roles and functions – and also depoliticises, the organisation shaped both 
around its own survival and, connected to this, the better enactment of projectised ends 
rather than political transformation. There was little contestation as these developments 
unfolded thanks to the broad compatibility between the charitable logics which 
characterised the group’s historical approach to human rights work and the organisational 
logics through which these were now realised. Both eschewed the directly oppositional or 
radically transformational: political interventions, such as those led by the Director, would 
circumvent or springboard from the organisation. 
For groups hailing from oppositional backgrounds, institutionalised through oppositional 












Case study 2: Internal democracy and political pedagogy 
Introduction 
Whilst political developments and structural change would impact all civil society actors in 
Myanmar, this does not mean it had the same results. The ‘mere’ objectivity of structural 
mechanisms and inducements for strategic reorientation does not necessarily determine 
the dissolution of values or abandonment of repertoires. Working on the basis of the 
layered nature of social reality, exploring the evolution of different groups with particular 
unique histories and qualities offers the possibility of illuminating through case 
comparison how the same institutional mechanisms can produce wholly different 
outcomes thanks to the contingencies of subjects and contexts. In addition to varied 
histories, communities and resources, the value-driven nature of political activism means 
that different groups are likely to encounter institutions with different normative 
orientations and expectations. EAW’s welfare-focused approach was relatively congruent 
with the NGOisation tendencies produced by contractual, legal and advisory structures 
that characterised Myanmar’s reform era. The experience of other, more explicitly 
politically-oriented groups would not be so sanguine.  
A frequent observation made by many long-time observers of the country is that 
Myanmar’s civil society, despite being a champion for the democratic cause, often 
displays precious little interest in democracy within its own ranks. Instead of practicing 
what they preach, organisations face accusations of autocratic leadership, insufficient 
internal consultation and a stifling culture of deference to status and age, a problem often 
blamed on ‘cultural deficiencies’ in the country wrought by decades of militarism. The 
decoupling of institutionalised logics from the structural causes of injustice, as noted in 
the first case study, threatens to deepen this lack of popular control in civil society, 
although it is paradoxically compatible with democratic change. In this second case study, 
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for the democracy-focused organisation TYT, embedding democratic and rights-respecting 
values in the structure, processes and outreach work of their new organisation was to be 
a key component of their mission. Democratic constitutional reforms might be expected 
to provide a hospitable environment for these objectives, but such is the nature of open 
systems that agential / structural interaction outcomes are sometimes at odds with 
expectations. 
Origins 
The clique of well-read, politically-aware young people who started TYT might elsewhere 
be labeled a group of lay intellectuals, but despite earning the intellectual respect of 
bookish peers this would be a somewhat ill-fitting term in 1990s and 2000s Myanmar. 
Members of the core group had collectively served around thirty years in prison during 
the 1990s and 2000s for their political activities, but not all had had such adverse 
experiences – one had a good career in structural engineering, while others worked in 
local development NGOs and pursued oppositional interests outside – and, wherever 
possible, inside – working hours. They had for years been involved in discussion groups 
and literature distribution in Yangon, a tradition which Chapter 3 showed to stretch back 
to colonial-era Burma but which had more lately become vital for less political, more 
prosaic reasons thanks to the lamentable state of education and the SPDC’s restrictions 
on information. They shared a common interest and motivation in political education 
towards the better realisation of the right to informed political participation, and their 
decision to launch TYT was a collective one. It appeared as a natural extension of activities 
which had been under way already for a number of years, as something of a necessity for 
a group of highly motivated activists: 
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We had to establish a new organisation to encourage young people and other minorities, 
people who live in [remote] areas, so they can engage in the political process. It is their 
birthright (Interview 31). 
Non-formal political education had previously taken place only in safe spaces such as the 
British Council and American Centre, led by international teachers according to a 
curriculum they had developed, in English. Private study groups existed beyond the 
teashops but this was an activity that both risk and resource served to restrict in scale. 
They formed part of a broader, informal  movement referred to in one early report as 
“reading groups”, an appropriate term as “many of these groups are based around 
discussion and education on civil society issues, though the reading aspect is frequently 
applied in development and education activities” (Buzzi et al. 2011: 21). 
Myanmar’s reforms increased both the demand and the acceptability of such work. As 
military rule was replaced with constitutional government, albeit one with manifest 
military tones, monitoring of the activity of key individuals, including some members of 
TYT, was significantly scaled back. With no junta dependent on the familiar formula of 
limited concessions and maximum coercion to ensure rule, close surveillance and 
repression of political dissidents was no longer made a police priority. This afforded the 
group an unprecedented opportunity for new, more public forms of the kind of popular 
education work and democracy promotion which they had been engaged in for years. 
Both the public appetite and the hospitable political climate for politically focused 
education were demonstrated through the civic and voter education work which had 
preceded the 2010 general election and, far more widely, the 2012 by-elections (Lidauer 
2012; Lall et al. 2013). The founder members of TYT had continued this activity after the 
2010 election (some of them having only recently been released from prison), using the 
2008 Myanmar Constitution as a starting point for tuition on democracy, human rights, 
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international relations and other topics deemed relevant or interesting for students in 
provincial parts of the country. Members would play different roles in these activities – 
some were in full-time employment in other local organisations and were thus better 
placed for a role in non-classroom activities such as preparation of workshop curricula and 
logistics, while others took up tutorial duties. 
Although circumstances were still far from ideal – in one member’s words, teaching 
political activists in 2011 was still “not very safe and not very popular” (Interview 30) – the 
lifting of close scrutiny of activists and the loosening of restrictions on certain gatherings 
(which in Yangon had been gradually relaxed since the 2008 Constitution referendum) 
meant it was now possible to rent premises where such activity could take place, without 
putting premises owners at risk79. Although political reform in Myanmar was at an early, 
tentative stage, TYT’s reading of positive signs suggested that it had become possible to 
plan into the future and thus to design and implement a more holisitic programme of 
integrated political activity, again centring around education. Such was their belief that 
founder members’ used personal savings and sourced donations for early rental, 
equipment and travel costs, confident of securing donor funding in the future. 
Hailing from a variety of backgrounds and working in a generally untested area of 
formalised civil society activity it was important, first of all, to establish clear objectives as 
a group. Agreement was reached at an early stage that their work should take a dual 
approach. A political engagement strand was designed to reach out to “political activists, 
going to remote area for discussions… and to understand what [are] their everyday 
political circumstances” (Interview 30). This was seen as critical in a country that was criss-
crossed by political and ethnic divisions, making genuine national reconciliation a core 
opposition ambition and slogan, and which was furthermore bedeviled by poor 
79 However, the group still had to move locations a number of times during their early years, at least partly due 
to landlord discomfort with the nature of activities.  
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communications and restricted opportunities to take such a diversity of views to the 
power centres of Yangon and, certainly, the new state capital Nay Pyi Taw.  
Secondly, a political education strand sought to provide a comprehensive introduction to 
a range of social and political science topics including political institutions, political 
philosophy and political processes. TYT would draw on their broader network and tailor 
academic material to suit it, specifically directing activity towards young activists with the 
intention of helping them overcome the gaps in their skills and knowledge left by the 
education system. Participants in programmes would be able to “better comprehend the 
challenges and opportunities which the country is presented with at this critical historical 
juncture” and, more fundamentally, programmes would “instill in them a strong 
democratic ethos grounded in grassroots communities” (TYT 2013a). One former member 
saw the design as analogous to more established educational institutions, stating that 
“[TYT] modified a model of other country’s universities: they have an academic section, 
and at the same time… they engage in policy, advocacy” (Interview 30). The modification 
in this instance was in the beneficiaries and intended results of this advocacy; state 
officials were not initially a direct target of advocacy efforts, but rather existing or likely 
democracy and human rights activists, including many rank-and-file NLD party members. 
There were clear, unambiguous normative objectives: that participants “become well 
informed on politics, nature of transition, role of civil society in political process and most 
importantly federalism” (TYT project report 2013b). Yet ideological differences were also 
evident – for some, the organisation would orient minds and society in a politically and 
economically liberal direction (Interviews 26, 33); others would bring leftist influences 
(Interviews 30, 31). 
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A moral mission 
Whilst activity was successfully ordered into these two separate complementary strands, 
the management of the activity itself also required close attention. The tradition of 
political reading groups, the symbolic importance of the training content, the 
backgrounds of the individuals involved and their messianic zeal for political and human 
rights education made TYT an unlikely candidate for a standard NGO hierarchical 
organisational configuration. Besides, whereas EAW could quite unproblematically 
identify themselves as a token of a various type or category of extant organisation, this 
was not so straightforward with TYT: was it a school, an NGO, a movement, or something 
else entirely? Overseas universities and their political science departments provided an 
ideal of quality and comprehensive coverage for TYT but could hardly offer a formula to 
answer strategic questions and problems issuing from reform era Myanmar’s unique 
structural circumstances. Students were usually poor and unable to afford prices 
appropriate for TYT’s sustainability, and formalising as a private school or university was 
legally complex. Furthermore, whereas EAW had a reputable organisation prior to reform, 
TYT were starting anew. Although it is true they were drawing upon a long-established 
tradition or repertoire of intellectual political action, it was not necessarily clear how this 
work and its attendant ambition – improvement in the capacity of the people through 
political science education so they could fully realise their right to political participation – 
would crystallise in suitable form.  
The absence of any clear, objective guide ropes fed into questions about internal 
structure and management. Here, however, the absence of an obvious direction would, 
initially, be offset by values. This was fundamentally a moral mission, with democratic 
ends and means. As a democracy promoting entity, the group looked to express 
democratic values within the organisational structure itself: rather than creating a 
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hierarchy for the organisation and its decision-making process, the group opted for a 
horizontal structure which would involve all the founding members, organised into a 
Board of Directors (BoD), in decision-making equally. 
All of the board members go down to the management level, we agree we will try to 
establish the democratic management, democratic administration; we made consensus 
decisions, nobody above another. That is a very democratic way (Interview 31). 
Meetings were held regularly for collective decision-making – these included setting the 
strategic goals of the organisation, the formulation of rules and regulations, partnership 
decisions, curriculum development and so on. The political ferment of the early reform 
days, along with the group’s social standing and political connections, also meant taking 
decisions with significant political repercussions. The decision to avoid engagement with 
political parties and state institutions involved in the 2012 by-elections, for example, was 
laboriously debated between BoD members, eventually coming down against 
participation on grounds that resource was better expended towards genuine nation 
building efforts. Three functional teams – an executive team, an advisory team and an 
administration and finance team – implemented and enabled the decisions made and the 
decision-making processes of the BoD. This collective approach to management extended 
also to finance and financial accountability; without a separate finance section or finance 
head, individual persons were assigned to withdraw cash by the approval of the BoD, and 
all expenditure was overseen and approved by the BoD. TYT was also taking individual 
donations in its early stages of formation so this level of assurance and oversight on 
financial matters was critical for early benefactors, given Myanmar’s reputation for 
corruption. 
The cooperative approach to managing and directing activities was recorded as an early 
success for TYT, marking the organisation out as unique in its levels of transparency and 
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democratic oversight. “There were no suspicions… everybody can easily know [what is 
going on]” (Interview 30). The work met with critical success: with well-known 
intellectuals and activists involved in the group, they quickly became a standard-bearer 
for civic and democracy / rights education among other groups. By the middle of 2013, 
the organisation had begun to receive core funding from the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) and from DFID. The flat, democratic governance structure was 
promulgated as a key normative feature: 
The TYT governance structure is inspired by collective leadership and democratic norms:  
organisational goals and policies are made by its Board of Directors (BOD), comprising 
eleven members at the moment. Major decisions are made democratically within the 
Board either by consensus or by vote among the board members (TYT 2013a). 
This approach, the reputation of its founders and early demonstrations of its convening 
power among wide sections of nation’s youth generated recognition of their potential as 
an educational institution. Beginning operations at a critical time in Myanmar’s juncture, 
TYT quickly attracted attention from other donors, academic visitors and foreign 
institutions eager to connect with a centre of political learning but unable to do so 
through the usual university channels. Two large grants were covering overheads and 
recruitment of a small number of full-time staff, an enviable position to be in among 
Yangon’s civil society community and all despite an absence of the factors usually deemed 
critical when funders examine proposals - track record, registration, and perhaps a more 
orthodox decision-making structure.  
Taught programmes in Yangon became more comprehensive introductions to political 
science, democracy and human rights thanks to the involvement of international trainers. 
The level of interest in these programmes increased, with student numbers drawn from 
rank and file political party members as Myanmar’s formal political scene took off, 
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student union leaders (still a significantly politically sensitive institution) and grassroots / 
community organisations. Political engagement became both more technical and more 
comprehensive as developing threats to the tentative democratic transition and human 
rights saw the organisation keen to use its convening power to bring together a new 
range of actors – engaging with a variety of religious and interfaith associations in 
response to a rise in Buddhist nationalism, mixing local and international academics to 
discuss economic and political governance issues (especially the continued involvement of 
the military in politics), and so on. New premises were found to accommodate the 
expansion of activities, and salaried staff taken on. 
Structural tensions 
Yet this internal structure was strained by contradictions at an early stage. Just as 
socialism for Oscar Wilde took up too many evenings, so the protracted decision-making 
process made for early difficulties. With nine members on the BoD, many of whom were 
in full-time employment elsewhere and voluntarily contributing time to TYT, meetings 
were only rarely attended by all members. Absentee BoD members would send opinions 
in advance, but as these gatherings and debates were conducted to forge consensus 
among the group rather than produce a simple majority, attendance was required to 
better ensure the kind of full and active participation required for consensus decisions. 
TYT’s governance structure, whilst reflecting the values of the democracy and human 
rights movement it was part of, would become increasingly at odds with the demands and 
complexities brought by injections of new resource and expansion of activity. 
Matters came to a head when an opportunity arose to participate as a local partner on an 
internationally-led political survey in Myanmar, one of the first of its kind in the country. 
This presented some obvious attractions: it would enable potentially fruitful new 
relationships to form with international actors, bring wider international recognition of 
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the organisation and would leave as a legacy specific skills and competencies in 
quantitative survey methods – a rare example of more immediately practical abilities on a 
capacity building environment still overwhelmed by, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, generic 
programmes in organisational development, project and contract management, rather 
than such specific technical skills. Yet it was also a decision that was loaded with political 
significance, since the survey was based on perceptions and institutions formed within a 
political system and transition that other group members believed to be hollow.  
With such limited opportunity to argue the case in BoD meetings and achieve consensus 
among members, and with the clock ticking on a decision before the opportunity was lost, 
a small section of the BoD took the initiative to go ahead and made an agreement to 
participate. Not only did this prompt efforts to reconfigure the organisation’s governance 
structure, but it also precipitated a split within the organisation itself; and only weeks 
later, a number of founder members would leave TYT. While normative disagreement 
over the survey itself underpinned division, division was closely bound up with the 
internal structural problems that had generated the impasse. The decision-making system 
was proving to be an inflexible hindrance to the operation of the organisation. It had to 
go, and once jettisoned, there was a considerable qualitative change in decision-making: 
The biggest improvement [in the organisation] is the structure… With so many members of 
the BoD, we cannot make effective decision-making. Now the decision-making procedure 
is very efficient and effective, we can decide things very quickly. I became the president, I 
consult with the BoD [and] decision making is efficient and effective (Interview 24). 
Efficiency and effective decision-making were not primary factors behind the original flat, 
consensus-driven governance structure: democracy and transparency drove the design. 
Yet the kinds of opportunities that would be presented to TYT meant that efficiency and 
effectiveness soon became priorities, values operationalised through the adoption of sets 
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of new organisational norms and the abandonment of those encoded in earlier 
repertoires. Not only were there more decisions to make, but also these decisions were 
increasingly complex and had to be made more rapidly – and, from the perspective of the 
organisation’s existence and ongoing activity, correctly. The demand for quick, 
authoritative responses had exposed contradictions within the democratic configuration 
of the organisation, leading to the wholesale reconfiguration of the Board and 
restructuring of decision-making processes so they reflected what was required 
professionally, rather than democratically. 
Preparing for the future  
This marked a key turning point for TYT. With politically-oriented civil society now a 
legitimate part of ‘above ground’ civil society, its reorganisation was able to benefit from 
proximity to similar organisations, exchanging ideas in tailored training on organisational 
development given on specific courses: “mostly we have to learn technical skills from 
workshops and training provided by [a DFID-funded organisational development 
programme]” (Interview 25). These would become increasingly important. Following the 
abandonment of the previous governance structure in mid-2014, TYT would complete 
work on survey activities, develop deeper partnerships with overseas universities and gain 
an unrivaled reputation for the provision of education in democracy, political science and 
human rights. Nearly twelve months after this shift, at a strategic planning meeting in 
April 2015, a professionally-led reflection and analysis of configurational developments 
and organisational learning was consolidated in a strategic plan, a set of five themes that 
would orient the group’s approach to its work from 2015-2017. 
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Recruit and retain quality staff 
- Enhance capacity of existing staff  
- Offer and attractive salary and benefit package 
 
Promote networking and partnerships with local and international 
organisations 
- Increase contact base for better political science training 
- Mobilize human resources, technical skills and knowledge, and 
financial resource 
 
Communicate results and impact 
- Research findings, results and impact shared nationally and 
internationally  
- Shared academic knowledge 
- Better monitoring and evaluation 
 
Provide political knowledge 
- Improve the right to access political knowledge for democratic 
reform  
- Spread political knowledge across the entire nation  
- Disseminate messages by applying various strategies and actions. 
-  
Promote as a sustainable professional institution 
- Engage diverse donors, local, international and private.  
- Consider income generation activities and introducing  costs for 
its services 

















 Figure 4: TYT strategic plan (Strategic planning workshop. April 2015).  
Whilst these would be derided as a strategic plan by a future consultant – “the objectives 
weren’t related to where the organisation wanted to go” (Interview 29) – they indicated 
an attempt to balance political objectives with the instrumental expediencies of the 
organisation. Despite a continued normative focus on realising the right to informed 
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political participation, the structure envisioned for the organisation itself was now geared 
to identifying and managing the partnerships and professional networks that would drive 
the expansion of such work. 
In another consequence of learning from fellow NGOs and international education 
partners, no restrictions were placed on the sourcing of resource - traditional donors, 
resource-in-kind and organisation-led income generation strategies all seen as potentially 
important for funding. The acquisition of financial management skills through specialist 
training from Mango, whose courses “are designed and run by experienced NGO finance 
professionals who understand the everyday challenges of programme delivery” (Mango 
2016), a heightened awareness of ‘alternative resource mobilisation’ options through 
workshops and interaction with other organisations, and a more streamlined decision-
making process made market-based income generation work viable. Investments in 
various income-generating initiatives, including a car rental service and a printing press, 
would be made, with more envisaged for the future. 
Analysis: democratic difficulties in the space for civil society  
The coupling of normative and configurational dimensions appeared in bold, stark form, 
reflecting the overwhelmingly democratic, rights-inspired oppositional politics embraced 
by individuals and groups that emerged in Myanmar’s post-1988 authoritarian stasis. Few, 
if any, other groups had taken such a deliberate stance to integrate democratic practice in 
their organisation, exemplifying Joshua Cohen’s description of deliberative democracy as 
“an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” 
(Cohen 1989: 17). Such an idea could be readily achieved and incorporated into TYT’s 
early organisational activity thanks to the retention of characteristics of the old reading 
groups: an informal, club-like, discussion-based approach to activity and the “self-
benefiting” quality of the group. One of the benefits and idiosyncrasies of membership-
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based groups is that they are largely free from the demands which issue from external 
relations. Despite the political subject matter of early reading groups, they were mainly 
self-benefiting, pooling interests and individual resource for the educative gains of 
members.  
The shift to an ‘other-benefiting’ or ‘programme-based’ form suggests both a change in 
the good produced – from private and exclusive to public and inclusive, indicating a shift 
in purpose – and a change in the volume and nature of resource needed for reproduction. 
Dependence moves from beneficiaries to contributors, the need to obtain resource 
becoming a pressing matter. TYT would of course not be alone in its search for perennially 
scarce resource: at this point organisations, whatever their sui generis qualities, come to 
focus on the overwhelming need to secure and manage resource. Zald and McCarthy’s 
resource mobilisation approach (1973; 1977) in particular stresses the organisational 
consequences of competition between social movement organisations (SMOs) and the 
impossibility of organisational independence from its material base. Given this need for 
“routinization of resource flow” and the fact that “many movement organizations will fail 
or shrivel if they cannot define a relationship to a support base” organisations tend to 
“develop oligarchic and bureaucratic features” and in so doing they “moderate goals and 
institutionalize careers” (McCarthy and Zald 1973: 24). Organisation may well be “the 
weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong” but it is also “the source from which 
the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy, occasioning there disastrous 
floods and rendering the plain unrecognizable” (Michels 1962 [1911]: 61-62). 
Whilst certain empirical aspects of the fate of civil society entities are undoubtedly 
illuminated by the quest for resource, such a reductive empiricism, confined to 
observables, is of limited causal explanatory value. No fundamental rule about 
organisations was suddenly revealed once the ‘space for civil society’ opened up. The 
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outcome of TYT’s democratic experiment is rather a product of the inappropriateness of 
normative action based on oppositional, democratic values, deeply held by all in TYT, 
against the structural selectivities emergent and incumbent on organisations now that 
relations had been radically reordered between government, donors and civil society 
actors, yielding new structurally-based vested interests for the organisation. Whilst new 
political circumstances were wholly dissimilar to those under SPDC, they were, for 
different reasons, equally hostile to radical democratic projects. TYT’s gradual realisation 
of this helps to make sense of the final resolution of the tensions between the different 
sets of norms, routines and technologies that ‘obviously’ had to be adopted as structural 
change took place. Attempts at realising “idealistic and moralistic claims about how 
human personal or group life ought to be organized” (Lofland 1996: 2-3), even on as small 
a scale as a local non-formal education provider, would be dismantled – this was an 
organisation, not a movement, working within structural selectivities, not out to change 
them. 
Yet unlike the more standard, project-mediated, instrumental change process described 
in the previous case study, TYT’s internal democratic cause was, at least partly, the victim 
of logics inherent in an ambition that was equally value-driven. TYT was not ‘chasing 
projects’ to stay afloat like their contemporaries, thanks to early good fortune in the form 
of NED and DFID core funding grants that covered overheads and salaries. They were 
instead able to focus attention on forging international academic links in order to attract 
thematic expertise on political science and democratic transitions into the country. In 
their early phase TYT had linked up with academics or practitioners entering Myanmar on 
the invitation of embassies or as short-term experts on donor projects, while political 
reform meant academics were also beginning to trickle in to pursue independent research 
projects. Later, longer-staying guests from universities worldwide lectured on longer 
programmes, while new projects were started through new links with international 
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organisations – participation in global networks facilitating leadership development; 
internationally funded projects on hate speech; and organisational capacity development 
for student unions. 
Undoubtedly, these may all ultimately contribute towards the flourishing of the 
democratic culture desired by the original founders of TYT. But professional facilitation of 
cultural change i.e. a human rights, democratic culture, plunges the organisation in a 
wholly different set of institutional logics compared to non-professional facilitation. These 
concerns were recognised by the group at an early stage in their transformation process: 
As an organisation developing from activism and democratic movements, the biggest 
challenge is always the lack of fundamental structure such as project management, 
organisational development and finance policy which are compatible to receive 
sustainable funding from several international funder directly… There is always a risk 
when one organisation tries to restructure its indigenous structure to be compatible with 
the criteria set by international organisation. It means that organisation development 
takes time and it is the process need to pursue for long term (TYT 2014). 
Whilst TYT did indeed enact a number of short-term projects, its core organisational 
ambition as a political education centre meant they had a more tightly defined 
programmatic mission compared to other organisations such as EAW. This would limit the 
impact of projectisation, the parceling of work into discrete packages of time-bound 
resources and activities. However, the projectisation phenomena far from exhausts the 
modalities through which new institutional logics are carried and come to clash with 
established, “indigenous” procedures. One principal effect of the institution of 
organisation then has been a strategic orientation towards a set of field structures which 
privilege configurations that permit the rapid making of decisions – a hierarchical 
structure.  Although sharing the democratic and human rights sentiments and objectives 
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that TYT held, the academics in charge of the political perceptions survey required a rapid 
(hopefully positive) decision rather than a consensus one. Recognition of the needs to 
establish international relationships, firmly on the cards following the abandonment of 
locally-led initiatives, did not immediately ask for the establishment of new technical roles 
(although these were created) but instead for a particular shift in what could be 
considered reasonable and appropriate deliberation. As Jessop makes clear, institutions 
“have a definite spatiotemporal extension” and “operate on one or more particular scales 
and with specific temporal horizons of action” (Jessop 2001a: 1227). Whilst Myanmar may 
arguably have offered the ‘space’ for civil society entities such as TYT, there was no time 
for its democratic processes. 
This is not, of course, to say that TYT shifted towards a more authoritarian mode of 
operation, but rather that they simply became more like other professional organisations 
emerging around the same time. Furthermore, the liberal and human rights background 
of the key individuals involved softened the edges of hierarchical structures:  
[TYT] have got a hierarchical structure… [but] in reality the communication is pretty flat. 
It's good, and there are no egos to be massaged in this place… I suppose that's what I 
meant when I was saying there was a very supportive environment, that's the impression 
I'm getting, nothing tells me any different from that (Interview 29). 
The difference was simply that “the structure they've got just now probably works well” 
(Interview 29). Its success was due to the scale and substance of the change in objective 
conditions, the technical nature of partnership work and the way asymmetries of power 
mean that the expectations and evaluative stances of benefactors, rather than TYT, set 
the direction of normative change. As field structures change and, with them, strategic 
selectivities, so the kinds of evaluative reasoning germane or appropriate for relationships 
within new worlds of concern changes too. In this way, and guided by Sayer’s 
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understanding of values (2011), performance-led values have not simply supplanted 
democratic ones but have emerged as a consequence of the norms and routines 
strategically appropriate for objective structural selectivities, learned and acquired 
through encounters with new actors. It was these routines and attendant technologies, 
intimately linked to shifts in objective field circumstances, that led to appropriate 
evaluative stances being adopted.  
Circuits of oppositional power 
The situational logics which undermined the internal dimension of TYT’s early democratic 
experiment also had a hand in realigning certain external aspects. Indeed, although 
democratic values and ambitions continued to be deeply held by all in the group, their 
incorporation into the daily routine of work was always discordant with systemic 
demands. Reflecting two years later after the abandonment of the deliberative 
democratic architecture, one commentator noted that although they had tried to 
implement a system that they thought was democratic, this obfuscated structural sources 
of power working alongside formal legal and political systems. Rather than focusing on 
the group’s goal of politically emancipatory education and the realisation of human rights, 
it was the principled but inconvenient introduction of what he termed “Western formal 
democratic norms” into the group itself that had, ultimately, proved so unhelpful to the 
more radical edge of TYT strategy (Interview 30). Getting out into remote areas, working 
with and linking lone activists into a broader democratisation movement not by civic 
education – teaching the 2008 Constitution, voter education and so on – but by asking 
political questions, by seeking to understand “what is their understanding of politics, what 
is their everyday politics” (Interview 30). This was purposeful, inclusive engagement which 
sought to connect with a network of activists on their own terms, to both inform and 
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learn from local understandings of politics.80 Initially running alongside but eventually 
displacing this approach to political pedagogy was a teacher / expert-centred method, 
which brought activists in to the classroom to learn the political science of 
democratisation (Interview 26). 
Both may have their merits, but carry different implications for supporters of Myanmar’s 
broader democratic and human rights cause. The country’s democracy movement had 
been of interest to Western powers – and for some in ASEAN too – since the annulled 
1990 elections. Typically, for the former, this had focused on using political and economic 
instruments to force the military from power, and in various ways protecting and 
promoting the opposition leadership and the democratic vehicles they had established, 
while echoing their pronouncements on democracy and human rights. The difficulty of 
doing any major work of political substance in the country had meant that politically-
oriented activity was concentrated along the Thai-Myanmar border and in exile 
populations. Within the country, the democratic credentials of the NLD leadership and 
better established oppositions among student groups – primarily the 88 Generation – 
were taken at their word and, to a lesser extent, those also of ethnic armed groups 
(Interview 45). As described in Chapter 3, whilst alternative centres of political 
organisation did exist, these were underdeveloped. 
The reform era revealed these well-established centres of opposition power, close 
connections between them and their generational condensations of struggle, together 
with no little reverence from civil society and the democracy movement. For some in TYT, 
however, the potential of these forces for establishing democracy was doubted and there 
was a profound disenchantment with opposition leaders. Statements on democracy, 
reconciliation and peace were dismissed as generic and bland, their lack of political ideas 
80 This is clearly reminiscent of Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), although this was never 
explicitly referenced in interviews. 
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and absence of strategic agenda beyond gaining power through election deemed to fall 
short of commitment to ‘genuine democracy’. Everything, in the words of one former 
board member, “was generalised” (Interview 44). They were also uncomfortable with 
nationalist stances (a sentiment shared throughout the organisation) and had a deep 
skepticism of old political symbols of pride such as ‘Panlong spirit’, to the extent of 
incorporating the puncturing of ‘nationalist myths’ to some of the talks they gave around 
the country. Instead, they favoured direct engagement with those participating in various 
sectoral struggles, such as farmers, factory labourers, young ethnic activists frustrated by 
war, radical students, and avoided established centres of opposition power: 
Before [the change in structure], we are more independent, we don’t work for any 
particular political association or political party, we are just trying to be as TYT itself… 
we’re just trying to generate ideas… [we thought] we’ll be able to do something more of a 
radical movement, for something like a vision in Myanmar (Interview 30). 
That this was not comprehensively shared across the organisation was, in earlier times, 
insignificant. But later, historical attachments and individual beliefs which could have 
been safely brushed aside or treated as matters for political discussion abstracted from 
the concrete in previous, undemocratic times mediated by the institution of opposition, 
by shared logics of antagonism, became significant:  
Some board members believed in liberal democracy values, some board members [are 
suspicious about] liberal democracy values. [The latter] support to the democracy from 
below, that will sustain the democracy in future. Some people are slightly reluctant to pick 
up these values, they would like to more encourage with political leaders, to support some 
political parties and political organisations (Interview 44). 
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In fact, all TYT members were equally quite comfortable criticising political leaders, their 
policies and beliefs. Yet once differences in ideology were seen to matter through their 
intermeshing with material decisions, which would prevail? Here we have attempts to 
directly apply political ideas at the socio-cultural level, to consciously guide action through 
ideological reflection. It is important to remember Archer’s point that institutional 
development leads to the appearance of certain situational logics – namely, “constraining 
contradictions” or “concomitant complementarities” between different ideas, either 
disrupting or reinforcing one another (1995: 229-246). Compare, on the one hand, the 
constraining contradictions which spring from an activist distrust of established power 
centres and impulse to engage directly with subaltern groups, but also a desire to make a 
successful education centre, with, on the other hand, the “consistency of components” 
between two hegemonic sets of ideas: a broadly liberal democratic (at least as espoused 
in generic statements) position embraced by the established opposition, and a 
professionalised, resource-generating, relations-building approach to the formalisation of 
organisation. 
Professionalising operations and implementing a hierarchical structure removed TYT from 
grassroots subaltern movements at numerous levels. Firstly, regular organisational 
strategic planning initiated after 2014 made the organisation the axiom of action, rather 
than the various political struggles going on in Myanmar. Whilst the latter were certainly 
recognised, they would be served by effective operation of the organisation. Secondly, 
once again, the building of staff capacity centred around the depoliticised management of 
projects, donor compliance and administration rather the honing of political skills and 
knowledge for fomenting effective political change. Thirdly, the ambition for new projects 
demanded a reputation for neutrality and professionalism in relationships. Project-
oriented goals required conscientious professional management, and reputations for 
radicalism had taken time to shake off. It had become difficult, for example, for TYT to 
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cultivate relationships with local government offices that were necessary for research, 
while relations became similarly strained with interlocutors from the NLD. 
This ethos of office that charges agency mediated by the institution of organisation finds a 
neat fit with an opposition which pulls back from radical politics and is accommodated 
within, rather than poses a challenge to, existing structures of power. The slowly 
unfolding, self-generating compatibility between de-radicalised politics and 
professionalisation, the latent structural orientation of strategic action, may not be easily 
recognised. “This may seem”, to actors like TYT, to be “nothing more than a felicitous 
facilitating influence”. But it is precisely in the easy accommodation between the 
discarding of internal democracy, disengagement from radical constituencies in various 
subaltern movements and the building of professional, depoliticised capacity within staff 
that such easy “facilitation [becomes] a directional influence… It guides thought and 
action along a smooth path, away from stony ground” (Archer 1995: 235). 
Although tensions within organisations are rarely this visibly and openly ideological, the 
processes involved and their implications are no less normative than were seen in other 
organisations. Decisions (or non-decisions) and action regarding strategic orientation are 
realised on the uneven ‘space for civil society’, buckled by the social forces unleashed by 
the state project. The outcome of actions in the face of constraints faced or enablement 
exploited can yield ethical implications and can impact on the ways through which rights 
and responsibilities are realised e.g. whether or not political freedom can be exercised 
through the modality of a democratic organisation. However, the operation of these 
dialectics within politically-oriented civil society is accompanied by a greater sensitivity to 
the meaning of change and the recognition of the gains or losses for broader political 
projects. On this reading, neither camp in TYT’s history deserves to be called idealistic 
more than the other. Both would encounter antecedent societal structures – in this case, 
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a variant of fiduciary mechanisms and, more broadly, the overall direction of incline 
across the NGOised space for civil society. Given the structural selectivities inherent 
within the institution, discordant norms would be sacrificed.  
Pragmatic, evaluative considerations would overdetermine the direction of travel. If “a 
defining attribute of a social movement is ‘the extent to which actions challenge or break 
the limits of a system of social relations’” (Carroll and Ratner 1994: 6), then equally one 
can recognise how participation in hegemonic institutions contributes to the reproduction 
of existing social relations, to the restraints on political imagination, and the 
abandonment of radical projects through pacific subsumption into hegemonic social 
forces. Evaluating this, however, is not straightforward: because newly granted formal 
rights and freedoms had long been demanded by a weary population, many rights-
orientated and democracy groups were wholly inclined towards progressive consolidation 
of these and further gains through the NLD and fair, transparent electoral processes 
rather than needlessly rocking the boat and threatening the delicate process of reform. 
Evaluative stances were well-served by the professionalism of the NGO, not shaken by it. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, political liberalism had been the defining ideology of many in 
the generation of democracy activists, displacing the Marxist orientation of earlier 
activists, a direction encouraged by Western donors and one which underpinned the 
institution of the NGO, and which meshed well with reformist caution. Yet at the same 
time, for leading politically-oriented civil society actors to be so collectively inclined 
demands explanation, and an assessment of the place and potential of alternative 
movements. 
Conclusion 
The example of TYT demonstrates the constraints which can plague attempts to enact 
challenging democratic projects under conditions of NGOising structures, despite the 
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existence of apparently more benign political circumstances. The logics of appropriateness 
of the institutional circumstances that came to animate and organise the repertoires of 
TYT as they sought funding, overseas academic relations and research opportunities were 
oriented around bureaucratic norms that ensured activities were effective and efficient, 
rather than democratic. The ‘space for civil society’ in which TYT grew and sought to gain 
a basis for impact was one which rewarded an orientation towards the embrace of norms 
and conventions of professional management, rather than norms of internal democracy. 
The latter were seen to be more or less inimical to the former: the temporal basis on 
which democratic negotiation depends is ill-equipped to respond with systemically-
mandated alacrity and efficiency.  
Such logics of organisation are also unsuitable for radical democratic ends involving 
subaltern movements. TYT’s attempts to make direct engagement with new land and 
labour movements and ethnic constituencies substituted for income-generating projects 
which depended on relations with, and carried influence within, established centres of 
power. These are attempts to fit values and ideas with the material world in which they 
circulate – despite the value motivation of activists, incongruities can go unnoticed. As it 
was, the professionalised, well-managed organisation served the cause of liberal 
democracy well. On the other hand, “indigenous practices” and the NGO form were 
riddled with contingent incompatibilities.  
None of this should detract from TYT’s significant achievements, and the manner in which 
their credibility and influence soared with its change in organisation and orientation, but 
should instead draw attention to the politics inherent in its course of travel, the social 
forces which have catalysed change and the appropriateness in particular logics mediated 
by the institution of organisation. The contradictory relations between their own 
democratic project and the broader, objective processes that were shaping 
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democratisation in the wider Myanmar context were a rude awakening for TYT’s radical 
faction. The failure of their democratic project meant that an organisation committed to 
realising the right to informed, democratic participation could not itself benefit from its 
teachings. Whilst newly-influential structures would not yield to democratic organisation, 

















Case study 3: Civil disobedience and the underground opposition 
network 
Introduction 
Despite distinctive journeys, the first two case studies dealt with what might be termed 
the standard working of the institution of the NGO: nothing could be thought to 
characterise NGOisation more than the development of the formal organisation itself and 
the systemic elimination of disruptive characteristics. Despite continued political 
engagement, this came to be mediated by institutional logics that closed down 
alternative, counter-hegemonic options despite the wealth of unique non-NGOised 
resource in the form of a large volunteer corps and an “indigenous”, democratic decision-
making processes. Outcomes of NGOising mechanisms – seen in depoliticisation, with 
hegemonic boundaries of opposition politics becoming increasingly common sense, and 
professionalisation – might be softened or exacerbated by contingencies, but ultimately 
configurational peculiarities and value orientations of EAW and TYT were more or less 
overcome, controlled and leveled out. 
Yet rather than simply being restricted to the production of compliant organisations, 
NGOisation as I understand it is a collection of mechanisms that impacts across civil 
society (and, indeed, given the forces involved, beyond it.) The heterogeneity of its 
movements makes it an impetuous overgeneralisation to assume that the endpoint will 
always be a well-run, standard NGO. Repertoires may equally be wholly incompatible for 
NGOised logics of appropriateness, with actor values vehemently disinclining them 
towards accommodation and compromise. This final case study deals with such an 
example, stemming from Myanmar’s oppositional tradition which for decades, mainly in 
the student movement, actively pursued the overthrow of the military junta and its 




The détente introduced by Thein Sein’s reformist administration in 2011, government 
willingness to attend to long-standing issues in an inclusive manner and the re-
establishment of international relationships focused attentions upwards, on politics at the 
highest level. Optimism for democracy and human rights was emboldened by indications 
of reconciliation, with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the embodiment of liberal hopes81, 
in 2010, and hundreds of other political prisoners months later; but also because of the 
nascent free and open political party system, the flexing of independent muscles in the 
new legislatures – “taking seriously their role as a check-and-balance on the executive” 
(Kumar 2012: 8) – and the apparent willingness of the executive to grapple with the most 
difficult questions of peace, economic and governance reform. Such “a remarkable top-
down transition” (International Crisis Group 2012: 1) necessarily focused most 
commentator gazes upwards rather than down toward the response of opposition 
networks, politically-oriented human rights defender and democracy activist networks. 
In Chapter 3 I described the politics and oppositional logics of these networks. Stoicism in 
the face of politically-motivated harassment, imprisonment, isolation and torture lent 
symbolic renown to the 88 Generation and also to those arrested in 1996 and 1998, and 
to Generation Wave after the 2007 protests (Interview 18). The most reputable assumed 
a degree of moral leadership among activists, tempered by splits and differences in 
politics. Despite the drift towards cooperation and constructive partnerships between 
once opposition civil society actors, international development partners and government 
noted in earlier case studies, the oppositional network tradition continued to flourish 
alongside this détente. Indeed, this tendency was refreshed with new movement actors 
81 As noted in Thein Sein’s inaugural address : “there are so many individuals and unlawful organisations inside 
and outside the nation that do not accept the State’s Seven Step Road Map and the Constitution… They are all 
citizens of our country. Therefore, they have to accept our government as their government constituted with 
national races of their own” (Thein Sein 2011). 
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exposing the gap between the government’s rights rhetoric and reality in particular issue 
areas: after 2012, land rights, labour rights and education reform brought together 
activists, some of whom had been involved in student politics in earlier decades. 
Networks linked human rights campaigners with individuals and groups directly affected 
by social and political decisions: examples include farmers linked through the network 
Land In Our Hands, sacked union members through WE Generation (Interview 41) and 
students and teachers via the National Network for Educational Reform and revitalised 
student unions. 
I will return to these new network groups later, contrasting them with developments in a 
pre-existing network associated with the broader democracy and human rights 
movement. The experiences of these activists and the fortunes of their groups in recent 
years are particularly instructive with regard to the prospects for and continued relevance 
of oppositional, civil disobedience repertoires under the dominance of the institution of 
organisation and its formal organisational norms. This case study focuses on NEVC, a 
group constituted by much older links and networks between ‘cells’ of human rights and 
democracy activists in different locations across Myanmar. 
To understand the events, figures, groups and so on surrounding 1988 is a separate work 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important, however, to recognise the geographic 
extension of the democratic opposition movement linked to the student-led 
demonstrations of 1988, and their fate following SLORC’s assumption of power following 
the May 1990 general election. Whilst the main images and accounts of 1988 focus on the 
day of the General Strike in Yangon in 8/8/88, the rapid disintegration in totalitarian rule 
that preceded the downfall of the BSPP was a nationwide phenomenon that had lasted 
for months. Weeks before the August demonstrations, 
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[i]n Yangon, Mandalay, Pyi, Taunggyi and other towns and cities in central and Northern 
Myanmar, there were increasing signs of the collapse of public order as economic 
necessity, petty complaints, and religious tensions exploded… into demonstrations and 
riots (Taylor 2009: 384). 
These involved many different groups and individuals, but university (and even high 
school) students featured prominently. Assisted by elements of the monastic order, 
joined by high school students and professional groups – including disgruntled civil 
servants – the breakdown in state order and shortages of basic needs led to attempts to 
coordinate day-to-day activities of public management through popular committees. 
These remained active until the military reinstated control through a September 1988 
coup, establishing rule of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The 
nationwide character of the popular uprisings of 1988 were built on through national 
party political apparatus developed to campaign for seats in the 1990 general elections, 
with an overwhelming majority of popular democratic forces siding and working with the 
National League for Democracy. 
Despite annulment of the NLD’s electoral victory and waves of imprisonments, repression 
of NLD and other political party activities, regular closure of universities and the 
curtailment of other associational liberties by SLORC, and the retreat into jungle or exile 
by prominent activists, those personal relations between those central to the popular 
uprising persisted. Some two decades after 1988, NEVC emerged as one associational 
offshoot of the various groups which formed part of the movement. Describing itself as an 
“umbrella organisation for all human rights defenders in Burma” (NEVC 2014), it was 
headed by Kyaw, an individual who had held a prominent position in the student union 
movement during the 1988 uprising and had subsequently joined the armed struggle of 
the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF): “I didn’t believe the non-violence way. 
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To have human rights and to have a democratic state, that’s why I became a member of 
the ABSDF” (Interview 20). Arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1991, he was 
released in 1999, but arrested again in 2002. Following release in 2006 he reestablished 
links with other prominent 1988 student leaders as they resumed their activism, 
culminating in their involvement in demonstrations that preceded the mass protests of 
September 2007, for which he was again imprisoned. 
His perspective on the place of violence in forcing political transformation changed in the 
early 2000s through a combination of pragmatism and a growing sense of moral 
repugnance, but it would only be in 2009 that these shifts in thought were consolidated in 
a new approach to activism. After release from prison, he joined educational programmes 
developed by international organisations based in Yangon. These initiatives had become 
more widespread, open and popular among political actors during his final period of 
incarceration. In contrast with his past as a political activist, these studies were notable 
for emphasis not on political strategy or criticism of the government but on the basics of 
liberal democracy, problems of globalisation, human rights and other topics more familiar 
to students of international studies in the West than opposition strategists. Although 
benefiting from professional instruction, this was a similar reading group to those which 
had inspired the movement behind TYT. A place on a free educational programme run by 
the British Council had introduced Kyaw to new international contacts and opportunities, 
including participation in a global programme called Active Citizens (British Council 2017).  
This capacity building programme was designed in the UK for civic volunteers across the 
world, though probably with those in less politically charged circumstances in mind than 
those experienced by Kyaw. With some adaptation to make it relevant for local actors, the 
Active Citizens curriculum became the template for NEVC’s educational work. 
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This was a significant intellectual influence on Kyaw, filling the vacuum that had followed 
repudiation of armed struggle:  
My ideas started to change… after the programmes of training, I well know about the 
parliament and cultural diversity, how to work together for the human beings not for the 
nationality. At that time I know – if we organise the people well, if we can work together, 
we can achieve our destination…not the armed struggle way, but the peaceful way – if can 
organise well all the people, all the nationalities, all the ethnicities, all the classes we can 
abolish the military regime (Interview 20). 
Students were encouraged to ‘cascade’ what they had learned, which saw Kyaw 
substantively reconnecting with the networks and constituencies that made up part of his 
earlier oppositional work. Although finances were restricted, he was able to organise and 
hold cascading workshops in various parts of the country and reconnect with groups 
formed from or with historic links to the 1988 uprising. These were attended by a total of 
around 500 individuals, hailing from a variety of parent groups and associations including 
student and workers’ unions, political parties – dominated by the NLD and ethnic parties – 
youth organisations and social welfare groups such as free funeral and blood donation 
associations. Together with Active Citizens activities, NEVC’s work would be a dizzying 
admixture of overtly depoliticised training programmes exploring culture, identity, 
intercultural dialogue and discussions and analysis of topical issues, and protests and 
human rights defence work for victims of land rights. 
Many in the core group of NEVC were therefore seasoned activists. During 2013 and 2014, 
members of the group made numerous protests at land confiscation sites in different 
parts of the country on behalf of, and sometimes alongside, the evicted. By this stage of 
the reform process such public actions could be undertaken if not with the expectation of 
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success, then at least with more tolerance from the authorities82. As the supposed 
blossoming of rule of law contrasted with continued human rights violations and a 
predilection for courts to punish the victims, imprisoning farmers and labour activists, 
participation in protests by NEVC leaders were an important vector of grievance. 
The elevation of education 
Yet there was a sentiment, certainly held by Kyaw, that despite its visceral and expressive 
satisfactions, and, more purposefully, its potential to raise awareness of injustice through 
an increasingly free media, protests were both ineffective in resolving grievances and, 
more surprisingly, were unnecessary.  
Before 2012, we call the political situation destructive politics. The authorities use their 
power to oppress the people, so we have to against their power… After 2012, the political 
situation is a little changed. We call it ‘constructive politics’. To pass the transitional period 
with achievement you have to know some laws, some theories, some techniques. We have 
to learn. It’s not enough just only with the courage [to protest], you must be intelligence, 
you must know something to pass this period (Interview 20). 
Coupled with this were NEVC’s structural and social limitations as a member-based 
network formed by individuals hailing from a variety of parent organisations and with a 
leadership scattered across the country. Coordination was haphazard and the thematic 
patchwork implied by human rights defence work hampered any coherent social or 
political programme; despite a Steering Committee, central direction was limited.  
In light of these dual concerns, Kyaw began to emphasise the urgent need to empower a 
new generation more directly through education; as seen in the TYT case study, education 
82 This was true even if actual outcomes differed widely from occasion to occasion, mainly due to ‘sensitivity’ – 
this can be broken down into factors like the political economy of the issue (the involvement of military 
personnel in projects), the physical location of the protest, its timing and so on. 
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was a potent leitmotif for many activists. There were some key differences rooted in 
origins and extant relationships between this work and that of TYT which demonstrated 
the overwhelmingly oppositional rather than intellectual heritage of NEVC. Initially, the 
shift in focus to educational work in NEVC was closely allied to supporting informed 
participation in members’ parent groups. This furthered the rights-oriented agenda of 
NEVC and the umbrella status that it claimed for human rights defenders around the 
country. Political content was focused less around technical knowledge disseminated by 
TYT, nor the civic education taught by voter education groups, and more toward training 
in the ‘soft skills’ thought to be required to bring about a democratic, rights-respecting 
vision for Myanmar society. One training proposal made explicit reference to activities in 
the Active Citizens framework which had captured Kyaw’s imagination during training 
seminars in Yangon: 
“Identity and Culture” can explain them why the conflict take place and how to do to 
overcome it... “Me and You Dialogue” can lead them to peaceful co-existence and “Johari 
window” can help them to work together with understanding for their communities (NEVC 
2013). 
Political engagement would continue to be promoted. In the same NEVC document, the 
rather lofty objectives of this strand of training was to  
give [students] the awareness about the international and the domestic affairs and to 
train them to be political-minded, to love truth and beauty of diversities, peace, to respect 
the values of democracy, freedom and to have willingness to work for the motherland 
(ibid.). 
The selection criteria was overwhelmingly tilted towards young people interested in and 
willing to get involved in political activity, although participating parent organisations 
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were often more social in orientation rather than directly political: blood donation groups, 
free funeral providers, teachers in monastic education centres and so on sent participants 
to these trainings. In its deployment of an older generation of seasoned activists and 
former political prisoners as teachers, NEVC became a network that forged connections 
across multiple dimensions: across Myanmar’s geographical space, its social space – given 
the types of actors and ethnicities involved – and, crucially, with the involvement of elders 
from the protest movement as mobilisers and teachers of youth, across time: 
we will invite some leaders from the political fields and let them talk to the participants so 
that the students and youth can have the willingness to work for our country and they will 
become brave to talk even with the leaders and later they will love democracy and 
freedom (ibid.). 
Spurred to change – the emergence of LMA 
Events were held when time and resource allowed, meaning Kyaw’s involvement with 
NEVC was, like that of many in Myanmar’s political opposition, a part-time activity. Whilst 
holding a coordinating role in NEVC, he was simultaneously creating his own organisation 
based in Yangon, LMA. Like NEVC, this initially combined education with non-formal 
political participation emphasising peace building and student politics. Indeed, any 
organisational distance between the two entities initially appeared negligible, with LMA 
merely an appellation for a geographically-restricted (Yangon) subsection of the NEVC 
activity. Yet its launch proper followed a series of demonstrations and subsequent prison 
sentences involving NEVC members, incidents which would function as crucial learning 
encounters for Kyaw. 
On 30th July, 2013 a demonstration was held which involved an NEVC network leader, 
alongside three alleged victims of land evictions in Yangon’s Hlegu Township, whose 
concerns some in the network had taken up. Despite a court decision that found the land 
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had been taken illegally, no subsequent request from the court had been made to return 
the land back to those claiming it. This was a far from uncommon occurrence in Myanmar 
at this time, and neither was the protest staged in response. Against the provisions laid 
down in Myanmar’s Peaceful Processions and Peaceful Assembly Act (2011)83, no request 
for permission to demonstrate had been submitted in advance to the authorities. The 
protest involved holding aloft banners, shouting slogans demanding a return of the land 
and alleging complicity of state officials in the land seizures; arrested, the protesters, 
including the NEVC leader, were later sentenced to over 10 years in prison. 
A year later, other members of NEVC were arrested after protests distributing which 
involved the distribution of leaflets in markets and other public places in Yangon in June 
and July, 2014. These were fiercely critical of the Thein Sein administration, and called on 
serving MPs to step down and give way to an administration headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Sentenced on 30 October 2014 to two years and four months imprisonment, the activist 
had also received a letter from the NEVC member jailed previously, in which the latter 
communicated the need to replace the USDP-led government with an interim 
government. Courts used Section 505(b) of the Myanmar Penal Code, frequently used in 
cases relating to freedom of expression, to prosecute both cases: this litigates against 
“[w]hoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report… with intent 
to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the 
public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or 
against the public tranquility”. 
These imprisonments significantly affected the management capacity of NEVC, disrupting 
already muddled coordination efforts. More fundamentally, the cases prompted 
reflection on the part of Kyaw, instigating transition in the network that culminated in the 
83 The law was updated in 2014, but was still considered to fall well short of international standards. 
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emergence proper of LMA. The appearance of LMA was not a simple politically-motivated 
action in response to potential fallout for Kyaw or for NEVC, an attempt by a core group to 
distance themselves from these incidents. Rather, it marked a deeper, double split: firstly, 
disillusionment and departure from civil disobedience, and a concomitant shift in 
practices toward those requiring longer-term planning embedded in community 
development; and secondly, a corresponding identification of and break with contrasting 
sets of objectives: “rights-based objectives” and “development-based objectives” 
(Interview 21), the values these connote and their relevance to Myanmar’s changed 
political landscape. 
LMA emerged as a very different entity to its NEVC forerunner in two principal ways. 
Firstly, education became more than a means to enable more active and informed 
political participation, either through the content of education provided or through the 
channels created for youth to engage with more experienced political activists. LMA now 
promoted itself as a community development organisation, based around a physical 
location: a single, somewhat makeshift classroom on the upper floor of a small, two-
storey wooden house in one of Yangon’s poorest townships. The location was unlikely to 
make students feel out of place, fitting perfectly into its environs. Under LMA, education 
consisted in the main of supplementary classes to those provided at regular state schools, 
to enable children to successfully complete their matriculation process. English language 
tuition was also provided. Kyaw’s management alongside other experienced political 
activists meant that some previously taught material from the Active Citizens modules 
would still be taught to the students and, as will be noted below, many students were 
galvanised to get involved in social activities, including demonstrations and 
commemorations of political events and community work such as litter picking. In this 
way it was linked to models of citizenship and republican ideals which, rather than 
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focusing on grievances, seek to impart the knowledge and skills necessary for better 
informed, historically aware participation in the polis: 
Not only do we teach them additional school, we teach them to love the environment, we 
attend annual ceremony like 8/8/88 and General Aung San’s [centennial birth 
commemoration] (Interview 20). 
Tuition was no longer so directly integrated with participation in political action. 
Educational activity was designed for students from poor, peripheral urban areas of 
Yangon who were selected and given places on the programme because of need, rather 
than a selection made on the basis of political considerations by network leaders. Despite 
the additional civic component, LMA functioned as a supplement to the woefully under-
resourced state education sector in the manner of other non-formal education efforts. 
Government curricula guided extra tuition in a manner little different to monastic 
education institutes, community-run schools and other NGO efforts (Lorch 2007). 
Secondly, LMA saw themselves as initiators of change through substantially different 
processes to that of NEVC. Demonstrations and agitation were understood as ultimately 
inconsequential – to “follow up these activities was very difficult” (Interview 21), while 
the loss of NEVC capacity following the imprisonment of other board members also meant 
a serious reconsideration of the costs and benefits associated with this approach. A 
complete volte-face saw Kyaw employing techniques unfolding over longer time horizons. 
Beyond the classroom, Kyaw sought to build on the reputation and links which the school 
had already gained in the community, but retain the focus on personal capacity building. 
LMA would become an adult education and careers guidance centre. Basic internet and 
email proficiency had always been among the skills taught alongside some of the Active 
Citizens-inspired classes run by NEVC; here the ambition was to integrate them not into 
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an agenda of political opposition and political networking but into vocational training 
programmes that would bolster individual job opportunities.  
Instead of running on an irregular basis, engaging in work whenever funding or 
opportunities became available, a school committee had been formed to run, manage and 
– with teachers on the committee – implement activity in the school. Exhibiting, for the 
first time, a stable set of role positions and functional relationships between them, this 
lent LMA a geographically restricted, stable structure – a semi-permanent activity fitting 
in the rhythms of orthodox organisational life both demanded that structure and made it 
possible. This was also a basis from which to develop and expand its activities; with this 
basis rooted in a geographically delimited concrete community, a job and skills centre 
would build on this. The ambition to work for progressive political change had far from 
disappeared, but its praxis had changed radically. The new incarnation was concerned 
with achieving a strategic outmaneuvering of the military and its proxy political parties, 
challenging votes for money. Taking an example beneficiary, Kyaw explained his theory of 
change thus: 
[If] he gets a good job he can influence family members, but he is also influenced by us. 
Because of our help and support he got a good job, he admires us so he will accept our 
advice about voting... USDP party lends money with low rate, so most of the poor people 
borrow and by this way they become members of the party… if they get good jobs they 
won’t need [USDP] money (Interview 21). 
Although the school was an important community resource, as a logic of political change 
it nevertheless appeared romantically hopeful. Understanding the direction of change 




Analysis: a freedom, of sorts 
Rather than taking on the vestiges of the military authoritarian state on the grounds of 
justice, Kyaw now situated political strategy on the basis of a modernist faith in the 
interplay between development and human rights, seeing a positive, progressive political 
climate as something more likely to emerge when people can’t be bought into supporting 
causes detrimental to human rights. As Donnelly notes, “those living on the economic 
edge, or with no realistic prospect of a better life for their children, are less likely to be 
willing to accommodate the interests of others or respect their rights” (2013: 218). Kyaw 
counterposed this work to the activities of NEVC, characterising it more as development 
work rather than human rights work:  
LMA is a little different, it’s only interested in development, they develop training, they 
help the people, they share the knowledge to the young people. NEVC has no ambition for 
development (Interview 21). 
This is far from an example of a once-politically motivated organisation abandoning 
principled activity to instead run along more pragmatically-framed ideals. Radical 
literature on social movement organisations contains many such examples, with changes 
commonly linked to processes set in motion by co-optation into processes of capitalist 
development (see Choudry and Kapoor 2010; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005), and the earlier 
case study on EAW detailed a slide into co-opted service delivery. Yet Kyaw remained a 
political activist, with no pretense at being a professional development worker with an 
assured command of technical development techniques. Superficially, the new initiative 
resembled other community-based projects offering free services to the poor in 
Myanmar, such as free clinics, funeral services and non-formal supplementary education. 
Unlike these efforts, however, an anti-militarist political objective remained discursively 
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active84, and Kyaw maintained his links with human rights defender networks across the 
country and continued to play an educator role at workshops, with LMA forming the basis 
for (unsuccessful) proposals to fund this work. 
The changing legitimacy of civil disobedience in changing times 
Whilst the rights and wrongs of violence against Myanmar’s government was a topic of 
hot debate, concerns over the legitimacy of civil disobedience were little issue for 
politically-oriented civil society, nor for supporters of human rights and democratic cause 
beyond Myanmar. As Chapter 3 showed, although rarely publicly manifested in main 
urban areas, oppositional activity involved a range of repertoires of contention – mainly 
episodic protests and various campaigns – that were often deemed illegal but received 
normative approbation from politically-oriented civil society as a strategic response to 
state violence85. Yet as state reforms created new structures which legalised NGO-based 
activity, normative presuppositions encoded in logics of organisational appropriateness 
would crowd out those still wedded to oppositional logics. It was no longer enough to 
make power visible through tried-and-tested tools and techniques, and then confront it. 
Alternative, legal and – apparently – effective routes to making rights claims and 
expressing discontent were now available. Not only could organisations partner with 
government and INGOs to solve issues, citizens could finally vote in free and open 
elections. Through the evidence-based work of formal – sometimes registered – entities, 
it challenges government constructively and according to publicly made laws in its role as 
a watchdog. It does not ‘throw stones’. As Kyaw went on to assert in reference to the 
84 “Service provision” also fails to capture the radical history of this repertoire in Myanmar, as detailed in the 
Chapter 3. Again, the political effects of a particular kind of social activity have to be seen in their relational 
contexts. 
85 As Beetham, in pursuit of a slightly different point, notes, “normative grounds or reasons are not the only 
reasons people have for obedience [to a moral norm]… power relations are almost always constituted by a 
framework of incentives and sanctions” (1991: 26-27).  
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direct action tactics of NEVC, “for the state-building process, it makes political trouble… 
CSO and CBO activities should support [a] compromising process” (Interview 21). 
This case study is the clearest of all three in demonstrating the obduracy of values. Far 
from an expression of a pathologically irrational oppositional culture developed in the 
face of glaring evidence of the reasonable and instrumentally useful, values emerge and 
are retained as a result of interaction with something. This was much more than a hard 
habit to shake; it was a premise of a political movement of dissent that unified and 
informed organisation. Fractious alliances were well-served and political differences 
obscured by a common cause, and compromise was difficult when the everyday labour of 
human rights defenders continued to be informed by oppositional values. Principled 
rejection of military government, including its vestiges in the reform administration and 
extensive repressive infrastructure in the police and judicial system, was borne from 
decades of interaction with military rule, and reinforced through the configuration of 
organisation. 
At the same time, the hopes of government by consent raised after the 2012 by-elections 
and realisation of other basic democratic principles could be expected to prompt doubts 
about the continued acceptability of civil disobedience. What was important for elite 
actors was ensuring that the “democratisation of Myanmar [continued] to remain on 
track” (The Economist 2013). Actions which could be detrimental to relations with and the 
flourishing of the new reform administration were poorly thought of among donors and 
elite actors, hence the shifting of funds away from opposition groups in Thailand and into 
Myanmar, requirements for grantees to work with local authorities in donor funded work 
and so on. This spoke not only of trust in government intentions but recognition of the 
legitimacy of its rule. Civil disobedience contradicted claims to legitimacy, as their 
deployment by principled actors indicated a thread connecting past to present that was 
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all too often obscured by the euphoria of restored relations. Like many activists and 
victims of human rights violations in Myanmar, NEVC perceived little change in the nature 
of the rulers. In continuing to deploy these techniques, it not only threatened to humiliate 
and delegitimise government efforts – “serv[ing] to weaken or undermine whatever moral 
authority a government possesses” (Beetham 1991: 211) – but also to unsettle 
international actors’ claims to stand for human rights while forging links with the new 
government. 
Whilst values and evaluation might be based on reason and linked to perceptions of 
objective conditions, there is no relation of infallibility between claims or actions informed 
by them and social reality (Sayer 2011: 39). Such stubborn activist pessimism may be 
objectively unwarranted. Yet it was widely accepted – even by the government itself – 
that in reform era Myanmar, actual political change coexisted uneasily with continued 
human rights violations. Whilst the international community praised the steps taken by 
the reformist administration86, INGOs and NGOs wondered at their ‘space’ and the 
Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners (CSRPP) sought to facilitate 
Thein Sein’s pledge to clear Myanmar’s jails of all political prisoners before 2014, critical 
voices maintained that this “represents a smokescreen and political tool to garner 
international favor without having to change policies within the country” (Assistance 
Association for Political Prisoners / Burma Partnership 2014: 2). Critics pointed to “the 
ongoing arrest, detention, charging and imprisoning of [human rights defenders], activists 
and peaceful protesters” during political reform, a “revolving door” policy of release and 
imprisonment (ibid.). 
Concern for farmers evicted by crony and military affiliated businesses, and an 
unwavering respect for the historical struggle of the 88 Generation and the sacrifices of 
86 Highly public visits to Myanmar were made by representatives from Western nations, including David 
Cameron, Barack Obama and Catherine Ashton. 
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later political prisoners, were shared among individuals holding more positive views of the 
Thein Sein administration. Confrontation was challenged, however, on grounds of lack of 
effectiveness. Whilst such actions might be justifiable, their demonstrable historic inability 
to lead to redress, coupled with the availability of new methods of making human rights 
claims meant continued direct action was not only ineffective but potentially damaging to 
slow, incremental but apparently real progress. Messaging from local and international 
actors on civil society frequently presented an opportunities / challenges dichotomy, 
placing the onus on civil society to recognise and respond accordingly to opportunities 
that had been presented to them: 
Myanmar has undergone tremendous economic and political changes; however, there are 
key issues such as rule of law and limited exercise of basic rights that still need to be 
addressed… Myanmar’s civil society plays a key role in shaping this transformation by 
furthering and consolidating democracy… At the same time, it will be an important 
opportunity for representatives of the opposition and civil society to demonstrate whether 
they can fulfil the role of political and social partners representing the needs of all 
Myanmar citizens. This is the context in which civil society will play a significant role in the 
coming few years and as such, it is important to understand their capacity to respond to 
the changing needs of society (People in Need 2014: 9). 
 More fundamentally, given structural shifts – the legality of associations, the openness of 
government to discussion and dialogue and the resource made available to support 
initiatives – the intransigence of NEVC was not just ineffective, nor just potentially 
destabilising: in its apparent inability to perceive objective changes, its stance was also 
emptied of reason. A relic of outmoded thinking, rooted in an oppositional culture which, 
given reform and the shift from ‘government as enemy’ to ‘government as potential 
partner’, must be shaken off in order to build more positive, mutually supportive 
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relationships. Illegality had begun to connote illegitimacy. An early signal of advancing 
institutional change was received by NEVC from once-supportive international human 
rights organisations, coming as a shock and a wake-up call to Kyaw: 
[After the arrests] some international organisations remark that NEVC are radicalists, 
activists. [They told us that] you have elections, to appoint the government is not the duty 
of your organisation but of the citizen. [This international organisation standing for human 
rights defenders] always mention about NEVC, they lobby to get a human rights prize for 
NEVC… [but because of this] we didn’t get a prize (Interview 21). 
Whilst liberal political thought, from Locke through to Rawls and Walzer, countenances 
civil disobedience (in the abstract) for civil society (in the abstract), in actuality it is 
foreclosed as a legitimate activity when counteracted by logics of organisational 
appropriateness. Its unacceptability is latent in donor projects which look to build positive 
relations between civil society and the different formal state institutions – between civil 
society and local authorities (EU), the police (USAID), the Union Election Commission 
(USAID, NDI) – and through formal dispute resolution mechanisms. Capacity building aims 
in advocacy skills, policy dialogue and so forth aims to provide NGOs with the power to 
influence government decision-making.  
Yet whilst responsible civil society was ushered away from involvement in illegal acts, it 
could of course still represent and support those who had been on the receiving end of 
state injustice. An embrace of such an instrumental use of the law and other solutions is 
at the same time expressive and involves a change in values, a shift in norms that places 
trust in the power of the Myanmar state’s (formal) institutions. LMA’s decision to move 
away from activities based on opposition to government and unjust government decisions 
was made following an act of state coercive power that, not so long ago, might have been 
claimed as a vindication of the truth and morality of their approach; now the encroaching 
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institution of the NGO had begun to colonise the peripheral zones of civil society where 
NEVC were located, such an outcome was something of an embarrassment. Kyaw spoke 
of a gradual awareness that NEVC was an anachronism: 
NEVC is just a kind of activist [group]… in NEVC there is no capacity building training, it’s 
just an activists’ organisation, they always protest for the rights. There [are] two types of 
work: activities for rights and activities for development; NEVC is only activities for rights, 
they always promote and protest about the rights, they never try for the development 
issue (Interview 21). 
Out of step with new networks 
With significant international trust invested in Myanmar’s democratisation and reform 
process, and with increased opportunities for civil society actors to engage with or even 
‘partner’ with state entities, NEVC’s oppositional stance was an unfashionable one not 
only among prominent, powerful actors and institutions involved in the reform process 
but among many local NGOs too. Despite sharing a common oppositional background 
with TYT and EAW, the latter groups had solidified into single organisational entities at an 
early stage. This hastened their professionalisation, development of regimes of 
competence and in a virtuous circle saw them quickly develop close relationships with 
reformist actors, including donors and other reputable local and international 
organisations. Political ideals, activist norms and repertoires adapted through interaction 
with institutionalising forces.  
For NEVC, their network form was a geographical and thematic admixture, an articulation 
of opposition that owed more to memories of strategic responses of the past than 
selectivities of structural development today. Lacking anything like dominant institutional 
form, they were also more or less cut off from donors and other major national or 
international entities, although some support in the form of statements of solidarity were 
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forthcoming from a handful of international organisations (although see above). Both the 
political-oppositional stance and the loose network arrangement limited the support 
required for reproduction, cutting off a lifeline to information: as institutional changes 
accelerated through the reform period, Kyaw’s lack of proximity to the intelligibilia of the 
institution of organisation became telling. Impacted by the institution but out of reach of 
institutionalising processes, NEVC appeared increasingly anachronistic. Structural change 
had eroded its capacity for impact, without institutionalisation creating a ready 
replacement. 
Yet it is not the case that rights entities like NEVC had to, as it were, ‘NGOise or die’. 
Indeed, the network form of civil society organising, as the Women’s Organisation 
Network (WON) example in the EAW case study showed, began to flourish during this 
period of Myanmar’s development. Yet there were crucial differences between these and 
NEVC. Rather than networking as a strategic movement response to repressive conditions 
(now significantly lessened), evading security services and spreading resource extensively, 
new networks were instrumental and normative arrangements that responded to the 
limitations of the NGO and formed around a common agenda. This does not mean that all 
can be understood as equally counter-hegemonic; indeed, reflecting the impact of 
structural mechanisms, some (unsurprisingly, the largest and more established) now had 
infrastructure, resourcing and full-time staffing arrangements that rivaled member NGOs, 
and as repositories of expert information oriented upwards to government or 
intergovernmental power.  
Whilst there is no hiding place from the force of structures, there is always the 
(ontological) possibility of reflecting on power and, through deliberate political acts and 
formations, setting out to overcome structures and their selective tendencies. Some 
networks had deliberately formed to pursue more radical political agendas. Land In Our 
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Hands (LIOH), “a multi-ethnic network made up of more than 60 local farmers 
organisations, supportive civil society organisations, and allied civil society organisations 
and ethnic rights activists from fourteen states and regions across the country” had 
formed links to “promote, protect, respect and fulfill human rights and tenure rights of 
small-scale farmers and fishers” (Lands In Our Hands Network 2015: 8). Bringing together 
those on the front line of human rights violations with urban-based, politically-inspired 
(the slogan “Land for people, not for profit!” prominent on the back cover of the (2015) 
report) and tactically nimble activists, this network – far from the only land rights group to 
emerge during political reform – adapted to selectivities of the objective terrain while 
seeking to challenge certain expressions and sources of power. 
LIOH are from what might be called a new generation of politically-oriented civil society 
networks and groups to emerge as a visible force in the reform era. “Informal”, “mostly 
unregistered” and linked together in networks along particular rights thematic areas and 
closely wedded to communities, many have benefitted from support from the long-
running programme civil society support programme, Paung Ku87 (Phuah et al. 2016: 13). 
This eschewed empowerment and capacity building centred on projects and 
organisational sustainability, and instead looked to support action, linkages and reflection 
tailored to the needs of small groups that “advocate for grassroots voices” (Interview 39).  
Out of touch with new developments, NEVC found their influence on the wane in the 
latter part of the reform era and, after 2015, into NLD rule. Situated in communities of 
practice that were committed and emotionally attached to confrontation but, through 
overwhelming commitment to values and insufficient resource, unable to reflect on the 
possibility of adjusting those logics and repertoires into strategies that would both 
challenge state power and achieve results, rights-based protest was, for Kyaw, consigned 
87 Meaning ‘bridge’ in Burmese. 
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to the past. NEVC’s successor organisation, LMA, found a niche in what Kyaw termed the 
“constructive politics” after 2012, and dismissed the “bravery” associated with “rights-
based” protests as thoroughly unwelcome in today’s context:  
Before 2012, OK – we protest. When we have to decide we decided to protest… without 
thinking of the further results, whether they arrest me or not we never consider. But now 
we have to consider – we can send the application letter to the authorities, they give the 
permission… the procedure and the situation has changed. We have to follow the 
situation, because we work for the people, so we should not neglect the current situation 
so that’s why our activities are more on the development issue (Interview 22). 
Conclusion 
Co-optation and depoliticisation, usually involving cunning absorption by state or 
corporate behemoth, only represent the operation of only one set of mechanisms by 
which shifts in the cultural political economy can serve to alter and constrain grassroots 
political imaginaries. In this more nuanced and mundane example, against a background 
of structural change constituted by reformed legal relationships between government and 
civil society actors, a combination of local events and international opinion together with 
an absence of resource and social connections served as the basis for a reflection on the 
illegitimacy of the confrontational and oppositional tactics which Kyaw had grown up 
with. Surveying the new environment of formal rights, Kyaw was anxious to preserve and 
build on what had been granted: “Now we can set up an organisation. Before 2012 we 
have no rights” (Interview 22). He was far from alone in this liberal progressivist 
perspective, seeing the situation as an imperfect but useful basis from which to work. 
Whilst the strategic objectives of political opposition might have remained, this account 
shows an attempt to articulate these with approaches more consonant with altered 
institutional circumstances. The objective grounding on which oppositional, 
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confrontational values were based was seen to have collapsed, leading to reflection and a 
profound change in direction. It is possible to say that Kyaw was wrong in his assessment 
of Myanmar after 2012, and he well understood that conflict and rights disputes 
continued. Construction of a public political sphere and its gradual acceptance by 
institutional stakeholders – government, donors and certain local and international civil 
society actors alike – had shaken the legitimacy of involvement in protest-related 
activism. At the same time, new groups were embedded in politically smart, networked 
forms of collective action and engagement with human rights victims. Under-resourced 
and on the margins of civil society activity, unable to access intelligibilia to help 
understand new configurations and opportunities, assessment that oppositional logics 
were irrelevant and outmoded was late, dramatic and costly.  
Whilst NEVC’s successor organisation, LMA, is in no way a model NGO, this further 
illustrates how social structures associated with NGOisation processes can operate at the 
level of the real whilst producing actual results which vary greatly. In the face of such 
apparently heterogeneous phenomena and a realist awareness of the importance of 
concrete circumstances, can any generalisations about NGOisation be made? Is it possible 
to draw any theoretical or practical conclusions about politically–oriented civil society, 








Chapter 6. After the institution? Human 
rights, state power and networks 
 
Impacts of the institution 
The case studies in Chapter 5 show how the powers of the institution of organisation 
mediate development from an earlier, pre-institutionalised phase of civil society 
characterised by logics of opposition and accommodation to a new phase dominated by 
the institution of organisation and a logic of appropriateness orientating civil society 
actors to action within the strategic selectivities of the institutional field. Appropriate 
ways of dealing with a structural context in which organisational survival, rule of law and a 
subordinate relation to government are predominant is through the enactment of 
projects and contracts, legal actions and political action that avoid structural challenge. 
These are the visible signs of NGOisation. At the same time, the impact of the institution is 
greatly affected by countervailing mechanisms and contingencies, including the values 
held by members of the organisation, the degree to which they were shaped by the 
earlier logics of opposition or accommodation and the willingness to compromise and find 
congruence with the terms on which social struggle will now take place. 
For EAW, whose politics were premised on humanitarian and community development 
objectives, institutionalisation proceeded relatively uncontested. Their volunteer corps 
was accommodated with relative ease into professional or project demands, into the 
standard CBO development repertoire. While the limitations of restricted funding and 
project-based development were plain to see, for the organisation this was a practical 
concern to be managed rather than a cause for deeper political or ideological despair. The 
topography of the institutional terrain favoured perspectives and approaches that had 
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shifted from an antagonistic, oppositional stance towards the Myanmar state and moved 
on to working with it.  
Contingent complementarities or necessary incompatibilities between political values and 
structures became salient for more explicitly politically-oriented civil society.  TYT 
attempted to make full use of the ‘expansion in space’ through retention and 
development of “indigenous” repertoires, alongside articulation of grassroots political 
demands. These attempts hampered the development of the organisation and were 
displaced by liberal approaches more congruent with institutional presuppositions, a 
development informed by proximity to a wide set of professional contacts and 
opportunities. Similar attempts by NEVC to use Myanmar’s post-2011 rights-respecting 
climate for a continuation of the network-based, campaigning approach familiar to 
activists also ran into problems, its integration into a changing political context this time 
hindered by a historical lack of proximity to expert information. Here, the objective 
terrain on which antagonistic values, orientations and imaginations had been long 
premised was argued by some to have fundamentally altered, to such an extent that old 
repertoires of direct action had been wholly delegitimised. 
Decisions on approach, on configuration, on the political vision to be realised through 
their actions can be understood as a response to Lenin’s basic question “What is to be 
done?”, answered in relation to the convergence of organisational contingencies and the 
distinct context presented by the institution of organisation. The decision to abandon, 
adjust or retain earlier normative orientations is informed by the strength of values and 
information from the wider community, but must always encounter the force of objective 
structural selectivities – the basic, expedient ‘facts of the matter’, including the survival of 
the organisation – in the end. At the same time, Myanmar’s rich political, antagonistic 
history means there is no outward uniformity: the case studies demonstrate how, despite 
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confronting the same objective constraints, the different qualities, capacities and values 
of agents make for different outcomes. Far from the straightforward stifling or 
depoliticisation of politically-oriented civil society, a McNGOisation, the institution of 
organisation might offer a more assured platform for continued political work of greater 
quality than previously imaginable. For those with the positioning and strategic acumen to 
make the most out of these circumstances, to push them to their acceptable limits, such 
as TYT, this is indeed a promising era for formal, professional civil society outfits. 
At the same time, this final chapter argues that while the outcomes of NGOisation, as I 
have outlined it here in critical realist terms, may not appear especially ruinous for civil 
society actors, the case studies illuminate a trajectory that is itself political and which 
makes it valuable to step outside the boundaries of the institution of organisation, and to 
critique and contrast its core premises against the NGO’s non-institutionalised other. 
Indeed, as the contradictions noted in Chapter 4 showed, what is problematic about the 
institutionalised space for civil society is that for it to enable, it must at the same time 
disable. In the remainder of this chapter, I follow the analysis in Chapter 4 and the case 
studies in Chapter 5 to show that, whilst the hegemony of the NGO and its attendant 
‘NGOism’ can be understood as part of a broader passive revolution in Myanmar, efforts 
to secure the rights and freedoms for civil society actors in Myanmar remain vital for 
social transformation. At the same time, for rights to be exercised with maximum 
emancipatory effect, a human rights praxis should seek to transform the institutions and 
structures that affect the historical and social value of rights. 
Rights, the state and emancipation 
The development industry is subject to regular shifts in its rules of engagement. Having 
played a crucial role in the New Policy Agenda, the golden age of the international NGO 
may now be coming to an end. Where they were once lauded as key partners for 
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government and their brethren in local civil society for ending poverty and injustice, “they 
are now seen as too close to their governments; anti-politics machines; complicit in being 
part of an aid ‘industry’ that has performed poorly and is unwilling to change; and the 
vanguards of neo-liberal models of development” (Roche and Hewett 2013). Yet whilst 
the international NGO might be hitting hard times, the local NGO appears to be alive and 
well. Indeed, the INGO faces difficult circumstances at least partly because its  
go-between role is under challenge from supporters in rich countries who are looking for 
more direct engagement, from civil society in the south, which in many cases has 
developed greater strength and capacity than Northern INGOs, and from official aid 
donors who are ‘leapfrogging’ INGOs and directly relating to southern civil society (ibid.). 
Given Myanmar’s development challenges and its authoritarian history, it is therefore 
likely that NGOs are going to be a part of the Myanmar landscape for years to come. Yet 
concerns remain, with their prospects uncertain because of systemic factors – insufficient 
funding, staff retention, capacity constraints and an urban-rural skills divide being some of 
the “major challenges” which beset organisations (Asia Development Bank 2015: 8).  
In addition to material worries are continued concerns over protection of rights to 
freedom of association and assembly and their effect on the ‘space for civil society’. For 
example, CIVICUS’ contribution to Myanmar’s Universal Periodic Review in 2015 praised 
the state’s “progressive steps to create an enabling legal environment for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate without undue interference” (2015: 2). Yet 
this continues to be hampered by obstacles to an ecosystem “in accordance with the 
rights ensured by the ICCPR and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders” (2015: 
6), to be remedied by repeal of offending legislation and the better implementation of 
international and domestic law that protects the rights of civil society actors. 
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Two aspects of this approach to civil society development can be noted. Firstly, the focus 
on legal and constitutional reform is characteristic of the global human rights industry, 
which after decades of dictatorial tin ear is now able to contribute to the progress in 
legislation which will yield democracy and human rights. The assumed telos of 
movements for human rights in Myanmar is its institutionalisation in law, rather than the 
development, impact and achievement of human rights in non-legal formations, 
specifically social movements. Pragmatic legal positivism “generates an imperative which 
requires the acceptance of, or at least engagement with, the "realpolitik" of human rights. 
That "realpolitik" is one which is… highly state-centric” (Stammers 1999: 992), the starting 
point for international human rights organisations’ interventions on behalf of civil society. 
On this (dominant) liberal account, the state is understood to be the principal violator or 
essential protector of human rights. It is in large part because of what the state is, and 
what it can do, that rights become both necessary and protected: “Negatively, [human 
rights] prohibit a wide range of state interferences in the personal, social and political 
lives of citizens” (Donnelly 1999: 86). The state that protects human rights knows its 
place, understands the boundaries between it and civil society. It is “an instrumental 
state, one charged with the performance of a set of tasks which, however, do not include 
responsibility for ultimate human fulfillment” (Gellner 1989: 125). CIVICUS’ perspective 
therefore rests on the respecting of fixed boundaries between the instruments and 
institutions of the state and the space of freedom of civil society, for which the law brings 
human rights into concrete form so they can guide the governance of the polity (Dembour 
2010). 
Secondly, and connected to this, what is most ambitious about these liberal diagnoses is 
not simply that action for civil society should seek beneficial change in the way human 
rights are codified and implemented through the law, but that such development is 
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assumed88 as a step towards to the realisation of freedom and democracy. The European 
Union’s Roadmap (2015) for Myanmar’s civil society is explicit in the potential impact of 
the removal of these restrictions: 
Civil society’s ability to participate in the different domains of public life still remains 
restricted in several ways. This is largely due to the political, legal and judicial systems. 
Further political and legal reforms that meet international human rights and rule of law 
standards are therefore necessary before Myanmar civil society can enjoy free and 
unrestricted democratic participation in public life. 
On this liberal account, the resulting rule-bounded space is neutral and free from the 
distortions of power. Furthermore, a number of scholars have made the basic Marxian 
point that the subject of human rights often appears as a prefabricated agent, 
ontologically prior to society rather than shaped through it (see Brown 2000; Gould 2004). 
Yet the preceding chapters have showed this ‘space’ to be structured, its impact 
conditioned by mechanisms and logics that enable and constrain specific types of identity, 
repertoire and, ultimately, normative orientations that are quintessentially liberal in 
character. The codification of freedom of association into law does not simply hold back 
the power of the state but is the premise from which institutions of state power develop 
to manage collective action and through the development of a terrain for civil society. As 
Marx (1985) demonstrated, the impact of law is always conditioned by social structures 
and forces, while rights can only be realised in concrete circumstances when distinctions 
once abstracted away return “to act after their own fashion” (1978: 33). As vital as 
continued efforts to secure basic freedoms are, human rights legal positivism draws us 
away from structural critiques of rights as they operate in concrete social settings. Far 
from evacuating power, the depoliticisation of the ‘realm of freedom’ naturalises it. 
88 CIVICUS, to be fair, do not make this claim directly, but it can be understood as an outcome of the ‘civic 
space’ or ‘enabling environment’. 
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On this account, the state maintains its instrumental role but in overseeing these forces 
acts as “nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie” (Marx 1985: 82), accentuating not its role as protector but as an enabler of 
exploitation. While posing as neutral, the state and the rights it accords underscore the 
power of the property-owning class. This observation also carries normative implications 
for those struggling for social justice, as any action not aimed at the economic base or 
revolutionary action to take over the state would ultimately be futile. This is the basis for 
Leninist frustrations with NGOs, which “work within the system, encouraging more 
'people's' participation and seeking to make minor changes to the existing system, rather 
than seizing state power and building a new political system” (Ungpakorn 2004). It is 
certainly possible, however, to agree with this statement of the problem whilst 
disagreeing with its purported solution. 
On the one hand, therefore, we have a wholly depoliticised, liberal conception of civil 
society, around which the primary concern is the intrusion of the state’s coercive 
machinery. Further legal reform is necessary to reign in its power as principal violator and 
promote its essential protector function. What actors do with their freedom is then a 
function of liberal choice. On the other hand, civil society is so thoroughly politicised that 
the primary task of politically emancipated actors operating in it ought to be exposure of 
the economic base as the primary source of social injustice and mobilisation for their 
destruction. In Myanmar’s current social order, the value that continued emancipation of 
the subject of human rights offers to collective agency in civil society (as opposed to the 
abstract individual that is usually the focus of contention in these debates – see (Roth 
2004; Brenkert 1986) and the victims of injustice can only be properly realised by 




Gramsci, Myanmar civil society and state power  
Between the two poles described above lies the political terrain described in the previous 
chapters, of political agency “which is born on the permanent organic terrain of economic 
life but which transcends it" (Gramsci 1971: 140). The relationship between realms of 
freedom and apparatuses of coercion is far more fluid than the “totemic motifs of civil 
society, state and rights ” (White 1999: 309) suggested either by liberalism or orthodox 
Marxism. Changes in Myanmar’s political system, restoration of the rule of law and 
granting of legal rights and access to material support have ameliorated the material and 
political subjugation of civil society organisations. It is also clear that this emancipation is 
an unfinished job, in part because of its geographical variation – certainly, ethnic and 
conflict-affected regions of Myanmar have benefited far less from human rights progress 
– and, to be sure, continued repressive controls on dissent. Institutionalising mechanisms 
influencing the form of civil society action and organisation have a less visible disciplinary 
impact on civil society action than laws, but have been no less causally real. Therefore, on 
the one hand we can recognise the expansion in the range of rights-promoting and rights-
protecting work civil society actors organise or engage in, the ideas disseminated, their 
mobilising capacity and power to initiate meaningful social, political and economic 
activities. Yet on the other hand, this is only possible thanks to developments in 
Myanmar’s political regime and the new causal relations introduced, which have 
ambivalent effects on political agency and the capacity for certain actors to affect the 
direction of social, political and economic change in Myanmar.  
Democratic reforms saw state doors opened to civil society, a move facilitated by rights, 
material support and the new regime of constitutional democracy. ‘Outside’ of the state, 
it operated according to its own logic and values – challenging the state, ready to topple 
those in charge of its apparatus in a war of movement – but ultimately with little or no 
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influence. In Bhaskar’s terms, this was a move “from an unwanted and unneeded to a 
wanted and needed source of determination” (2009: 115), through the transformation of 
relations usually understood as political emancipation. These new sources of 
determination only partly involve the repressive laws remaining on Myanmar’s statute 
books. More positively, they are an outcome of the ethical and political forms taken up by 
domestic and international power, real relations intended to knit together the forces of 
state, civil society and political society. Yet whilst proving to be a boon in one way for 
Myanmar’s civil society, these new relations constrain just as they enable, and have 
conditioned actions with certain unintended outcomes. In particular, the statist 
assumptions on which civil society now operates bury any imaginaries that would redefine 
the constituent relations of the social formation, the state thereafter figuring as a “real 
abstraction” which “subordinates and organises a civil society that, ‘enwrapped’ by the 
existing political society, can only figure as its subaltern ‘raw material’” (Thomas 2009: 
193). 
Whilst Myanmar might be decades away from a liberal democratic constitutional state, 
institutionalisation has enveloped leading fractions of civil society – I have focused in 
particular on Yangon-based entities – within structural latticeworks that limit action to the 
amelioration of states of affairs, rather than their transformation. Agency proceeds 
according to logics appropriate for a set of supporting structures for sustaining NGOs, 
rather than one which can realise alternative values, despite the ambitious and impressive 
mission statements of actors. Below, I highlight three moments in which this 
subordination can be seen; again, it is important to emphasise the progress this 
constitutes, and further caveats are also noted below. Moreover, the NGO is not the 
terminus for civil society, but a point of departure for its future development. 
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Firstly, despite civil society unification vital to the achievement of consensus and the 
necessary stability for democratic rule, the power of NGOised civil society to achieve 
results is wholly contingent on the predilections and dispositions of political society in its 
allegiance with broader class forces in the historic bloc (see Fernando 2011: 236). Recent 
events have made this painfully obvious to many actors, as the new NLD-led government, 
buoyed by its overwhelming mandate to govern, has redoubled the passivity of the 
revolution begun under the USDP. Not only has it withdrawn many of the informal policy 
input channels that became standard under the Thein Sein government and laid down 
severe restrictions on communication between civil society and its MPs (Interview 43), 
but officials’ disdain towards more outspoken civil society actors have served as a 
reminder of the latter’s subordination. This is compounded by international donors, too, 
as state agencies respond to their host’s communications, passing on pressure to 
organisations dependent on their support: as one representative of a bilateral donor 
agency noted, “If civil society decides to take a more oppositional or “political” approach, 
we and other donors will need to review our core-funding support” (in Desmond 2016: 
13). Despite the success of the NLD owing so much to the sacrifices of those in key 
positions in civil society organisations, realpolitik has taken its toll on civil society and 
revealed the insecure foundations of its power. 
Secondly, whilst representation of popular demands has tended to receive short shrift 
from government and donors, the work of other sections of politically-oriented civil 
society has accelerated. Especially in Yangon and Mandalay, but also in other provincial 
cities, the core work for many such actors continues to centre around voter education, 
election monitoring, work with Union Election Commission officials, constitutional training 
and engagement with other areas of official politics. This has become a crucial area of 
support for donors, overdetermining a ‘natural’ direction of travel for Myanmar’s 
politically motivated, politically informed civil society actors since reform. This sees civil 
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society activity drawn increasingly towards the minutiae of formal institutional 
management, the high politics of NayPyiTaw and away from grassroots mobilisation. As 
the TYT case study demonstrated, bound up in the new configurations of state power, 
much of politically-oriented civil society in Myanmar has become a functional advocate 
for the maintenance of the formal structures of the polity, a service sector for new 
creations of the Constitution and, ultimately, for an alienating politics in which private and 
public life constitute mutually exclusive, sequestered spheres each with their own 
specialist repertoires and logics of action. 
At the same time, given the reality of this organisation of society and politics, scrutiny of 
the processes by which executive power is gained is clearly vital. Continued dominance of 
the Tatmadaw and absence of full democratic control over the entire range of coercive 
apparatus of the Myanmar state makes it perfectly reasonable that these continue to 
exercise the concerns and capacities of well-resourced NGOs. The very containment of 
democracy in public institutions, however, leads to a third observation which highlights 
the urgency for civil society’s recognition of a broader front to its work. As Wood has 
argued, “purely ‘political’ battles, over the power to govern and rule remain unfinished 
until they implicate not only the institutions of the state, but the political powers that 
have been privatised and transferred to the economic sphere” (2012: 30). In Myanmar, 
civil society’s attention on the injustice of arbitrary force in the ‘private’ realm has for the 
most part been limited to the extra-economic power of the military and – albeit less so – 
of crony companies. As earlier chapters have noted, the spoils of market reforms since 
2011, in land speculation, agribusiness, infrastructure and property construction, 
extractives and exports of factory processed goods have fallen largely to the military and 
crony companies.  
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Yet despite popular protests over specific instances of contradictions between 
development, democracy and human rights, such as dam construction, NGOs have 
hitherto rarely challenged relations of market-mediated exploitation and the threats of 
permanent insecurity, inequality and environmental degradation associated with capital 
accumulation. The accumulation regime of the capitalist state is generally off the radar of 
NGO issues: as Fernando notes, “although NGOs regularly claim to challenge the way in 
which the state manages capital accumulation… they do not typically require changes that 
would require a radical transformation in the nature of the capitalist state” (2011: 237). 
As one NGO’s experience in investigating rights abuses at the Myitsone Dam site and the 
Letpadaung Copper Mine, the problem is usually limited to government action: 
There were eleven of us… [The Chinese] would let us meet with different companies who 
have a stake in Letpadaung and Myitsone, they give us their aspect of what’s going on, 
and their problems. As a result, what we found in these visits – we’ve gone twice already – 
is that the companies are quite transparent, they’ve shown us all their financial 
documents, how much they’ve provided the government, what had been signed, what had 
been agreed, and also the environmental assessments they’ve done – independent 
research using Australian companies – and the results show Letpadaung is not 
environmentally damaging. These are information that we never knew. What we realise is 
that it’s the corrupt government that took all the money from these companies, not giving 
to the people who were affected. [The people] did not get what they were supposed to 
get. The mistake the Chinese made is to trust the government (Interview 43). 
Although coalitions of actors may come together and act, sometimes with success – such 
as the postponement of the construction of the Myitsone Dam – an inability to penetrate 
beneath the surface appearance of problems means NGOs rarely deal with their real 
causes, a failure rewarded and compounded by NGOisation. It is never too long until the 
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next outrage appears. Once again, crucial caveats should be noted here, most notably the 
desperate problem of the underdevelopment of productive forces in Myanmar. 
Moreover, an expansion in international contacts in recent years and return of exile actors 
has broadened the terms of political mobilisation and political education well beyond that 
offered by liberal institutions in the 2000s. This was exemplified after 2015 by a popular 
campaign by civil society actors around the European Union negotiations for an 
Investment Protection Agreement that, like similar agreements worldwide, threatens to 
reverse democratic gains (Transnational Institute 2016). Successful in at least forcing its 
delay, the civil society networks responsible also hold the potential to challenge the 
boundaries around institutionalised civil society. 
 
Deploying rights effectively: theory for human rights in the service 
of transformation 
Together with the developments described in the case studies, the power and 
emancipatory potential of civil society appears ambivalent, yet this does not appear to be 
a problem based on rights. The actions taken by CIVICUS and others to seek further 
assurance for the protection of the rights of civil society actors would therefore appear 
not to touch the efficacy of civil society itself. Like NGOs themselves, rights fall short of 
being a magic bullet for freedom and democracy. Yet rather than signaling the relative 
unimportance of rights, this draws attention to the socioeconomic and institutional 
context in which rights come to be exercised, and to the construction of the subjects of 
rights. This is usually absent from the legalistic approach of CIVICUS and other human 
rights groups who have sought the amendment of existing laws or the framing of new 
legislation in pursuit of human rights aims yet is a crucial determinant of the impact of 
rights. Wendy Brown, working from Marx’s critique of the abstract nature of rights, argues 
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that the socially-constructed interests which rights come to serve are naturalised or 
depoliticised, and hence go unnoticed, once attached to rights. In this way, “the liberatory 
or egalitarian force of rights is always historically and culturally circumscribed… the 
measure of their political efficacy requires a high degree of historical and social 
specificity” (Brown 1995: 97). In other words, the interests which rights protect do not 
precede concrete, social circumstances; rather, their value is a function of broader social 
relations through which rights come to be effective or ineffective. Attention therefore, 
should at least be as equally given to the circumstances in which rights come to be valued 
and interests they serve as on the rights themselves.  
I have argued that for certain, leading sections of civil society today those interests are 
bound up in, or endogenous to, a particular institution that scaffolds the space for civil 
society. Rights function to enable organisations to better adjust to the structural 
selectivities of a new latticework of relations that has arisen to serve civil society. They 
empower NGOs to solve their fundamental problems of the material reproduction of the 
organisation, the design and delivery of effective packages of support to beneficiary 
groups, and to gather and present information in order to better deliver advice to 
government. The rights regime supporting Myanmar civil society is now characterised by 
historically novel forces which have not only created this new institution of organisation 
upon rights, but also institutionalised bearers of rights. The material insecurity that is 
solved through project funding by international donors, the absence of political power 
solved by coupling with the state or international actors is integral to the common-sense 
notion that civil society ought to look like a collection of NGOs that are subordinate to the 
state, decoupled from political power and operating under the universal interest captured 
in the rule of law. 
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In this way, to return to Gramsci, rights become harnessed to the hegemonic bloc, with 
hegemony “concerned not just with the construction of a ruling bloc, but with the 
reproduction of the social structures that create the material conditions for such a bloc” 
(Joseph 2003: 125): the hegemonic apparatus developed to serve new freedoms of civil 
society also sets its legitimate political limits. The normative thought implicit in these 
institutional components – and sometimes explicit, such as in the apolitical, technical 
teaching of civil society popular in Myanmar – no longer reflects the emancipatory 
ambitions of the subaltern but rather the political strategy expedient for the maintenance 
of established power. Achieving a consensual fit with these forces rather than 
exacerbating antagonism towards them has involved a complexity of new structures – 
contractual, legal, advisory – between ‘autonomous’ organisations, government and 
international actors in a political-ethical project that has reorganised and modernised the 
relations between state and civil society. As Gramsci puts it, the objective can be 
understood as 
to construct within the shell of political society a complex and well-articulated civil society 
in which the individual governs himself, provided that his self-government does not enter 
into conflict with political society but becomes, rather, its normal continuation, its organic 
complement (Gramsci 2007: 310. In Bieler et al. 2015: 143) 
Civil society’s organisational leaders, its intellectuals, play a crucial role in a praxis that 
largely decouples them from articulating subaltern demands. For many decades, the 
democracy movement discussed in Chapter 3 articulated political interests repressed by 
the militarised crony state. After 1990, many of these actors performed roles as a 
transmission belt for a repressed popular political party in the form of the National 
League for Democracy. The painstaking work of acquiring political knowledge and its 
dissemination was performed through political and also ostensibly apolitical initiatives, in 
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everyday organising that meant the needs and perspectives of the subaltern were both 
known and felt by those in the democracy movement. Such “national popular 
intellectuals” articulated the indignity of political repression coherently and critically and 
led the efforts for political emancipation. Knowledge and reason were therefore grounded 
in a particular kind of “life activity” of the people, an organic body of thought that also 
served to lay the popular intellectual foundation for political leadership at a higher level 
(Fontana 2015). It is this grounding with the subaltern that leads Gramsci to predicate 
these figures as “organic” intellectuals, intellectuals marked by their connectedness or 
proximity to the experience of dominated groups rather than disconnected gurus 
(however venerated they would be by their students). 
The institution of organisation, however, moves them from intellectual and moral 
positions alongside the subaltern and into positions of management and responsibility for 
technical initiatives and interventions remolded by disconnected “traditional” 
intellectuals, in organisations moved by visions and values divorced from concrete 
relations. Each instance of NGOisation seen in the case studies shows how the entities 
which contributed in different ways to the democracy and human rights movement are 
now disciplined within new systemic constraints: in EAW the projectisation, sidelining of 
grassroots forces and financialised notions of empowerment demonstrate clear 
organisational shifts to better accommodate to a market landscape; for TYT, the 
impracticality of an organisational democracy reflects the institutional absence of 
democracy in civil society more widely; while the submission of activities and organisation 
to juridical and political norms in NEVC depicts clearly the difficulties and dilemmas 
involved in thinking or acting – even peacefully – beyond these boundaries. When driven 
by institutional logics rather than values, the intellectuals are slowly lifted out of the 
subaltern fray, and the rights and freedoms associated with civil society activity thereafter 
take on an overwhelmingly insular task – improving capacity, implementing projects, 
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establishing new partnerships, a tendency underpinned by an astonishing depoliticisation 
of civil society in prolific education and training courses. In this way, NGOs can be 
understood to be alienated in both a vernacular sense in that they are removed from the 
everyday reality of the their lives, but more importantly in a Marxist sense, as the 
outcome of political emancipation now articulates forces that renew their subjugation. 
Production and subservience to this general will is therefore the most fundamental way 
civil society dissent is managed. Along with the case studies, these points illustrate the 
deep grounding of the institution of organisation, and its role in a passive revolution that 
has constrained the development of what were once islands of autonomy. Enabled by 
structural forces of NGOisation, “subordinate groups willingly adopt the hegemonic world 
view or parts of it and affirm its ostensible universality through their belief system, 
language, and actions” (Gordon 2006: 165). Structured for activity within projectised 
spaces, hegemonic apparatuses and for the management and mollification of subaltern 
demands rather than their realisation, NGOisation in its most subtle and brutal form 
renders civil society actors both practically and ideologically incapable of adopting a war 
of position and making the kind of structural critique which would emphasise this as their 
predominant political function.  
Antithetical possibilities beyond the institution: networks and the 
subaltern 
 
Yet whilst challenges to the status quo are absorbed by hegemony wrapped in passive 
revolution, this is not the result of any natural equilibrium between societal realms but is 
rather a political achievement requiring “continual construction, maintenance, and 
defence of hegemony in the face of constant resistance and pressures” (Morton 2007: 
97). Just as there is no iron law of NGOisation, there is no inevitable passive revolution; 
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indeed, as Peter Thomas points out, the latter only assumes concrete political form by 
recognition of the threat of de-pacification by counter-hegemonic forces (Thomas 2013), 
a point that can be developed with reference to Myanmar. For whilst the focus of this 
research has been to reveal and critique the development and impact of NGOisation, the 
institution of organisation, on Myanmar’s politically-oriented civil society, despite this 
expansion of the NGO form over the past decade and the inexorable spread of its 
professional and depoliticised logics, civil society is far from exhausted by the NGO and its 
modalities of action. 
As the final case study in Chapter 5 mentioned, networks have begun to gain critical 
attention in Myanmar recently (see Rivers et al. 2016; Phuah et al. 2016). It is as difficult 
(and as methodologically suspect) to generalise networks as much as it is NGOs, yet 
notable characteristics include their tendency to bring a diversity of groups together 
around a common issue, membership size ranging from local to national, positioning 
along a spectrum of professional and formal status, and varying degrees of democratic 
organisation. Some of these networks have become nationally prominent – the National 
Network for Education Reform (NNER), Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and 
Accountability (MATA), Gender Equality Network (GEN), Myanmar Legal Aid Network 
(MLAW) being some of the best known. Whilst their diversity means they are not 
straightforwardly the antithesis of the NGO, the political agency of those that seek to 
directly link and mobilise the subaltern are of particular note. In addition to victims of 
land and resource confiscations, exemplified by the work of Land In Our Hands (LIOH) in 
Chapter 5, we might also highlight networks of students and teachers on education 




Among these networks, civil and political rights serve subaltern interests directly, coming 
to life as vitally important instruments to enable new movement logics beyond the 
institution of organisation. If, as argued above, the actual material importance of human 
rights is down to socially and historically determined needs and interests, then historical 
contingencies can create new interests or grievances and new logics of action in which 
they become vitally important. The destruction caused by accumulation strategies, 
abetted by militarism, produces precisely such material conditions, and when resistance 
here is taken up by the subaltern themselves the possibility opens up for counter-
hegemonic movements. Below I draw attention to three analytical components which, if 
present, may constitute an alternative to NGOised action for social change and open up 
the possibility of radical social transformation. 
Firstly, it can be noted that rights to property protected by the rule of law – “central to all 
that the NLD is about… the 'business end', if you like, of Aung San Suu Kyi's refrain on the 
importance of the 'rule of law'” (Turnell 2015) – have served to threaten livelihoods and 
human security among many movement participants. Civil society and political rights, 
meanwhile, channeled through the institution of organisation, employ these rights in such 
a way that confrontation with this power is avoided. At other times, in circumstances 
when the rules of the game are deemed unimportant, rights enable the development of a 
new movement logic, one inappropriate for or not complementary to the negotiation of 
interests within extant structural relations. Rather, like the earlier social movements seen 
in Chapter 3, it is framed in an antagonistic relation toward established boundaries of 
legitimate action, a discursive move which makes them less responsive or susceptible to 
the structural selectivities that has constrained the emancipatory relevance of NGOised 
actors. This non-alignment may be both accident and design: a non-professional, non-
projectised approach more or less eliminates the survival-led submission to fiduciary 
structures, while unfamiliarity and disinterest with the procedures of political society 
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challenges the strategic orientation to the strictures imposed by advisory relationships 
with government (Interview 50). 
Between the lines of the above paragraph is the possibility of a counter-hegemonic 
movement, against the hegemonic bloc of international and domestic class interests. This 
leads to a second point. This new network movement logic has developed because it is 
organically linked to subaltern leadership, leadership by those who have been at the 
margins of the professional resurrection of civil society; who have been, at best, project 
beneficiaries89. When displaced farmers and workers assume leadership or mobilising 
roles there is a move towards a unity of knowledge of their conditions, needs and 
interests with the feeling and passion of their group. This sees them adopt the social 
function of the intellectual, and in so doing restore non-NGOised values or worlds of 
concern to a place of centrality in social action. These network movements facilitate 
counter-hegemony precisely because they circumvent the pretence of universal interests 
and “common sense” vested in the established structures of power, and are instead 
motivated by subaltern “good sense” (Gramsci 1971: 345-6). In this way the movement is 
not mediated by hegemonic assumptions, and action more reflective of actual material 
needs rather than abstract universals.  
At the same time, both the above points contain voluntarist temptations. To reiterate, 
there is no structural sanctuary – for agents to be effective, their projects must be 
enabled by structures as much as they may be constrained by them. Given its centrality 
for civil society, we might highlight the material reproduction of the network. Funding 
networks in Myanmar has come to mean funding a programme or a cause, rather than 
funding project activities (Interview 50) and “irrespective of whether they are formally 
registered” (Rivers et al. 2016: 6). However empirically distinct this may appear from 
89 This is not to deny the importance that modern development narratives place on participation, but to doubt 
its potential to challenge the structural causes of marginalisation. 
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project funding in NGOised civil society, limitations to the emancipatory potential of 
networks begins to loom, as network subjects become objects, ends in themselves, 
subjugated by refreshed logics of appropriateness within the confines of existing social 
relations rather than strategies to overcome these. The reproductive requirements of the 
network are, of course, fundamentally different to those of farmers or workers, and as 
one comes to displace and dominate the other, the generative mechanism of the logic of 
movement is countered by logics of appropriateness linked to the selectivities of existing 
structures. Indeed, NGOist subordination is present in the reports referred to above: 
networks sought “recognition and space”, while evidence of effectiveness lies in the 
achievements of their policy advocacy engagements (Phuah et al. 2016: 44-47).  
In this way, once again, they influence power holders without necessarily challenging the 
structural sources of this power. Whilst such mediatory gains are of strategic importance, 
successful counter-hegemony demands structural change. This, then, leads to a third 
point. As a post-NGO, pro-network sentiment begins to gain traction among both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic civil society advocates in Myanmar, albeit for 
different reasons, it is important not to lose sight of the structural and material conditions 
in which these movements arise and against which interests and demands are related. As 
expressed, these are many and varied - like NGOs, networks or social movements do not 
obviously have a shared political ambition. Yet far from drawing links through floating 
signifiers amongst a radical plurality of actors at the level of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985), connections might be sought in the issues they confront and a unified interest in 
overcoming their structural basis (Carroll and Ratner 1994). Links between those in land, 
environmental, labour and peace movements are likely to be substantive and objective, 
and refer specifically to the totalising dynamic of capital and its accommodation with 
Myanmar’s continued militarism.  
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Unlike NGOs, there are no structurally-driven interests for accommodation with relations 
of subordination. Rather, the projects of networks such as LIOH appear to hinge around 
transfoming the structures they confront: “democratic control of land, community of self-
determination, self-administration… [the community] fulfils their right to the land” 
(Interview 50). Given these demands and the nature of the structure confronted, mere 
amelioration appears a tall order, but attempts have been made. For example, 
representations and input from a wide variety of civil society actors into Myanmar’s 2016 
National Land Use Policy (NLUP), led to recognition of customary rights to land and the 
inclusion of human rights standards in the text, something absent from the laws 
developed under the Thein Sein administration. At the same time, the NLUP also made 
explicit the role of the state, “the ultimate owner of all lands in the Union”, in enabling 
their market exploitation by “enact[ing] necessary law to supervise extraction and 
utilisation of State-owned natural resources by economic forces” (2016: 4). Whilst human 
rights standards and capitalism appear to balance one another in the text, the political 
economy of the totalising logic of capital, its internal expansionary dynamics, indicates the 
outcome will be determined by the forces of capital and the expression of private, 
coercive power without public responsibility, rendering existing moral economies 
chronically unstable. 
The difference between the vague, hopeful rhetoric around sustainable development that 
make up the vision and mission statements of organisations like EAW, and the demands 
of networks such as LIOH – “Land for people, not for profit” – is the relation of social ills to 
their structural origin, and a praxis built around their elimination. In this way, such 
counter-hegemonic movements have a non-utopian character. Of course, that such a 
social and political transformation is understood as desirable neither makes it achievable 
nor viable (Olin Wright 2009). Political agency can be consciously directed towards 
building an order constituted by particular social structures, with social goods expected to 
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be generated by the mechanisms so emergent, but these might not yield expected 
consequences. Such openness is something which can never be wholly avoided; it is not a 
reason for inaction – certainly, capital does not shy away from creating markets over 
concerns for their contradictions – but it is a demand for clear-headedness, insight and, 
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